-
6In this contribution we discuss Gallagher's and Zahavi's project of naturalization of phenomenology. In their book The Phenomenological Mind, they aim at intertwining the phenomenological method with a number of results from the field of cognitive sciences. Nevertheless, one could oppose that such a project is based upon a metaphysical assumption: indeed, if mental states belong to nature, they should be approached by natural sciences. This paper replies to this objection by emphasizing how Gall…Read more
-
5Mark Textor (Ed.): The Austrian Contribution to Analytic Philosophy. (London Studies in the History of Philosophy). London, New York: Routledge 2006. ISBN-13: 978-0415404051; £ 60.00, $ 100.00 (hardback); 336 pages (review)History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 11 (1): 234-237. 2008.
-
32I hate you. On hatred and its paradigmatic formsPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 20 (4): 617-633. 2020.In a recent paper, Thomas Szanto develops an account of hatred, according to which the target of this attitude, paradigmatically, is a representative of a group or a class. On this account, hatred overgeneralises its target, has a blurred affective focus, is co-constituted by an outgroup/ingroup distinction, and is accompanied by a commitment for the subject to stick to the hostile attitude. While this description captures an important form of hatred, this paper claims that it does not do justic…Read more
-
Communities and Values. Dietrich von Hildebrand’s Social OntologyIn Alessandro Salice & Hans Bernhard Schmid (eds.), The Phenomenological Approach to Social Reality: History, Concepts, Problems, Springer Verlag. 2016.
-
48The Phenomenological Approach to Social Reality: History, Concepts, Problems (edited book)Springer Verlag. 2016.What kind of reality is legal reality, how is it created, and what are its a priori foundations? These are the central questions asked by the early phenomenologists who took interest in social ontology and law. While Reinach represents the well-known “realist” approach to phenomenology of law, Felix Kaufmann and Fritz Schreier belonged to the “positivist” “Vienna School of Jurisprudence,” combining Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law with Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology—and thereby challenging Reina…Read more
-
The Construction of Social Facts and Cultural MeaningsPhainomena 70In my paper I investigate a particular class of objects, i.e. the so called “cultural” objects. I argue that all cultural objects are social objects, but not all social objects are cultural. Social objects are observer relative as cultural objects too, but cultural objects show an intrinsic dependence to social groups and their cultures which does not obtain in the case of social objects. The investigation is concerned with concrete cultural objects mainly and its conclusion is that a concrete s…Read more
-
11Husserl and Disjunctivism RevisitedHusserl Studies 40 (2): 171-188. 2024.In a recent series of important papers, Søren Overgaard has defended a disjunctivist reading of Edmund Husserl’s theory of perception. According to Overgaard, Husserl commits to disjunctivism when arguing that hallucination intrinsically differs from perception because only experiences of the latter kind carry singular content and, thereby, pick out individuals. This paper rejects that interpretation by invoking the theory of intentionality developed by Husserl in the Logical Investigations. It …Read more
-
48Based on a qualitative study about expert musicianship, this paper distinguishes three ways of interacting by putting them in relation to the sense of agency. Following Pacherie, it highlights that the phenomenology of shared agency undergoes a drastic transformation when musicians establish a sense of we-agency. In particular, the musicians conceive of the performance as one single action towards which they experience an epistemic privileged access. The implications of these results for a theor…Read more
-
18Condividere un’emozioneRivista di Estetica 60 104-120. 2015.Negli ultimi anni, un dibattito sempre più intenso si è sviluppato attorno alla nozione di intenzionalità collettiva o intenzionalità del noi. In questo dibattito, che coinvolge non soltanto la filosofia, ma anche molte discipline empiriche, emergono domande quali la possibilità di condividere attitudini cognitive (credenze, atti di accettazione…) o di natura conativa (intenzioni, desideri…) da parte di una pluralità di individui. Eppure, solo di recente l'interesse si è rivolto verso la condivi…Read more
-
19The we and its many forms: Kurt Stavenhagen’s contribution to social phenomenologyBritish Journal for the History of Philosophy 28 (6): 1094-1115. 2020.‘We’ is said in many ways. This paper investigates Kurt Stavenhagen’s neglected account of different kinds of ‘we’, which is maintained to be one of the most sophisticated within classical phenomen...
-
30Editorial NoteJournal of Social Ontology 1 (1). 2015.Social Ontology encompasses a wide variety of inquiries into the nature, structure and perhaps essence of social phenomena, and their role and place in our world. Topics of research in Social Ontology range from small-scale interactions to large-scale institutions, from spontaneous teamwork to the functioning of formal organizations, and from unintended consequences to institutional design. Social Ontology brings together theoretical work from a large number of disciplines. This rapidly evolving…Read more
-
9The Disrupted 'We': Schizophrenia and Collective IntentionalityJournal of Consciousness Studies 22 (7-8): 145-171. 2015.In various ways, schizophrenia seems to involve an anomalous form of collective intentionality. Many patients report notable difficulties in establishing and maintaining relationships to others, which often may lead to social withdrawal, isolation, and pro-found feelings of solitude. What is puzzling is of course not that patients, despite their interpersonal difficulties, participate in or try to participate in various social activities, but that some of these social activities appear quite tol…Read more
-
93Pride, Shame, and Group IdentificationFrontiers in Psychology 7. 2016.Self-conscious emotions such as shame and pride are emotions that typically focus on the self of the person who feels them. In other words, the intentional object of these emotions is assumed to be the subject that experiences them. Many reasons speak in its favor and yet this account seems to leave a question open: how to cash out those cases in which one genuinely feels ashamed or proud of what someone else does? This paper contends that such cases do not necessarily challenge the idea that sh…Read more
-
60Violence as a social factPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1): 161-177. 2014.This paper describes a class of social acts called “violent acts” and distinguishes them from damaging acts. The former are successfully performed if they are apprehended by the victim, while the latter, being not social, are successful only as long as the intended damage is realized. It is argued that violent acts, if successful, generate a social relation which include the aggressor, the victim and, if the concomitant damaging act is satisfied, the damage itself
-
62Self-Esteem, Social Esteem, and PrideEmotion Review 12 (3): 193-205. 2020.This article explores self-esteem as an episodic self-conscious emotion. Episodic self-esteem is first distinguished from trait self-esteem, which is described as an enduring state related to the subject’s sense of self-worth. Episodic self-esteem is further compared with pride by claiming that the two attitudes differ in crucial respects. Importantly, episodic self-esteem—but not pride—is a function of social esteem: in episodic self-esteem, the subject evaluates herself in the same way in whic…Read more
-
Practical intentionality: from Brentano to the phenomenology of the Munich and Göttingen circlesIn Dan Zahavi (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the History of Phenomenology, Oxford University Press. 2018.
-
121The Phenomenality and Intentional Structure of We-ExperiencesTopoi 41 (1): 1-11. 2020.When you and I share an experience, each of us lives through a we-experience. The paper claims that we-experiences have unique phenomenality and structure. First, we-experiences’ phenomenality is characterised by the fact that they feel like ours to their subject. This specific phenomenality is contended to derive from the way these experiences self-represent: a we-experience exemplifies us-ness or togetherness because it self-represents as mine qua ours. Second, living through a we-experience t…Read more
-
56Social epistemological conception of delusionSynthese 199 (1-2): 1831-1851. 2020.The dominant conception of delusion in psychiatry (in textbooks, research papers, diagnostic manuals, etc.) is predominantly epistemic. Delusions are almost always characterized in terms of their epistemic defects, i.e., defects with respect to evidence, reasoning, judgment, etc. However, there is an individualistic bias in the epistemic conception; the alleged epistemic defects and abnormalities in delusions relate to individualistic epistemic processes rather than social epistemic processes. W…Read more
-
Social Reality – The Phenomenological ApproachIn Alessandro Salice & Hans Bernhard Schmid (eds.), The Phenomenological Approach to Social Reality: History, Concepts, Problems, Springer Verlag. 2016.
-
35Putting Plural Self-Awareness into Practice: The Phenomenology of Expert MusicianshipTopoi 38 (1): 197-209. 2019.Based on a qualitative study about expert musicianship, this paper distinguishes three ways of interacting by putting them in relation to the sense of agency. Following Pacherie, it highlights that the phenomenology of shared agency undergoes a drastic transformation when musicians establish a sense of we-agency. In particular, the musicians conceive of the performance as one single action towards which they experience an epistemic privileged access. The implications of these results for a theor…Read more
-
18The we and its many forms: Kurt Stavenhagen’s contribution to social phenomenologyBritish Journal for the History of Philosophy 28 (6): 1094-1115. 2020.ABSTRACT ‘We’ is said in many ways. This paper investigates Kurt Stavenhagen’s neglected account of different kinds of ‘we’, which is maintained to be one of the most sophisticated within classical phenomenology. The paper starts by elaborating on the phenomenological distinction between mass, society, and community by claiming that individuals partake in episodes of experiential sharing only within communities. Stavenhagen conceptualizes experiential sharing as a meshing of conscious experience…Read more
-
40Social Ontology as Embedded in the Tradition of Phenomenological RealismIn Michael Schmitz, Beatrice Kobow & Hans Bernhard Schmid (eds.), The Background of Social Reality: Selected Contributions from the Inaugural Meeting of ENSO, Springer. pp. 217--232. 2013.
-
45Group-Directed Empathy: A Phenomenological AccountJournal of Phenomenological Psychology 46 (2): 163-184. 2015.This paper is an attempt to build a bridge between the fields of social cognition and social ontology. Drawing on both classical and more recent phenomenological studies, the article develops an account ofgroup-directed empathy. The first part of the article spells out the phenomenological notion of empathy and suggests certain conceptual distinctions vis-à-vis two different kinds of group. The second part of the paper applies these conceptual considerations to cases in which empathy is directed…Read more
-
102The Phenomenality and Intentional Structure of We-ExperiencesTopoi 41 (1): 195-205. 2020.When you and I share an experience, each of us lives through a we-experience. The paper claims that we-experiences have unique phenomenality and structure. First, we-experiences’ phenomenality is characterised by the fact that they feel like ours to their subject. This specific phenomenality is contended to derive from the way these experiences self-represent: a we-experience exemplifies us-ness or togetherness because it self-represents as mine qua ours. Second, living through a we-experience t…Read more
-
28Social Acts and Communities: Walther Between Husserl and ReinachIn Antonio Calcagno (ed.), Gerda Walther’s Phenomenology of Sociality, Psychology, and Religion, Springer Verlag. pp. 27-46. 2018.The chapter contextualizes and reconstructs Walther’s theory of social acts. In her view a given act qualifies as social if it is performed in the name of or on behalf of a community. Interestingly, Walther’s understanding of that notion is patently at odds with the idea of a social act originally propounded by Reinach. According to Reinach, an act is social if it “addresses” other persons and if it, for its success, requires them to grasp it. We claim that to explain Walther’s reconfiguration o…Read more
-
6The Phenomenological Approach to Social Reality: History, Concepts, Problems (edited book)Imprint: Springer. 2016.This volume features fourteen essays that examine the works of key figures within the phenomenological movement in a clear and accessible way. It presents the fertile, groundbreaking, and unique aspects of phenomenological theorizing against the background of contemporary debate about social ontology and collective intentionality. The expert contributors explore the insights of such thinkers as Martin Heidegger, Edmund Husserl, Adolf Reinach, and Max Scheler. Readers will also learn about other …Read more
Alessandro Salice
University College Cork