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19The we and its many forms: Kurt Stavenhagen’s contribution to social phenomenologyBritish Journal for the History of Philosophy 28 (6): 1094-1115. 2020.‘We’ is said in many ways. This paper investigates Kurt Stavenhagen’s neglected account of different kinds of ‘we’, which is maintained to be one of the most sophisticated within classical phenomen...
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78The Phenomenality and Intentional Structure of We-ExperiencesTopoi 41 (1): 195-205. 2020.When you and I share an experience, each of us lives through a we-experience. The paper claims that we-experiences have unique phenomenality and structure. First, we-experiences’ phenomenality is characterised by the fact that they feel like ours to their subject. This specific phenomenality is contended to derive from the way these experiences self-represent: a we-experience exemplifies us-ness or togetherness because it self-represents as mine qua ours. Second, living through a we-experience t…Read more
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26Social Acts and Communities: Walther Between Husserl and ReinachIn Antonio Calcagno (ed.), Gerda Walther’s Phenomenology of Sociality, Psychology, and Religion, Springer Verlag. pp. 27-46. 2018.The chapter contextualizes and reconstructs Walther’s theory of social acts. In her view a given act qualifies as social if it is performed in the name of or on behalf of a community. Interestingly, Walther’s understanding of that notion is patently at odds with the idea of a social act originally propounded by Reinach. According to Reinach, an act is social if it “addresses” other persons and if it, for its success, requires them to grasp it. We claim that to explain Walther’s reconfiguration o…Read more
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5The Phenomenological Approach to Social Reality: History, Concepts, Problems (edited book)Imprint: Springer. 2016.This volume features fourteen essays that examine the works of key figures within the phenomenological movement in a clear and accessible way. It presents the fertile, groundbreaking, and unique aspects of phenomenological theorizing against the background of contemporary debate about social ontology and collective intentionality. The expert contributors explore the insights of such thinkers as Martin Heidegger, Edmund Husserl, Adolf Reinach, and Max Scheler. Readers will also learn about other …Read more
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46Social facts: metaphysical and empirical perspectives—an introductionPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1): 1-5. 2014.Mind reading (i.e. the ability to infer the mental state of another agent) is taken to be the main cognitive ability required to share an intention and to collaborate. In this paper, I argue that another cognitive ability is also necessary to collaborate: representing others’ and ones’ own goals from a third-person perspective (other-centred or allocentric representation of goals). I argue that allocentric mind reading enables the cognitive ability of goal adoption, i.e. having the goal that ano…Read more
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18Editorial NoteJournal of Social Ontology 1 (1). 2015.Social Ontology encompasses a wide variety of inquiries into the nature, structure and perhaps essence of social phenomena, and their role and place in our world. Topics of research in Social Ontology range from small-scale interactions to large-scale institutions, from spontaneous teamwork to the functioning of formal organizations, and from unintended consequences to institutional design. Social Ontology brings together theoretical work from a large number of disciplines. This rapidly evolving…Read more
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9The Disrupted 'We': Schizophrenia and Collective IntentionalityJournal of Consciousness Studies 22 (7-8): 145-171. 2015.In various ways, schizophrenia seems to involve an anomalous form of collective intentionality. Many patients report notable difficulties in establishing and maintaining relationships to others, which often may lead to social withdrawal, isolation, and pro-found feelings of solitude. What is puzzling is of course not that patients, despite their interpersonal difficulties, participate in or try to participate in various social activities, but that some of these social activities appear quite tol…Read more
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87Pride, Shame, and Group IdentificationFrontiers in Psychology 7. 2016.Self-conscious emotions such as shame and pride are emotions that typically focus on the self of the person who feels them. In other words, the intentional object of these emotions is assumed to be the subject that experiences them. Many reasons speak in its favor and yet this account seems to leave a question open: how to cash out those cases in which one genuinely feels ashamed or proud of what someone else does? This paper contends that such cases do not necessarily challenge the idea that sh…Read more
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59Violence as a social factPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1): 161-177. 2014.This paper describes a class of social acts called “violent acts” and distinguishes them from damaging acts. The former are successfully performed if they are apprehended by the victim, while the latter, being not social, are successful only as long as the intended damage is realized. It is argued that violent acts, if successful, generate a social relation which include the aggressor, the victim and, if the concomitant damaging act is satisfied, the damage itself
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51Self-Esteem, Social Esteem, and PrideEmotion Review 12 (3): 193-205. 2020.This article explores self-esteem as an episodic self-conscious emotion. Episodic self-esteem is first distinguished from trait self-esteem, which is described as an enduring state related to the subject’s sense of self-worth. Episodic self-esteem is further compared with pride by claiming that the two attitudes differ in crucial respects. Importantly, episodic self-esteem—but not pride—is a function of social esteem: in episodic self-esteem, the subject evaluates herself in the same way in whic…Read more
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Practical intentionality: from Brentano to the phenomenology of the Munich and Göttingen circlesIn Dan Zahavi (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the History of Phenomenology, Oxford University Press. 2018.
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97The Phenomenality and Intentional Structure of We-ExperiencesTopoi 41 (1): 1-11. 2020.When you and I share an experience, each of us lives through a we-experience. The paper claims that we-experiences have unique phenomenality and structure. First, we-experiences’ phenomenality is characterised by the fact that they feel like ours to their subject. This specific phenomenality is contended to derive from the way these experiences self-represent: a we-experience exemplifies us-ness or togetherness because it self-represents as mine qua ours. Second, living through a we-experience t…Read more
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51Social epistemological conception of delusionSynthese 199 (1-2): 1831-1851. 2020.The dominant conception of delusion in psychiatry (in textbooks, research papers, diagnostic manuals, etc.) is predominantly epistemic. Delusions are almost always characterized in terms of their epistemic defects, i.e., defects with respect to evidence, reasoning, judgment, etc. However, there is an individualistic bias in the epistemic conception; the alleged epistemic defects and abnormalities in delusions relate to individualistic epistemic processes rather than social epistemic processes. W…Read more
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Social Reality – The Phenomenological ApproachIn Alessandro Salice & Hans Bernhard Schmid (eds.), The Phenomenological Approach to Social Reality, Springer Verlag. 2016.
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34Putting Plural Self-Awareness into Practice: The Phenomenology of Expert MusicianshipTopoi 38 (1): 197-209. 2019.Based on a qualitative study about expert musicianship, this paper distinguishes three ways of interacting by putting them in relation to the sense of agency. Following Pacherie, it highlights that the phenomenology of shared agency undergoes a drastic transformation when musicians establish a sense of we-agency. In particular, the musicians conceive of the performance as one single action towards which they experience an epistemic privileged access. The implications of these results for a theor…Read more
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17The we and its many forms: Kurt Stavenhagen’s contribution to social phenomenologyBritish Journal for the History of Philosophy 28 (6): 1094-1115. 2020.ABSTRACT ‘We’ is said in many ways. This paper investigates Kurt Stavenhagen’s neglected account of different kinds of ‘we’, which is maintained to be one of the most sophisticated within classical phenomenology. The paper starts by elaborating on the phenomenological distinction between mass, society, and community by claiming that individuals partake in episodes of experiential sharing only within communities. Stavenhagen conceptualizes experiential sharing as a meshing of conscious experience…Read more
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40Social Ontology as Embedded in the Tradition of Phenomenological RealismIn Michael Schmitz, Beatrice Kobow & Hans Bernhard Schmid (eds.), The Background of Social Reality, Springer. pp. 217--232. 2013.
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45Group-Directed Empathy: A Phenomenological AccountJournal of Phenomenological Psychology 46 (2): 163-184. 2015.This paper is an attempt to build a bridge between the fields of social cognition and social ontology. Drawing on both classical and more recent phenomenological studies, the article develops an account ofgroup-directed empathy. The first part of the article spells out the phenomenological notion of empathy and suggests certain conceptual distinctions vis-à-vis two different kinds of group. The second part of the paper applies these conceptual considerations to cases in which empathy is directed…Read more
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73Consciousness, belief, and the group mind hypothesisSynthese 198 (2): 1-25. 2019.According to the Group Mind Hypothesis, a group can have beliefs over and above the beliefs of the individual members of the group. Some maintain that there can be group mentality of this kind in the absence of any group-level phenomenal consciousness. We present a challenge to the latter view. First, we argue that a state is not a belief unless the owner of the state is disposed to access the state’s content in a corresponding conscious judgment. Thus, if there is no such thing as group conscio…Read more
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2Ontologia degli oggetti culturaliRivista di Estetica 36 (36): 181-198. 2007.1 La relatività a una cultura Negli ultimi anni si parla pressoché quotidianamente di “differenze” o “caratteristiche” culturali. Queste espressioni vengono spesso impiegate in contesti prefilosofici senza una chiara esplicazione del loro riferimento. Uno sguardo più attento può tuttavia rilevare che il semplice aggettivo “culturale” prescrive delle condizioni di verità aggiuntive alle proposizioni che lo contengono. Così, ad esempio:(1) la simmetria è un criterio culturale di bellezza classi...
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10Giudizio ed esistenza: Schröder, Husserl e Meinong. Introduzione al carteggio tra Meinong e HusserlRivista di Estetica 40 149-167. 2009.1. Un incontro mancato I legami tra Edmund Husserl e Alexius Meinong, e più in generale tra fenomenologia tedesca e teoria degli oggetti, narrano una storia per certi versi paradossale, che vede i due brillanti allievi e caustici critici di Franz Brentano percorrere per un lungo periodo di tempo binari di pensiero non lontani gli uni dagli altri, in certi momenti persino paralleli, per poi divergere proprio nel momento in cui le loro conclusioni andavano consolidandosi, aprendo la strada a un...
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33Collective Intentionality and the Collective Person in Max SchelerIn Harald A. Wiltsche & Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl (eds.), Analytic and Continental Philosophy: Methods and Perspectives. Proceedings of the 37th International Wittgenstein Symposium, De Gruyter. pp. 277-288. 2016.
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Joint Commitments and Group Identification in Human-Robot InteractionIn Raul Hakli & Johanna Seibt (eds.), Sociality and Normativity for Robots. Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality., Springer. 2017.
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44Practical intentionality: from Brentano to the phenomenology of the Munich and Göttingen CirclesIn Dan Zahavi (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the History of Phenomenology, Oxford University Press. pp. 604-622. 2018.The aim of this chapter is to mine, reconstruct, and evaluate the phenomenological notion of practical intentionality. It is claimed that the phenomenologists of the Munich and Göttingen Circles substantially modify the idea of practical intentionality originally developed by Franz Brentano. This development, it is further contended, anticipates the switch that occurred within contemporary theory of action from a belief-desire to a belief-desire-intention model of deliberation. While Brentanoâ s…Read more
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43Edmund Husserl: Untersuchungen zur Urteilstheorie . Texte aus dem Nachlass ( 1893 – 1918 ), ed. Robin Rollinger (review)Husserl Studies 27 (2): 161-166. 2011.
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45Emotional Self-Knowledge (edited book)Routledge. 2023.This volume sheds light on the affective dimensions of self-knowledge and the roles that emotions and other affective states play in promoting or obstructing our knowledge of ourselves. It is the first book specifically devoted to the issue of affective self-knowledge. The relation between self-knowledge and human emotions is an often emphasized, but poorly articulated one. While philosophers of emotion tend to give affectivity a central role in making us who we are, the philosophical literature…Read more
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La nozione di Aussersein nella teoria degli oggetti di Alexius MeinongRivista di Estetica 44 (3). 2004.
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14Group identification, joint attention, and preferences: a cluster of minimal pre-conditions for joint actionsPhilosophical Psychology. forthcoming.An important thesis discussed in the literature on shared agency is that group identification motivates pre-school children to act together. This paper aims at further illuminating this thesis by clarifying what triggers the process of group identification in young children. It is argued that joint attention, among other functions in supporting joint actions, can reveal to the co-attenders that they share some preferences. Since sharing preferences has been established by the literature to be a …Read more
Alessandro Salice
University College Cork