• Two Observations About S5
    Mathematical Logic Quarterly 23 (36): 485-486. 1976.
  • Two Observations About S5
    Zeitschrift fur mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik 23 (36): 485-486. 1977.
  • D-Validity in Predicate Logic with Individual Constants
    International Logic Review 35 28. 1987.
  • An introduction to logic
    Philosophia 18 (2-3): 303-308. 1988.
  • A note on pleasure
    Journal of Value Inquiry 25 (October): 367-70. 1991.
  • A Formalization Of A Segment I Of Spinoza's Ethics
    Alex Blum and S. Malinovich
    Metalogicon 1 1-14. 1993.
  • On the cannot of infallibility
    Sophia 44 (1): 125-127. 2005.
    We content that a very seductive argument for theological fatalism fails. In the course of our discussion we point out that theological fatalism is incompatible with the existence of a being who is omnipotent, omniscient and infallible. We end by suggesting that ‘possible’ formalized as ‘◊’ is to be understood as ‘can or could have been’ and not simply as ‘can’. The argument we discuss conflates the two.
  • Stanley Malinovich, 1933-2004
    Alex Blum and Sidney Gendin
    Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 78 (5). 2005.
  • A note on theological fatalism1
    Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 14 (2): 143-147. 2007.
    We contend that a very seductive argument for theological fatalism fails. In the course of our discussion we point out that theological fatalism is incompatible with the existence of a being who is omnipotent, omniscient and infallible. We suggest that ‘possible’ formalized as ‘◊’ is to be understood as ‘can or could have been’ and not simply as ‘can’. The argument we discuss conflates the two. We end by rounding out, hope-fully, some left over corners of serious concern to the theist
  • We show how second order logic incompleteness follows from incompleteness of arithmetic, as proved by Gödel
  • Sortals and paradox
    Philosophical Studies 22 (3). 1971.
  • The Kantian versus Frankfurt
    Analysis 60 (3). 2000.
  • Discussion: Tractatus 2.063
    Philosophical Investigations 12 (4): 325-326. 1989.
  • Bayne on Kripke
    Philosophia 19 (4): 455-456. 1989.
  • An Anomaly in the D–N Model of Explanation
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (3): 365-367. 1989.
    It is argued that the constraints placed on the non-law premisses of a D–N explanation are irrelevant to their function and will not salvage the deductive requirement from triviality.
  • A note on natural deduction
    Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 15 (2): 349-350. 1974.
  • Quine on an alleged non sequitur
    Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 22 (3): 249-250. 1981.
  • The core of the consequence argument
    Dialectica 57 (4): 423-429. 2003.
    We suggest that the classical version of the consequence argument contending that freedom and determinism are incompatible subtly misstates the core intuition, which is that if a true conditional and a true antecedent are jointly beyond our control, then so is the consequent. We show however that the improved version no less than the classical implies fatalism.Interestingly, the reasoning, that yields fatalism, undermines a direct argument for the soundness of the improved version. But if fatali…Read more
  • Simple and compound statements
    Logique Et Analyse 20 (77): 165. 1977.
  • 'Tractatus 2.063'-discussion
    Philosophical Investigations 12 (4): 325-326. 1989.
  • The Kantian versus Frankfurt
    Analysis 60 (3): 287-288. 2000.
  • The Core of the Consequence Argument
    Dialectica 57 (4): 423-429. 2003.
    We suggest that the classical version of the consequence argument contending that freedom and determinism are incompatible subtly misstates the core intuition, which is that if a true conditional and a true antecedent are jointly beyond our control, then so is the consequent. We show however that the improved version no less than the classical implies fatalism.Interestingly, the reasoning, that yields fatalism, undermines a direct argument for the soundness of the improved version. But if fatali…Read more
  • The Hidden Future
    Symposion. Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences. forthcoming.
    Alex Blum ABSTRACT: We argue that the part of the future which is up to us is in principle unknowable. Download PDF.
  • The Hidden Future
    Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 5 (1): 9-10. 2018.
    We argue that the part of the future which is up to us is in principle unknowable.
  • Can It Be that Tully=Cicero?
    Symposion. Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences. forthcoming.
    Alex Blum ABSTRACT: We show, that given two fundamental theses of Kripke, no statement of the form ‘‘a=b’ is necessarily true’, is true, if ‘a’ and ‘b’ are distinct rigid designators. Download PDF.
  • The Force of Truth1
    Philosophical Investigations 34 (4): 393-395. 2011.
    The theme of the paper is that what is true cannot be false and conversely. This position was anticipated by Aristotle in De Interpretatione and by G. H. von Wright. The latter calls it “a truth of the logic of relative modalities.”Aristotle has been taken to task by Susan Haack and others for arguing fallaciously from the Principle of Bivalence, that every statement is either true or false, to fatalism. The implication holds, but we show that it is unreasonable to assume that Aristotle grounded…Read more
  • The Force of Truth
    Philosophical Investigations 34 (4): 393-395. 2011.
    The theme of the paper is that what is true cannot be false and conversely. This position was anticipated by Aristotle in De Interpretatione and by G. H. von Wright. The latter calls it “a truth of the logic of relative modalities.”Aristotle has been taken to task by Susan Haack and others for arguing fallaciously from the Principle of Bivalence, that every statement is either true or false, to fatalism. The implication holds, but we show that it is unreasonable to assume that Aristotle grounded…Read more
  • Can It Be that Tully=Cicero?
    Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 4 (2): 149-150. 2017.
    We show, that given two fundamental theses of Kripke, no statement of the form ‘‘a=b’ is necessarily true’, is true, if ‘a’ and ‘b’ are distinct rigid designators.