In this paper, I provide a new solution to the “gamer’s dilemma” (Luck in Ethics Inf Technol 11(1):31–36, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-008-9168-4, 2009) which is an open problem at the intersection of ethics and aesthetics: the problem consists in reconciling two widespread moral intuitions about virtual actions, i.e. that virtual murder is morally permissible whereas virtual paedophilia is not. To solve the problem, I apply a well-known notion coming from the philosophy of fiction, viz. imagi…
Read moreIn this paper, I provide a new solution to the “gamer’s dilemma” (Luck in Ethics Inf Technol 11(1):31–36, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-008-9168-4, 2009) which is an open problem at the intersection of ethics and aesthetics: the problem consists in reconciling two widespread moral intuitions about virtual actions, i.e. that virtual murder is morally permissible whereas virtual paedophilia is not. To solve the problem, I apply a well-known notion coming from the philosophy of fiction, viz. imaginative resistance, which I adapt as ludic resistance. Connecting the two bodies of literature (the philosophy of fiction and the philosophy of video games) is original and, I argue, helpful: first, it solves the problem under discussion; second, it provides a way of looking back at imaginative resistance in an interesting new light. In (video) games, as opposed to traditional, non-ludic fictions, ”resistance” is interpreted against an implicit notion of agency.