Alex Lenferna

A commonly held view is that giving to the poor is superogatory i.e., that while it is a good thing to do, it is not morally wrong for us not to do so. This essay sets out to show that for the affluent in the world giving to the poor is not superogatory but is rather a moral obligation. The paper critiques Singer's famous argument in ‘Famine, Affluence and Morality’ and finds that although the argument is a cogent and powerful one, Singer, when trying to apply the argument to how we should act, somewhat skews the argument's real implications. Furthermore, it is argued that a cosmopolitan concern for the global poor is the morally correct response to have, and the author defends this view by examining the proper effect that aspects like geographical distance, nationality, reciprocity, and the nature of the global economic system should have on our moral considerations. In conclusion, it is argued that since the way that each person utilises his/her resources is a reflection of what he/she values, then for many of us in positions of affluence, in order to be moral, much more should be done in order to help those experiencing dire, life-threatening poverty across the globe.1

This thesis aims to critique the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth and its underlying moral justification in order to provide a stronger and improved version of both. In Chapter 1 I explore what sort of moral justification is necessary to establish the Universal Declaration on firm grounds and explore its relation to environmental ethics and rights discourse. I argue that a non-anthropocentric perspective is necessary to justify the Universal Declaration’s rights. In Chapter 2 I explore the underlying justification of the Universal Declaration as discovered in the works of Cormac Cullinan and Father Thomas Berry. I argue that their ethical framework is indeterminate, has many ambiguities and uncertainties, and, among other problems, it does not provide a clear action-guiding framework. In Chapter 3 I develop an alternative justification for the Universal Declaration. I argue against many predominant moral theories, that in light of our best scientific and moral understanding we should expand the realm of moral concern to include all living beings, a moral theory I call Life’s Imperative. In Chapter 4 I illustrate that Life’s Imperative is a much stronger, more coherent justification for the Universal Declaration, one that coheres with both our best understanding of the natural world and our relation to it, and to an environmental ethic reflective of that relationship. Unfortunately many of the weaknesses in the current implicit justification of the Universal Declaration have also led to it enshrining rights that are themselves problematic. In order to address these issues, I revise its rights to accord with the stronger justification that I established in Chapter 3. The end result of doing so is a revised version of the Universal Declaration

In this paper I aim to critically analyse the underlying moral justification of the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth. The aim of the critique is to highlight some of the problematic areas that underpin the Declaration’s rights and in doing so to point to ways that one can begin to rectify the problems with them and the Universal Declaration itself. The paper aims to critically examine the moral justification for the Universal Declaration’s rights, which is found in the works of Thomas Berry and his commentators who use the notion of ‘subjectivity’ to justify the existence of such rights. The paper critically examines such a notion and argues that it is not strong enough to do the work required of it, and that it is too problematic to serve as a justification for the Universal Declaration’s rights, as the ethical framework it provides is too cryptic and indeterminate, and does not provide us with an adequate action- and law-guiding framework upon which to establish the Universal Declaration and its rights.