I argue that aesthetic properties can negatively bias our epistemic evaluations: they can make us think that communications that are actually significant or profound are banal or unimportant. Then, I argue that this observation has implications for our understanding of the value of art. Many people think their favourite artworks are valuable qua art partly because of the insights they convey—a version of a view called aesthetic cognitivism. One objection to this view highlights the difficulty of…
Read moreI argue that aesthetic properties can negatively bias our epistemic evaluations: they can make us think that communications that are actually significant or profound are banal or unimportant. Then, I argue that this observation has implications for our understanding of the value of art. Many people think their favourite artworks are valuable qua art partly because of the insights they convey—a version of a view called aesthetic cognitivism. One objection to this view highlights the difficulty of giving examples of insights learnt from art—articulations of the supposed ‘insights’ often sound hopelessly banal. However, the potential for aesthetically induced epistemic underestimations undermines this objection. The aesthetic properties that articulations of insights from artworks tend to bear are likely to give a false impression of banality. So, attempts to articulate insights from artworks are not reliable evidence of the epistemic value of those works.
