Alvaro David Monterroza-Rios

Technological change is one of the central concerns of several disciplines, insofar as they seek to explain the causes and effects that drive transformations in the technical environment. Among the diverse explanatory approaches, one finds a group of theories inspired by Darwinian evolutionism, which is more than a biological metaphor and can be applied to many historical and adaptive processes, including technical change. Despite their explanatory strengths, however, these evolutionary approaches fail to account adequately for the emergence of technical innovations---those innovations that reshape landscapes of possibility and expand the creative horizon for further innovations. This article argues that the theories and methodologies of contemporary industrial design open up a promising explanatory avenue for understanding technical innovation, thereby helping to overcome some of the limitations of evolutionary models of technological change.

Algunas concepciones tradicionales de cultura suelen considerarla como un depósito de representaciones abstractas (información o conocimiento) mientras que otras la consideran un conjunto de mecanismos simbólicos de control de la conducta. Ambas concepciones suponen que los contenidos de la cultura son procesados o interiorizados por las mentes de los individuos, ya sea de una manera más o menos directa, o recurriendo a las estructuras mentales aprendidas en procesos de socialización simbólica. Las teorías corporizadas de la cognición, en especial el enactivismo, cuestionan estas ideas al no formular claridades sobre cómo se dan estos procesos de enculturación. Se defiende la idea de que la cultura debería ser considerada más allá de sus resultados (conocimientos, creencias, valores, costumbres, leyes, etc.) y comprenderla como un conjunto de prácticas significativas en los que sus procesos de enculturación se dan por el acople dinámico entre los agentes humanos y sus entornos de cultura material, a través de la búsqueda de sentido participativa. Se discute si esta idea de presentar la cultura desde un punto de vista enactivo puede llevar a un reduccionismo biologicista, así como también de qué manera podría relacionarse el enactivismo con enfoques cercanos como la psicología ecológica.

RESUMEN El artículo responde algunas críticas planteadas por Ignacio Ávila a mi interpretación de la epistemología davidsoniana. Presento argumentos en contra de: a) que sea necesario distinguir entre representaciones epistemológicamente “peligrosas”e “inofensivas”; b) que el empirismo mínimo sea un tipo de realismo directo; c) que mi uso de la expresión “evidencia distal” y el interés por la teoría de la correspondencia sean asuntos ajenos a Davidson. Finalmente, sostengo que la triangulación es un elemento fundamental de la epistemología davidsoniana, pues permite sortear la ansiedad realista manteniéndose en una postura no representacionalista. ABSTRACT In this article, I respond to some of Ignacio Ávila's criticisms of my interpretation of Davidson’s epistemology. I argue against: a) the need to distinguish between epistemologically “dangerous” and “harmless” representations; b) the idea that minimal empiricism is a kind of direct realism; and c) the claim that my usage of the expression “distal evidence” and interest in the theory of correspondence are issues that do not pertain to Davidson. Finally, I claim that triangulation is a key element in Davidsonian epistemology since it allows us to deal with the realist anxiety while maintaining a non-representationalist viewpoint.

Transhumanism is a concept that seeks to transcend human biological limitations through biomedical, cybernetic, and computational technologies. Specifically, cybernetic-computational transhumanism proposes transferring the mind to an inorganic support, thereby detaching human life from its biological physical form. Raymond Kurzweil, one of the foremost proponents of this idea, describes the human mind as an emergence from the brain, particularly from the neocortex, which processes information through pattern recognition. However, this concept conflicts with the enactive perspective of cognition, which argues that the mind extends throughout the body and is continuously reconstructed through ongoing interaction with the environment. In this view, the mind cannot be reduced to information patterns; therefore, if enactivism is correct, the replication and downloading of the mind onto an artificial support would be ontologically untenable.

Culture has traditionally been considered as a set of knowledge, beliefs, arts, laws, norms, and morals, acquired by a human being as a member of a group. Some anthropologists interpret this as a set of abstract representations, such as information or knowledge, while others interpret it as behavioral control mechanisms. These views assume that the contents of a particular culture must be processed by the minds of individuals, either in a direct way or by resorting to learned mental structures in processes of symbolic socialization. Some critics suggest a problem with these perspectives since they do not provide a convincing explanation of the enculturation process beyond metaphorical images of transfer or internalization of symbolic cultural contents through linguistic transmission. The new embodied theories of cognition, especially enactivism, could give new ideas about what enculturation processes are like, through the concept of participatory sense-making in material culture environments. In this essay, we discuss how an enactive vision of culture could be, and what advantages it would have, as well as the challenges and weaknesses in explaining the culture and its learning processes.