•  8
    Epistemic Uses of Imagination (edited book)
    Routledge. 2021.
    Contents: 1) Peter Kung, Why We Need Something Like Imagery; 2) Derek Lam, An Imaginative Person’s Guide to Objective Modality; 3) Rebecca Hanrahan, Crossing Rivers: Imagination and Real Possibilities; 4) Michael Omoge, Imagination, Metaphysical Modality, and Modal Psychology; 5) Joshua Myers, Reasoning with Imagination; 6) Franz Berto, Equivalence in Imagination; 7) Christopher Badura, How Imagination Can Justify; 8) Antonella Mallozzi, Imagination, Inference, and Apriority; 9) Margherita Arcan…Read more
  •  171
    Imaginative Experience
    In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Consciousness, Oxford University Press. 2020.
    In this essay, the focus is not on what imagination is but rather on what it is like. Rather than exploring the various accounts of imagination on offer in the philosophical literature, we will instead be exploring the various accounts of imaginative experience on offer in that literature. In particular, our focus in what follows will be on three different sorts of accounts that have played an especially prominent role in philosophical thinking about these issues: the impoverishment view (ofte…Read more
  •  87
    The Skill of Imagination
    In Ellen Fridland & Carlotta Pavese (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Skill and Expertise, Routledge. pp. 335-346. 2020.
    We often talk of people as being more or less imaginative than one another – as being better or worse at imagining – and we also compare various feats of imagination to one another in terms of how easy or hard they are. Facts such as these might be taken to suggest that imagination is often implicitly understood as a skill. This implicit understanding, however, has rarely (if ever) been made explicit in the philosophical literature. Such is the task of this chapter. I first attempt to flesh…Read more
  •  23
    Unlimited Imagination
    The Philosophers' Magazine 88 83-89. 2020.
  •  8
    The Farewell
    The Philosophers' Magazine 87 111-112. 2019.
  •  40
    The Life of Imagination: Revealing and Making the World
    British Journal of Aesthetics 60 (2): 234-237. 2020.
    The Life of Imagination: Revealing and Making the WorldJennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei Columbia University Press. 2018. pp. 352. £50.
  •  10
    Berys Gaut & Matthew Kieran, , "Creativity and Philosophy." Reviewed by
    Philosophy in Review 39 (3): 129-131. 2019.
  •  22
    Imagination Minimalized
    British Journal of Aesthetics 59 (2): 215-218. 2019.
    In Only Imagine, Kathleen Stock defends a theory of fictional content she calls extreme intentionalism. Roughly put, this view holds that the fictional content of a text is determined solely by its author’s intention. What is true in a given work of fiction gets fixed by what the author of that fiction intends a reader to imagine.
  •  2
    Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory (review)
    Review of Metaphysics 55 (1): 125-126. 2001.
    Carruthers’s central project in Phenomenal Consciousness is to naturalize consciousness. Given the vast success of naturalism in science, he maintains that we should require powerful reasons to abandon it when constructing philosophical theories of consciousness. Unsurprisingly, he then argues that there are no such reasons. In particular, he claims that the well-known arguments of Thomas Nagel and Frank Jackson fail, as do inverted and absent qualia arguments. Carruthers’s main strategy for def…Read more
  •  271
    Philosophers in the Western tradition have both theorized about imagination and used imagination in their theorizing about other matters. In this chapter, I first provide a brief overview of philosophical theorizing about imagination with a special focus on its relation to other mental states such as belief and perception. I then turn to a discussion of the methodological role that imagination has played in philosophy. I here focus on the imaginability principle, i.e., the claim that the imag…Read more
  •  271
    Mary's Powers of Imagination
    In Sam Coleman (ed.), The Knowledge Argument. forthcoming.
    One common response to the knowledge argument is the ability hypothesis. Proponents of the ability hypothesis accept that Mary learns what seeing red is like when she exits her black-and-white room, but they deny that the kind of knowledge she gains is propositional in nature. Rather, she acquires a cluster of abilities that she previously lacked, in particular, the abilities to recognize, remember, and imagine the color red. For proponents of the ability hypothesis, knowing what an experienc…Read more
  •  231
    David Lewis has argued that “having an experience is the best way or perhaps the only way, of coming to know what that experience is like”; when an experience is of a sufficiently new sort, mere science lessons are not enough. Developing this Lewisian line, L.A. Paul has suggested that some experiences are epistemically transformative. Until an individual has such an experience it remains epistemically inaccessible to her. No amount of stories and theories and testimony from others can teach …Read more
  •  1
    Book Reviews (review)
    Disputatio 1 (11): 51-56. 2001.
  •  38
    Only Imagine: Fiction, Interpretation, and Imagination, by StockKathleen. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. ix + 222.
  •  27
    The Snowman's Imagination
    American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (4): 341-348. 2016.
    Not all imaginings are successful; sometimes when an imaginer sets out to imagine some target, her imagining involves some kind of mistake. The error can be diagnosed in two ways: the imaginer imagines her target in a way that mischaracterizes it, or the imaginer fails to imagine her target at all and rather imagines something else that is similar in some ways to that target. In ordinary day-to-day imaginings, explanations of type seem most natural, but in discussions of philosophical imaginings…Read more
  •  194
    Imagination occupies a central place in philosophy, going back to Aristotle. However, following a period of relative neglect there has been an explosion of interest in imagination in the past two decades as philosophers examine the role of imagination in debates about the mind and cognition, aesthetics and ethics, as well as epistemology, science and mathematics. This outstanding _Handbook_ contains over thirty specially commissioned chapters by leading philosophers organised into six clear sect…Read more
  •  497
    What’s so Transparent about Transparency?
    Philosophical Studies 115 (3): 225-244. 2003.
    Intuitions about the transparency of experience have recently begun to play a key role in the debate about qualia. Specifically, such intuitions have been used by representationalists to support their view that the phenomenal character of our experience can be wholly explained in terms of its intentional content.[i] But what exactly does it mean to say that experience is transparent? In my view, recent discussions of transparency leave matters considerably murkier than one would like. As I will …Read more
  •  34
    Narratives and Narrators: A Philosophy of Stories (review)
    Philosophical Quarterly 64 (254): 186-188. 2014.
  •  238
    Imagery and imagination
    Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2005.
    Both imagery and imagination play an important part in our mental lives. This article, which has three main sections, discusses both of these phenomena, and the connection between them. The first part discusses mental images and, in particular, the dispute about their representational nature that has become known as the _imagery debate_ . The second part turns to the faculty of the imagination, discussing the long philosophical tradition linking mental imagery and the imagination—a tradition tha…Read more
  •  27
    with Eric Olson, Paul Snowdon, and A. M. Ferner
    The Philosophers' Magazine 76 66-69. 2017.
  •  196
    Knowledge Through Imagination (edited book)
    with Peter Kung
    Oxford University Press UK. 2016.
    Imagination is celebrated as our vehicle for escape from the mundane here and now. It transports us to distant lands of magic and make-believe, and provides us with diversions during boring meetings or long bus rides. Yet the focus on imagination as a means of escape from the real world minimizes the fact that imagination seems also to furnish us with knowledge about it. Imagination seems an essential component in our endeavor to learn about the world in which we live--whether we're planning for…Read more
  •  48
    The construction of social reality (review)
    Social Theory and Practice 27 (2): 345-351. 2001.
  •  291
    Putting the image back in imagination
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1): 85-110. 2001.
    Despite their intuitive appeal and a long philosophical history, imagery-based accounts of the imagination have fallen into disfavor in contemporary discussions. The philosophical pressure to reject such accounts seems to derive from two distinct sources. First, the fact that mental images have proved difficult to accommodate within a scientific conception of mind has led to numerous attempts to explain away their existence, and this in turn has led to attempts to explain the phenomenon of ima…Read more
  •  41
    The question of personal identity—what makes a person the same person over time—is puzzling. Through the course of a life, someone might undergo a dramatic alteration in personality, radically change her values, lose almost all of her memories, and undergo significant changes in her physical appearance. Given all of these potential changes, why should we be inclined to regard her as the same person? Battlestar Galactica presents us with an even bigger puzzle: What makes a Cylon the same Cylon ov…Read more
  •  2
    Philosophical Studies 163 (1): 1-1. 2013.
  •  422
    Imaginative Vividness
    Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (1): 32-50. 2017.
    How are we to understand the phenomenology of imagining? Attempts to answer this question often invoke descriptors concerning the “vivacity” or “vividness” of our imaginative states. Not only are particular imaginings often phenomenologically compared and contrasted with other imaginings on grounds of how vivid they are, but such imaginings are also often compared and contrasted with perceptions and memories on similar grounds. Yet however natural it may be to use “vividness” and cognate term…Read more
  •  250
    Shoemaker, self-blindness and Moore's paradox
    Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210): 39-48. 2003.
    I show how the 'innersense' (quasiperceptual) view of introspection can be defended against Shoemaker's influential 'argument from selfblindness'. If introspection and perception are analogous, the relationship between beliefs and introspective knowledge of them is merely contingent. Shoemaker argues that this implies the possibility that agents could be selfblind, i.e., could lack any introspective awareness of their own mental states. By invoking Moore's paradox, he rejects this possibility. B…Read more