•  3
    Imagination Minimalized
    British Journal of Aesthetics 59 (2): 215-218. 2019.
    In Only Imagine, Kathleen Stock defends a theory of fictional content she calls extreme intentionalism. Roughly put, this view holds that the fictional content of a text is determined solely by its author’s intention. What is true in a given work of fiction gets fixed by what the author of that fiction intends a reader to imagine.
  • Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory (review)
    Review of Metaphysics 55 (1): 125-126. 2001.
    Carruthers’s central project in Phenomenal Consciousness is to naturalize consciousness. Given the vast success of naturalism in science, he maintains that we should require powerful reasons to abandon it when constructing philosophical theories of consciousness. Unsurprisingly, he then argues that there are no such reasons. In particular, he claims that the well-known arguments of Thomas Nagel and Frank Jackson fail, as do inverted and absent qualia arguments. Carruthers’s main strategy for def…Read more
  •  31
    In this essay, the focus is not on what imagination is but rather on what it is like. Rather than exploring the various accounts of imagination on offer in the philosophical literature, we will instead be exploring the various accounts of imaginative experience on offer in that literature. In particular, our focus in what follows will be on three different sorts of accounts that have played an especially prominent role in philosophical thinking about these issues: the impoverishment view (ofte…Read more
  •  25
    Philosophers in the Western tradition have both theorized about imagination and used imagination in their theorizing about other matters. In this chapter, I first provide a brief overview of philosophical theorizing about imagination with a special focus on its relation to other mental states such as belief and perception. I then turn to a discussion of the methodological role that imagination has played in philosophy. I here focus on the imaginability principle, i.e., the claim that the imag…Read more
  •  27
    Mary's Powers of Imagination
    In Sam Coleman (ed.), The Knowledge Argument. forthcoming.
    One common response to the knowledge argument is the ability hypothesis. Proponents of the ability hypothesis accept that Mary learns what seeing red is like when she exits her black-and-white room, but they deny that the kind of knowledge she gains is propositional in nature. Rather, she acquires a cluster of abilities that she previously lacked, in particular, the abilities to recognize, remember, and imagine the color red. For proponents of the ability hypothesis, knowing what an experienc…Read more
  •  40
    David Lewis has argued that “having an experience is the best way or perhaps the only way, of coming to know what that experience is like”; when an experience is of a sufficiently new sort, mere science lessons are not enough. Developing this Lewisian line, L.A. Paul has suggested that some experiences are epistemically transformative. Until an individual has such an experience it remains epistemically inaccessible to her. No amount of stories and theories and testimony from others can teach …Read more
  •  1
    Book Reviews (review)
    Disputatio 1 (11): 51-56. 2001.
  •  22
    Only Imagine: Fiction, Interpretation, and Imagination, by StockKathleen. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. ix + 222.
  •  15
    The Snowman's Imagination
    American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (4): 341-348. 2016.
    Not all imaginings are successful; sometimes when an imaginer sets out to imagine some target, her imagining involves some kind of mistake. The error can be diagnosed in two ways: the imaginer imagines her target in a way that mischaracterizes it, or the imaginer fails to imagine her target at all and rather imagines something else that is similar in some ways to that target. In ordinary day-to-day imaginings, explanations of type seem most natural, but in discussions of philosophical imaginings…Read more
  •  121
    Imagination occupies a central place in philosophy, going back to Aristotle. However, following a period of relative neglect there has been an explosion of interest in imagination in the past two decades as philosophers examine the role of imagination in debates about the mind and cognition, aesthetics and ethics, as well as epistemology, science and mathematics. This outstanding _Handbook_ contains over thirty specially commissioned chapters by leading philosophers organised into six clear sect…Read more
  •  446
    What's so transparent about transparency?
    Philosophical Studies 115 (3): 225-244. 2003.
    Intuitions about the transparency of experience have recently begun to play a key role in the debate about qualia. Specifically, such intuitions have been used by representationalists to support their view that the phenomenal character of our experience can be wholly explained in terms of its intentional content.[i] But what exactly does it mean to say that experience is transparent? In my view, recent discussions of transparency leave matters considerably murkier than one would like. As I will …Read more
  •  2
    Philosophical Studies 163 (1): 1-1. 2013.
  •  209
    Imaginative Vividness
    Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (1): 32-50. 2017.
    How are we to understand the phenomenology of imagining? Attempts to answer this question often invoke descriptors concerning the “vivacity” or “vividness” of our imaginative states. Not only are particular imaginings often phenomenologically compared and contrasted with other imaginings on grounds of how vivid they are, but such imaginings are also often compared and contrasted with perceptions and memories on similar grounds. Yet however natural it may be to use “vividness” and cognate term…Read more
  •  188
    Shoemaker, self-blindness and Moore's paradox
    Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210): 39-48. 2003.
    I show how the 'innersense' (quasiperceptual) view of introspection can be defended against Shoemaker's influential 'argument from selfblindness'. If introspection and perception are analogous, the relationship between beliefs and introspective knowledge of them is merely contingent. Shoemaker argues that this implies the possibility that agents could be selfblind, i.e., could lack any introspective awareness of their own mental states. By invoking Moore's paradox, he rejects this possibility. B…Read more
  •  24
    Imagination and the Imaginary, by Kathleen Lennon (review)
    Mind 125 (500): 1244-1251. 2016.
    Imagination and the Imaginary, by LennonKathleen. London : Routledge, 2015. Pp. viii + 145.
  •  19
    Captain Fantastic (review)
    The Philosophers' Magazine 75 112-113. 2016.
  •  227
    Qualia realism
    Philosophical Studies 104 (2). 2001.
    Philosophical Studies 104: 143-162 (2001).
  •  861
    The Heterogeneity of the Imagination
    Erkenntnis 78 (1): 141-159. 2013.
    Imagination has been assigned an important explanatory role in a multitude of philosophical contexts. This paper examines four such contexts: mindreading, pretense, our engagement with fiction, and modal epistemology. Close attention to each of these contexts suggests that the mental activity of imagining is considerably more heterogeneous than previously realized. In short, no single mental activity can do all the explanatory work that has been assigned to imagining
  •  46
    Knowledge and Mind: A Philosophical Introduction (review)
    Teaching Philosophy 25 (1): 98-101. 2002.
  •  135
    How to believe in qualia
    In Edmond Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia, Mit Press. pp. 285--298. 2008.
    in The Case for Qualia,ed. by Edmond Wright , MIT Press (2008), pp. 285-298.
  •  96
    As persons, we are importantly different from all other creatures in the universe. But in what, exactly, does this difference consist? What kinds of entities are we, and what makes each of us the same person today that we were yesterday? Could we survive having all of our memories erased and replaced with false ones? What about if our bodies were destroyed and our brains were transplanted into android bodies, or if instead our minds were simply uploaded to computers? In this engaging and accessi…Read more
  •  574
    The Puzzle of Imaginative Desire
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (3): 421-439. 2011.
    The puzzle of imaginative desire arises from the difficulty of accounting for the surprising behaviour of desire in imaginative activities such as our engagement with fiction and our games of pretend. Several philosophers have recently attempted to solve this puzzle by introducing a class of novel mental states?what they call desire-like imaginings or i-desires. In this paper, I argue that we should reject the i-desire solution to the puzzle of imaginative desire. The introduction of i-desires i…Read more
  •  314
    From the perspective of many philosophers of mind in these early years of the 21st Century, the debate between dualism and physicalism has seemed to have stalled, if not to have come to a complete standstill. There seems to be no way to settle the basic clash of intuitions that underlies it. Recently however, a growing number of proponents of Russellian monism have suggested that their view promises to show us a new way forward. Insofar as Russellian monism might allow us to break out of the cur…Read more
  •  25
    Is Ignorance Bliss?
    In Sandra Shapshay (ed.), Bioethics at the Movies, Johns Hopkins University Press. pp. 121. 2009.