•  9
    Epistemic Uses of Imagination (edited book)
    Routledge. 2021.
    Contents: 1) Peter Kung, Why We Need Something Like Imagery; 2) Derek Lam, An Imaginative Person’s Guide to Objective Modality; 3) Rebecca Hanrahan, Crossing Rivers: Imagination and Real Possibilities; 4) Michael Omoge, Imagination, Metaphysical Modality, and Modal Psychology; 5) Joshua Myers, Reasoning with Imagination; 6) Franz Berto, Equivalence in Imagination; 7) Christopher Badura, How Imagination Can Justify; 8) Antonella Mallozzi, Imagination, Inference, and Apriority; 9) Margherita Arcan…Read more
  •  172
    Imaginative Experience
    In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Consciousness, Oxford University Press. 2020.
    In this essay, the focus is not on what imagination is but rather on what it is like. Rather than exploring the various accounts of imagination on offer in the philosophical literature, we will instead be exploring the various accounts of imaginative experience on offer in that literature. In particular, our focus in what follows will be on three different sorts of accounts that have played an especially prominent role in philosophical thinking about these issues: the impoverishment view (ofte…Read more
  •  90
    The Skill of Imagination
    In Ellen Fridland & Carlotta Pavese (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Skill and Expertise, Routledge. pp. 335-346. 2020.
    We often talk of people as being more or less imaginative than one another – as being better or worse at imagining – and we also compare various feats of imagination to one another in terms of how easy or hard they are. Facts such as these might be taken to suggest that imagination is often implicitly understood as a skill. This implicit understanding, however, has rarely (if ever) been made explicit in the philosophical literature. Such is the task of this chapter. I first attempt to flesh…Read more
  •  23
    Unlimited Imagination
    The Philosophers' Magazine 88 83-89. 2020.
  •  8
    The Farewell
    The Philosophers' Magazine 87 111-112. 2019.
  •  40
    The Life of Imagination: Revealing and Making the World
    British Journal of Aesthetics 60 (2): 234-237. 2020.
    The Life of Imagination: Revealing and Making the WorldJennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei Columbia University Press. 2018. pp. 352. £50.
  •  10
    Berys Gaut & Matthew Kieran, , "Creativity and Philosophy." Reviewed by
    Philosophy in Review 39 (3): 129-131. 2019.
  •  22
    Imagination Minimalized
    British Journal of Aesthetics 59 (2): 215-218. 2019.
    In Only Imagine, Kathleen Stock defends a theory of fictional content she calls extreme intentionalism. Roughly put, this view holds that the fictional content of a text is determined solely by its author’s intention. What is true in a given work of fiction gets fixed by what the author of that fiction intends a reader to imagine.
  •  2
    Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory (review)
    Review of Metaphysics 55 (1): 125-126. 2001.
    Carruthers’s central project in Phenomenal Consciousness is to naturalize consciousness. Given the vast success of naturalism in science, he maintains that we should require powerful reasons to abandon it when constructing philosophical theories of consciousness. Unsurprisingly, he then argues that there are no such reasons. In particular, he claims that the well-known arguments of Thomas Nagel and Frank Jackson fail, as do inverted and absent qualia arguments. Carruthers’s main strategy for def…Read more
  •  274
    Philosophers in the Western tradition have both theorized about imagination and used imagination in their theorizing about other matters. In this chapter, I first provide a brief overview of philosophical theorizing about imagination with a special focus on its relation to other mental states such as belief and perception. I then turn to a discussion of the methodological role that imagination has played in philosophy. I here focus on the imaginability principle, i.e., the claim that the imag…Read more
  •  272
    Mary's Powers of Imagination
    In Sam Coleman (ed.), The Knowledge Argument. forthcoming.
    One common response to the knowledge argument is the ability hypothesis. Proponents of the ability hypothesis accept that Mary learns what seeing red is like when she exits her black-and-white room, but they deny that the kind of knowledge she gains is propositional in nature. Rather, she acquires a cluster of abilities that she previously lacked, in particular, the abilities to recognize, remember, and imagine the color red. For proponents of the ability hypothesis, knowing what an experienc…Read more
  •  234
    David Lewis has argued that “having an experience is the best way or perhaps the only way, of coming to know what that experience is like”; when an experience is of a sufficiently new sort, mere science lessons are not enough. Developing this Lewisian line, L.A. Paul has suggested that some experiences are epistemically transformative. Until an individual has such an experience it remains epistemically inaccessible to her. No amount of stories and theories and testimony from others can teach …Read more
  •  1
    Book Reviews (review)
    Disputatio 1 (11): 51-56. 2001.
  •  38
    Only Imagine: Fiction, Interpretation, and Imagination, by StockKathleen. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. ix + 222.
  •  27
    The Snowman's Imagination
    American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (4): 341-348. 2016.
    Not all imaginings are successful; sometimes when an imaginer sets out to imagine some target, her imagining involves some kind of mistake. The error can be diagnosed in two ways: the imaginer imagines her target in a way that mischaracterizes it, or the imaginer fails to imagine her target at all and rather imagines something else that is similar in some ways to that target. In ordinary day-to-day imaginings, explanations of type seem most natural, but in discussions of philosophical imaginings…Read more
  •  194
    Imagination occupies a central place in philosophy, going back to Aristotle. However, following a period of relative neglect there has been an explosion of interest in imagination in the past two decades as philosophers examine the role of imagination in debates about the mind and cognition, aesthetics and ethics, as well as epistemology, science and mathematics. This outstanding _Handbook_ contains over thirty specially commissioned chapters by leading philosophers organised into six clear sect…Read more
  •  497
    What’s so Transparent about Transparency?
    Philosophical Studies 115 (3): 225-244. 2003.
    Intuitions about the transparency of experience have recently begun to play a key role in the debate about qualia. Specifically, such intuitions have been used by representationalists to support their view that the phenomenal character of our experience can be wholly explained in terms of its intentional content.[i] But what exactly does it mean to say that experience is transparent? In my view, recent discussions of transparency leave matters considerably murkier than one would like. As I will …Read more
  •  225
    The Irreducibility of Consciousness
    Disputatio 1 (19): 1-18. 2005.
    In this paper, by analyzing the Chalmers-Searle debate about Chalmers’ zombie thought experiment, I attempt to determine the implications that the irreducibility of consciousness has for the truth of materialism. While Chalmers claims that the irreducibility of consciousness forces us to embrace dualism, Searle claims that it has no deep metaphysical import and, in particular, that it is fully consistent with his materialist theory of mind. I argue that this disagreement hinges on the notion of …Read more
  •  36
    Metaphysics at the multiplex
    The Philosophers' Magazine 55 (55): 112-113. 2011.
    This is a brief review of the movie "Source Code."
  •  80
    Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2005.
    Introspection is the process by which someone comes to form beliefs about her own mental states. We might form the belief that someone else is happy on the basis of perception – for example, by perceiving her behavior. But a person typically does not have to observe her own behavior in order to determine whether she is happy. Rather, one makes this determination by introspecting
  •  494
    Panexperientialism, cognition, and the nature of experience
    PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12. 2006.
    i>: This paper explores the plausibility of panexperientialism by an examination of Gregg Rosenberg.
  •  28
    Imaginative Phenomenology and Existential Status
    Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (2): 273-278. 2016.
    __: In this essay I explore the account of imaginative phenomenology developed by Uriah Kriegel in _The Varieties of Consciousness_. On his view, the difference between perceptual phenomenology and imaginative phenomenology arises from the way that they present the existential status of their object: While perceptual experience presents its object as existent, imaginative experience presents its object as non-existent. While I agree with Kriegel that it’s likely that the difference between imagi…Read more
  •  374
    Philosophers have long suggested that our attitude of special concern for the future is problematic for a reductionist view of personal identity, such as the one developed by Derek Parfit in Reasons and Persons. Specifically, it is often claimed that reductionism cannot provide justification for this attitude. In this paper, I argue that much of the debate in this arena involves a misconception of the connection between metaphysical theories of personal identity and our special concern. A proper…Read more