•  21
    Memory perspectives on past events allegedly take one of two shapes. In field memories, we recall episodes from a first-person point of view, while in observer memories, we look at a past scene from a third-person perspective. But this mere visuospatial dichotomy faces several practical and conceptual challenges. First, this binary distinction is not exhaustive. Second, this characterization insufficiently accounts for the phenomenology of observer memories. Third, the focus on the visual aspect…Read more
  •  71
    How do we perceive cultural affordances? [orig. Hoe nemen we culturele affordances waar?]
    Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 113 (3): 393-397. 2021.
    Cognitive scientists typically explain cognitive processes in groups from the study of the individual. Even researchers who recognize that our cognition is inherently situated and cannot be understood without placing it in a social context take the individual as the starting point for looking at group processes. It is reason for Robert Wilson (2004) to argue for 'group minds'. With this he creates room for the idea that certain group processes cannot solely be explained as the sum of the individ…Read more
  •  625
    Filosoof op de arbeidsmarkt: Interview met Babs van den Bergh
    with Bas Leijssenaar
    Splijtstof 39 (1): 123-129. 2010.
    Interview met Babs van den Bergh over haar studie filosofie en de daaropvolgende carrière.
  •  509
    Technological artefacts have, in recent years, invited increasingly intimate ways of interaction. But surprisingly little attention has been devoted to how such interactions, like with wearable devices or household robots, shape our minds, cognitive capacities, and moral character. In this thesis, I develop an embodied, enactive account of mind--technology interaction that takes the reciprocal influence of artefacts on minds seriously. First, I examine how recent developments in philosophy of te…Read more
  •  1178
    Sympathy for Dolores: Moral Consideration for Robots Based on Virtue and Recognition
    with Massimiliano L. Cappuccio and William McDonald
    Philosophy and Technology 33 (1): 9-31. 2019.
    This paper motivates the idea that social robots should be credited as moral patients, building on an argumentative approach that combines virtue ethics and social recognition theory. Our proposal answers the call for a nuanced ethical evaluation of human-robot interaction that does justice to both the robustness of the social responses solicited in humans by robots and the fact that robots are designed to be used as instruments. On the one hand, we acknowledge that the instrumental nature of ro…Read more
  • Though many of our social, scientific, and medical practices are shaped by technological artefacts, we lack a framework that adequately accounts for the cognitive role such artefacts play. Current approaches to mind and technology interaction often depart from the extended mind thesis, and are cashed out in terms of information-processing. While proposals for mind extension have generated daring new research programs, (post)phenomenologists have argued that the extended mind account of mind-tech…Read more
  • Virtue ethics enjoys new-found attention in philosophy of technology and philosophical psychology. This attention informs the growing realization that virtue has an important role to play in the ethical evaluation of human–technology relations. But it remains unclear which cognitive processes ground such interactions in both their regular and virtuous forms. This paper proposes that an embodied, enactive cognition approach aptly captures the various ways persons and artefacts interact, while at …Read more
  •  1159
    In this paper, we evaluate the pragmatic turn towards embodied, enactive thinking in cognitive science, in the context of recent empirical research on the memory palace technique. The memory palace is a powerful method for remembering yet it faces two problems. First, cognitive scientists are currently unable to clarify its efficacy. Second, the technique faces significant practical challenges to its users. Virtual reality devices are sometimes presented as a way to solve these practical challen…Read more
  •  334
    Steering away from multiple realization
    Adaptive Behavior 28 (1): 29-30. 2020.
    Mario Villalobos and Pablo Razeto-Barry argue that enactivists should understand living beings not as autopoietic systems, but as autopoietic bodies. In doing so, they surrender the principle of multiple realizability of the spatial location of living beings. By way of counterexample, I argue that more motivation is required before this principle is surrendered.
  •  868
    Designing Virtuous Sex Robots
    International Journal of Social Robotics 1-12. 2019.
    We propose that virtue ethics can be used to address ethical issues central to discussions about sex robots. In particular, we argue virtue ethics is well equipped to focus on the implications of sex robots for human moral character. Our evaluation develops in four steps. First, we present virtue ethics as a suitable framework for the evaluation of human–robot relationships. Second, we show the advantages of our virtue ethical account of sex robots by comparing it to current instrumentalist appr…Read more
  •  772
    The Cognitive Basis of Computation: Putting Computation in Its Place
    with Daniel D. Hutto, Erik Myin, and Farid Zahnoun
    In Mark Sprevak & Matteo Colombo (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind, Routledge. pp. 272-282. 2018.
    The mainstream view in cognitive science is that computation lies at the basis of and explains cognition. Our analysis reveals that there is no compelling evidence or argument for thinking that brains compute. It makes the case for inverting the explanatory order proposed by the computational basis of cognition thesis. We give reasons to reverse the polarity of standard thinking on this topic, and ask how it is possible that computation, natural and artificial, might be based on cognition and no…Read more
  •  684
    The roots of remembering: Radically enactive recollecting
    In Kourken Michaelian, Dorothea Debus & Denis Perrin (eds.), New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory, Routledge. pp. 97-118. 2018.
    This chapter proposes a radically enactive account of remembering that casts it as creative, dynamic, and wide-reaching. It paints a picture of remembering that no longer conceives of it as involving passive recollections – always occurring wholly and solely inside heads. Integrating empirical findings from various sources, the chapter puts pressure on familiar cognitivist visions of remembering. Pivotally, it is argued, that we achieve a stronger and more elegant account of remembering by aband…Read more
  •  22
    A. Dragomir: The World We Live In (review)
    Phenomenological Reviews 3 54. 2017.
    The World We Live In contains private lectures given by Alexandru Dragomir spanning a period from 1985 to 1998. Some lectures are graceful examples of ‘live’ philosophical thinking, where phenomenological investigation and philological skill are combined to probe issues concerning time, space, and technology. Other lectures are less polished and should perhaps not have been published. Almost all the lectures engage with classic philosophical texts, primarily by Plato and Aristotle, and, to a les…Read more
  •  459
    Cognitive ontology in flux: The possibility of protean brains
    with Daniel D. Hutto and Miguel Segundo-Ortin
    Philosophical Explorations 20 (2): 209-223. 2017.
    This paper motivates taking seriously the possibility that brains are basically protean: that they make use of neural structures in inventive, on-the-fly improvisations to suit circumstance and context. Accordingly, we should not always expect cognition to divide into functionally stable neural parts and pieces. We begin by reviewing recent work in cognitive ontology that highlights the inadequacy of traditional neuroscientific approaches when it comes to divining the function and structure of c…Read more
  •  685
    Are we theorising or simulating? Interview with Robert Gordon
    with Jorrit Kiel
    Splijtstof 37 (2): 40-43. 2008.
    Interview with Robert Gordon (Ph.D., Columbia). Discussed topics include his academic career in philosophy and views on the simulation theory of mind.
  •  6
    Cicero als filosoof?
    In Proceedings from the Student Research Conference 2010, Association of Universities in the Netherlands. pp. 255-259. 2010.
    Investigation of Cicero's contribution to Virtue Ethics in his "De Officiis".
  •  818
    Students using Ritalin in preparation for their exams is a hotly debated issue, while meditating or drinking coffee before those same exams is deemed uncontroversial. However, taking Ritalin, meditating and drinking coffee or even education in general, can all be considered forms of cognitive enhancement. Although social acceptance might change in the future, it is interesting to examine the current reasons that are used to distinguish cases deemed problematic or unproblematic. Why are some form…Read more
  •  326
    Freedom regained: The possibility of free will (review)
    Philosophical Psychology 30 (5): 682-684. 2017.
    In Freedom Regained, Julian Baggini draws on a broad spectrum of disciplines to defend the notion that, yes, we do have free will. Baggini targets recent claims from scientists who argue that (neuro)science has supposedly proven there is no such thing as free will. Such arguments depend on mistaken conflations of the self, which is taken as the nexus for free will, with, for example, the brain, the conscious mind, or the rational mind. Such amalgams are then taken to clash with a p…Read more