André Martin

In his Long Commentary on the De anima, Averroes tentatively argues that, just as Aristotle suggests a so-called “agent intellect”, we should also posit an analogous “agent sense”. In this paper, I survey the surprisingly wide and varied rejection of this Averroist notion in the (mid to late) 13th century, prior to its infamous reception in the early 14th century by Jean of Jandun. This survey includes those who endorse a more passive theory of sensation, on seemingly Aristotelian grounds, such as the influential Dominican Albert the Great, but also those who, on more Augustinian grounds, endorse their own active theory of sensation, such as the radical Augustinian Franciscan Peter John Olivi and the more moderate Augustinian Giles of Rome. As I explain, each of these figures have their own peculiar points of overlap and contrast in how they object to an agent sense and how they even conceive of such a power. Albert considers two different interpretations: one tied to an early 13th-century theory of light, which seemingly puts the agent sense outside of the soul; the other tied to Augustine, which puts the agent sense in the soul. Nevertheless, Albert objects to both views on philosophical grounds. Olivi, in contrast, champions his own Augustinian active account of sensation but objects to an account like that of Averroes, which he more clearly differentiates. Giles, with perhaps the most nuance, returns to Albert’s two interpretations and partially defends both views philosophically but objects to calling either such external or internal agent of sensation an (Averroist) “agent sense”; such an agent is either not a sense or at least not what Averroes intended. In contrast, in the early 14th century, Jandun explicitly defends Averroes’ agent sense and attempts to defend it on equally Augustinian grounds.

In this paper I examine how far the fourteenth-century philosopher and theologian Peter Auriol parallels the senses (with its apprehensive and retentive powers) and the intellect insofar as he posits a sort of intellectual memory, i.e. a “place” to retain non-occurrent intelligible similitudes (or “species”), in some sense analogous to sensitive memory which retains sensible similitudes. Most importantly, although Auriol grants intellectual memory, he does not make a real distinction between the intellect’s retentive and apprehensive powers, just as he does not make a real distinction between an intelligible similitude and an act of intellection. On the face of it, Auriol’s view can raise numerous puzzles concerning, e.g., why we aren’t consciously cognizing every object of which we have a similitude, if every act and similitude is “really” the same thing, and whether the senses can admit of any further “real” changes and divisions to help resolve this issue. As I discuss, common to both the intellect and the senses, Auriol admits of a difference in our attentive gaze, at least partially subject to our wills and desires, to help explain which similitude in fact goes into occurrent act. Moreover, given the more corporeal nature of the senses, Auriol further distinguishes different sense powers in terms of the different locations of their organs, where similitudes move between these organs, to help explain further differences in sensitive cognition and memory. Nevertheless, I argue that this difference in the underlying reality of sensitive cognition is consistent with Auriol’s general account which defines cognition, both sensitive and intellective, independently of such absolute foundations.

In this paper, I survey one of the key arguments used in Latin medieval psychology in favour of active views of cognition, from Peter John Olivi to Durand of St. Pourҁain. In broad terms, these ‘attribution arguments’, based on some appeal to other causal events or how we speak of them, argue that passive views of cognition have the absurd consequence that they misattribute our cognitive acts to things ultimately external to our intrinsic cognitive powers (viz., external objects or sensible/intelligible species). In the secondary literature, these arguments tend to get overshadowed by arguments with more distinctly Augustinian roots, based on the nobility of cognition or the experience of active attention. However, in this paper I argue that these ‘attribution arguments’ are distinctly interesting, especially insofar as they speak to hot debates concerning so-called ‘immanent acts’ and how to read Aristotle on such actions in Metaphysics Θ.

Peter John Olivi is oft characterized as having a particularly radical view, concerning the activity of the soul in cognition/appetite, where the soul’s cognitive and appetitive powers are the proper efficient causes from which even their most basic acts are produced; in contrast, external corporeal objects are insufficient to produce any direct effect on these “higher” powers. Olivi’s view can appear to be untenable, either leaving external objects completely outside of psychological explanation or requiring some novel type of cause outside of the typical medieval-Aristotelian causal framework. However, in this paper, I seek to alleviate this concern by considering Olivi’s response that the object can still be considered a “broadly efficient cause”; in particular, I look at how Olivi’s same view is endorsed by Gonsalvus of Spain, one of Olivi’s students. I argue that Gonsalvus takes a more diplomatic approach, despite endorsing essentially the same view, which shows that their shared active view of cognition/appetite can safely fit into a wider medieval-Aristotelian causal framework with some further explanation. As I explain, this interpretation of Olivi, alongside Gonsalvus, helps put later active views of cognition/appetite (e.g., from John Duns Scotus), and their own qualifications, into a more complete context.

In this dissertation, I survey 13th-14th century debates in medieval psychology and metaphysics, chiefly concerning the activity of the soul and the general nature of causation and causal co-operation. I give particular attention to a few notable “Augustinian” Franciscans, viz., Peter John Olivi, Gonsalvus of Spain, and John Duns Scotus. According to these figures, even our most basic acts of cognition primarily originate from within our cognitive powers, rather than from external objects. This view is motivated by both metaphysical and empirical considerations, such as Neo-Platonic and Aristotelian causal principles and the apparent experiential effects of attention on cognition. As I discuss, active accounts of cognition are also forced to say something about how external objects can nonetheless play some role in cognition, and, thus, end up tied to generally interesting theories of asymmetric causal co-operation. In this survey, I also examine the peculiar Dominican, Durand of St. Pourçain. I argue that despite employing many common arguments and authoritative passages as Olivi, Gonsalvus, and Scotus, Durand offers a more minimal picture of cognition, in some ways, more extreme, but in other ways, more passive.

In this paper, I aim to explain Peter John Olivi’s technical notion of “aspectus.” More specifically, I distinguish different uses of this notion by Olivi, not all of which have been made clear in the secondary literature, in order to help resolve a prima facie tension in the way Olivi puts together his active theory of cognition and his direct account of cognition (or “direct realism”). In brief, the issue is that Olivi builds his active theory of cognition out of the commitment that the body cannot, strictly speaking, act as an efficient cause to produce an act of cognition in the spiritual soul; so, in order to account for soul-body interaction, Olivi will often speak of the soul having a seemingly one-way aspectus or orientation towards the body so that the soul can respond appropriately to changes in the body. However, given Olivi’s commitment to direct realism, the aspectus of cognition should go directly to the external object when, e.g., perceiving a present object. So, I take it Olivi must have some sort of distinction in mind between types of aspectūs in order to avoid contrariety. In short, my view is that by distinguishing between conscious/cognitive and non conscious/non-cognitive sorts of aspectūs in Olivi, one can understand how an aspectus towards inner corporeal changes can still contribute to direct cognition of external objects. Moreover, I take it that Olivi’s discussion of another technical notion, the mode of connection or “colligantia” between soul and body, provides further evidence for my interpretation.