Newcomb’s paradox is still debated despite its deceptively simple
setup. Here we introduce a two-stage policy framework parametrized by
pre-entry and in-room 1-boxing propensities (α,β), predictor error rate
ε, and uncertainty about the predictor’s timing (λ). An expected utility
analysis shows that 1-boxing dominates across the joint uncertainty
space of these parameters (except at the extremes), even under high risk
aversion. Thus, we argue that the paradox is fundamentally epistemic:
the rati…
Read moreNewcomb’s paradox is still debated despite its deceptively simple
setup. Here we introduce a two-stage policy framework parametrized by
pre-entry and in-room 1-boxing propensities (α,β), predictor error rate
ε, and uncertainty about the predictor’s timing (λ). An expected utility
analysis shows that 1-boxing dominates across the joint uncertainty
space of these parameters (except at the extremes), even under high risk
aversion. Thus, we argue that the paradox is fundamentally epistemic:
the rational response depends on the agent’s beliefs about predictor
accuracy and about which stage of deliberation the predictor targets.
We suggest that 2-boxers either believe that the predictor Omega
is unreliable, or that the choice in-room is completely uncaused (i.e.
unpredictable). If such a belief is due to a valuation of one’s own
free will equivalent to or above $1,000, then we argue that even under
maximin reasoning, 1-boxing is optimal as being wrong about one’s
own deterministic nature is far more costly for 2-boxers than 1-boxers.
