Angela K. Martin

In this article, we present two independent arguments in favor of the view that parents have a pro tanto moral duty to feed their children a predominantly plant-based diet. The first is the ‘Animal Harm Argument’. The significant suffering caused to animals by harmful animal agriculture is morally wrong, and consequently there is a moral duty to avoid consuming products coming from such circumstances. In a family context, parents have a moral duty to teach their young children the best ‘rules-of-thumb’ to comply with morality’s demands. Therefore, parents should, as a rule, provide their children with a plant-based diet. The second is the ‘Environmental Harm Argument’. Consuming animal products is associated with a large ecological footprint. There is a moral duty to reduce one’s ecological footprint, and significant reductions are not feasible without substantially cutting down on animal products, so moving toward a more plant-based diet is morally required. In families, parents have a special responsibility to help reduce their children’s ecological footprint, and to prepare them to heed laws requiring such reductions in the future, and therefore should feed them a predominantly plant-based diet. Lastly, we address several objections to our arguments and show why they do not hold.

One Health – the view that human, animal, and environmental health are interdependent – has gained significant traction over recent decades. The most widely endorsed definition of One Health, developed by the One Health High-Level Expert Panel (OHHLEP), is characterised by several key features, including: i) the aim to sustainably balance and optimise human, animal, and environmental health; ii) the inclusion of diverse disciplines, sectors, and perspectives; and iii) a commitment to respecting the intrinsic value of all living beings in the ecosystem to achieve a socio-ecological equilibrium. By acknowledging the intrinsic value of all living entities, OHHLEP’s definition explicitly endorses biocentrism – the view that all living beings matter for their own sake. Furthermore, inclusion is a central principle of One Health, understood as the integration of actors from different disciplines, sectors, and communities. Yet despite this emphasis, the active inclusion and involvement of two highly relevant groups – animals and nature – currently remain largely ignored in One Health decision-making and practice. There is a significant gap in the literature concerning how animals’ and nature’s interests and needs could be meaningfully incorporated into One Health decision-making to both optimise health outcomes and respect their intrinsic value. In this paper, I argue that moving beyond an anthropocentric interpretation of One Health requires the inclusion of animals and nature in One Health approaches. I present three justifications for this claim: the affectedness of animals and nature by One Health measures, considerations of procedural justice, and biocentrism. Subsequently, I discuss three relevant models developed in fields beyond the One Health domain and demonstrate how they can be fruitfully applied to this context. These include: i) animal agency; ii) inclusion through human diversity; and iii) assigning a human to speak on behalf of animals and nature in One Health decision-making. I outline the advantages and limits of each proposal and suggest that the third option – representation of animals and nature by a human person – is likely the fairest and most promising approach.

The One Health approach, as defined by the One Health High-Level Expert Panel (OHHLEP), emphasizes the interdependencies between the health of humans, animals, plants, and the wider environment. It calls for an integrated strategy to "sustainably balance and optimise" these di-verse health interests. However, without a unified definition of "health" that applies across hu-mans, animals, plants and ecosystems, it is nearly impossible to compare, balance, or optimise these often-competing health interests. This paper proposes a common framework for health based on ‘normal species functioning’. We argue that while existing definitions offer certain benefits, they often remain too vague or species-specific to serve as a common health metric. First, we outline the incommensurability challenge of comparing health of humans, animals, plants and ecosystems. Second, we propose that normal species functioning provides a con-sistent reference point for individual living beings. Third, we extend this definition to ecosys-tems. We argue that ecosystem health should be understood as ecosystem integrity, flourishing or resilience. Last, we illustrate how health, understood as normal (species) functioning, can be balanced and optimised within the One Health context, as required by OHHLEP.

A transition toward more plant-based diets can improve human health while reducing the environmental impact of food systems. This chapter examines the ethical requirements of such a transition through the framework of just transition and the interests of five affected groups: laborers, consumers, autarkic communities, animals, and future generations. It argues that reducing reliance on animal-based foods can contribute to climate-change mitigation, public health, animal welfare, and food security, but that these benefits do not by themselves make a transition just. A just food transition must distribute costs and burdens fairly, protect access to nutritionally and culturally adequate food, provide viable livelihood alternatives for workers in affected industries, respect communities whose subsistence practices differ from those of industrial food systems, and preserve socially valuable practices of preparing and sharing meals. Dietary transition should therefore be understood as a broader social transformation rather than a simple substitution of plant-based foods for animal products.

The most established approach to legitimizing animal research worldwide is through Harm-Benefit Analyses (HBAs), which require that the expected benefits of research be compared to and outweigh the harms done to animals. For this process to be ethically sound, all relevant harms must be considered. However, HBAs leave one fundamental harm insufficiently considered: killing, i.e., the deliberate termination of animals’ lives as part of the research project. This article argues that the law’s ignorance of the harm of killing leads to its trivialization in practice and, consequently, undermines the ethical legitimacy of deadly animal research projects. While our argument applies broadly, we use Switzerland as an illustrative case example. We first disentangle, from an ethical standpoint, the harms that killings inflict on animals in research. Second, we show that most harms of killing, both to the inherent worth and wellbeing of animals, are not accounted for in law, allowing killings to be trivialized. Third, we propose that killing should always (a) be subject to ethical and legal scrutiny by animal research commissions, (b) have to pass the necessity test (i.e., killing should be permitted if, and only if, it is necessary to achieve the purpose of the experiment), and (c) be included in HBAs. Fourth, we consider common objections to our arguments, and, in concluding, show why recognizing the harm of killing is essential to upholding the ethical legitimacy of animal research.

Part I offers a set of ethical recommendations on various aspects of the everyday operations of animal shelters. The authors begin by clarifying the ethical framework on which the recommendations are based as well as setting out several overarching issues. The authors then address specific ethical questions arising in the context of the shelter’s internal structure and decision-making processes; its relationship with the public, donors, industry, and government; its role in the enforcement of animal welfare legislation; shelter operations, such as responses to overpopulation and decisions about when to end animals’ lives; how it should respond to animals in the community, such as feral cats; and issues arising in relation to shelter staff. The first part of the policy document summarizes these recommendations; the second part explains, in more detail, the reasoning behind these recommendations.

In recent years, the field of animal ethics has taken a political turn, with scholars arguing that sentient nonhuman animals should be included in the political sphere. This article explores two key challenges arising from this turn towards the political inclusion of animals: the Conflict Problem and the Numbers Problem. The Conflict Problem highlights the difficulty of resolving conflicts between humans and animals, and amongst individual animals, who often have competing interests (such as predators and prey). The Numbers Problem arises because animals vastly outnumber humans: if animals were to be fully included in political decision-making processes, their representatives would form majorities that would likely predominate, potentially to the detriment of human interests. We assess four potential responses to these two problems: (i) discounting animal interests; (ii) revisiting principles of political inclusion; (iii) granting group-differentiated rights; and (iv) adopting a bicameral system. Each response, we argue, involves significant ethical trade-offs. Ultimately, we conclude that proponents of sentientist political equality may need to bite the bullet with respect to the Conflict Problem and Numbers Problem. For those who think otherwise, we claim that the onus is on them to develop more viable solutions.

In this article, we present two independent arguments in favor of the view that parents have a pro tanto moral duty to feed their children a predominantly plant-based diet. The first is the ‘Animal Harm Argument’. The significant suffering caused to animals by harmful animal agriculture is morally wrong, and consequently there is a moral duty to avoid consuming products coming from such circumstances. In a family context, parents have a moral duty to teach their young children the best ‘rules-of-thumb’ to comply with morality’s demands. Therefore, parents should, as a rule, provide their children with a plant-based diet. The second is the ‘Environmental Harm Argument’. Consuming animal products is associated with a large ecological footprint. There is a moral duty to reduce one’s ecological footprint, and significant reductions are not feasible without substantially cutting down on animal products, so moving towards a more plant-based diet is morally required. In families, parents have a special responsibility to help reduce their children’s ecological footprint, and to prepare them to heed laws requiring such reductions in the future, and therefore should feed them a predominantly plant-based diet. Lastly, we address several objections to our arguments and show why they do not hold.

Nowadays, more sentient animals are used for their meat, milk, and eggs than ever before in history. This chapter shows that many—but not all—uses of animals for food are morally problematic. Speciesist prejudices mask that animals are commonly due more consideration than we give them. First, this chapter examines animal products involving suffering, arguing that such products are often—but not always—morally problematic. Second, it discusses whether there is a problem with killing animals which could be deemed “happy.” Third, it argues against “principled veganism,” contending that dependency does not necessarily result in increased vulnerability. Finally, it is concluded that we should recognize many groups of animals we commonly use for food as particularly vulnerable and augment their protection accordingly.

This chapter investigates whether animals used in research should be described as a particularly vulnerable group. First, it inquires whether research animals currently receive the protection they are due, and concludes that they do not. Indeed, it is shown that the research standards currently guiding animal research insufficiently protect animals’ basic claims. Consequently, many research animals can be considered particularly vulnerable, insofar as they run an increased risk of not receiving what they are due. Second, it argues that for animal research to be ethical, it must be made more similar to research with humans, and it is outlined what research respecting animals’ claims could look like in practice.

This chapter discusses whether some animals fulfill the previously outlined conditions for vulnerability ascription. It shows that sentient animals do indeed have welfare interests and, sometimes, agency interests that can potentially be frustrated. It argues that speciesism—a prejudice based on species-membership—should be rejected, and that similar interests should have equal weight, regardless of their bearer’s species. This results in a list of basic claims on animals’ behalf that should be considered fairly by all moral agents: a claim to the absence of hunger and thirst; a claim to the absence of suffering (i.e., pain, injury, and disease); a claim to express and pursue normal behavior; a claim to the absence of discomfort, fear, and distress; a claim to lead a self-determined life; and a claim to continued existence.

This chapter argues that wild animals can be claim-holders, and, as a consequence, that humans have a moral duty to consider their plight. First, it describes wild animals’ living conditions, which often involve substantial suffering and premature death. Second, it defends the thesis that humans have duties to respect the claims of wild animals and even to assist and help them in some situations—although we frequently fail to do so in practice. Third, it suggests that moral agents owe a duty of compensation and reparation to those animals they have harmed—intentionally or even unintentionally—by violating the latter’s claims. As humans often fall short of these two requirements, wild animals can be considered a particularly vulnerable group. Consequently, they should receive additional protection and attention, for example, in policy-making and in setting research priorities.

This chapter introduces three case studies of what can intuitively be deemed vulnerabilities. They illustrate the difficulties which arise when defining vulnerability. Furthermore, it presents different uses of vulnerability and provides an analysis of the concept. It identifies vulnerability as dispositional term, and introduces the distinction between universal and situational vulnerability. Finally, the chapter outlines what desiderata a definition of vulnerability should fulfill, concluding that an explicative definition of vulnerability is most suitable for the purposes of this book.

This chapter presents a definition of both universal and situational vulnerability. It argues that those beings with welfare and agency interests which can potentially be frustrated should be counted as generally vulnerable. If these basic interests are frustrated, one may experience justified or unpreventable harm, unjustified harm, or harmless wrongs. This implies that not all vulnerabilities are morally relevant. Rather, the account presented here allows for a distinction between, on the one hand, manifestations of vulnerability which are unpreventable parts of life and, on the other, those manifestations which are morally problematic. Furthermore, this chapter argues that those individuals and groups with a comparatively higher risk of having their claims disregarded or unfairly considered by moral agents should be deemed situationally particularly vulnerable and be afforded additional attention and special protection.

This chapter summarizes the book’s main ideas and arguments with regard to human and animal vulnerability. It identifies the specific function of vulnerability discourse—namely, directing our attention toward those individuals who need additional attention and special protection. Moreover, it addresses questions which are still open and in need of further investigation. Finally, responses and further clarifications are provided with regard to the account of vulnerability presented here, and further application fields of vulnerability discourse are fleshed out.

In this article, we discuss the ethics of research suspensions in animal research facilities and the consequent (mis)treatment of laboratory animals during emergencies. Through a case study from Switzerland during the COVID-19 pandemic, we articulate ethical principles and moral considerations that ought to guide the treatment and care of laboratory animals within animal research facilities during emergencies. They include a principle of preparedness, the importance of recognizing animal laboratory personnel as essential workers and conducting a Harm-Benefit Analysis in the case of an emergency, assigning responsibilities in a clear way, and providing psychological support in the aftermath of an emergency. More generally, we suggest that the pandemic should be taken as a learning opportunity for critically re-evaluating and improving emergency planning within animal research institutions worldwide, in view of mitigating risks to both human and animal well-being in future emergencies.

Human-wildlife interactions frequently lead to conflicts – about the fair use of natural resources, for example. Various principled accounts have been proposed to resolve such interspecies conflicts. However, the existing frameworks are often inadequate to the complexities of real-life scenarios. In particular, they frequently fail because they do not adequately take account of the qualitative importance of individual interests, their relative importance, and the number of individuals affected. This article presents a limited aggregation account designed to overcome these shortcomings and thus to facilitate decision-making in real-world human-wildlife conflicts.

In this chapter, Angela Martin explores what moral agents owe to insects as a potential food source. Given that no scientific consensus has yet been reached on the question of whether or not insects are sentient, she investigates three assumptions on that head, along with their moral implications: i) the view that insects are definitely not sentient; ii) the view that there is uncertainty about insect sentience; and iii) the view that insects are definitely sentient. Martin argues that under assumptions i) to iii), there are no strong reasons against eating insects. She thus concludes that it is morally permissible (although not morally obligatory) to use insects for human consumption.

In this open access book, Angela K. Martin thoroughly addresses what animal vulnerability is, how and why it matters from a moral point of view, and how it compares to human vulnerability. Vulnerability has been an important topic in bioethical discourse over the last forty years. Its predominant focus was on human vulnerability but recently, animal vulnerability has become a topic of philosophical investigation as well. She carefully explores both human and animal vulnerability, bringing out both their similarities and their differences, and she shows how vulnerability discourse can be made fruitful for animal ethics. This is an open access book.

In this chapter, it is argued that some animal shelters fulfill the conditions that make triage protocols necessary, namely, the operation with limited financial budgets, space, medical resources, and staff. It is suggested that requirements presented for triage in humans can be fruitfully applied to the context of animal shelters. The focus lies on the criteria of maximizing benefit, justice, medical criteria, life-span considerations, fair decision-making, patient will, re-evaluation of triage decisions and changes in the therapeutic goal, and burden of triage and staff support. The establishment of triage protocols for shelters will make the decision-making process less arbitrary, fairer, and more transparent. Furthermore, it is argued that, in situations where disagreement persist among shelter staff, an external Ethics Board could be called in to help analyze and potentially resolve some of the remaining ethical issues.

Human-wildlife interactions frequently lead to conflicts – about the fair use of natural resources, for example. Various principled accounts have been proposed to resolve such interspecies conflicts. However, the existing frameworks are often inadequate to the complexities of real-life scenarios. In particular, they frequently fail because they do not adequately take account of the qualitative importance of individual interests, their relative importance, and the number of individuals affected. This article presents a limited aggregation account designed to overcome these shortcomings and thus to facilitate decision-making in real-world human-wildlife conflicts.

Human and animal interests are often in conflict. In many situations, however, it is unclear how to evaluate and weigh competing human and animal interests, as the satisfaction of the interests of one group often inevitably occurs at the expense of those of the other group. Human-animal conflicts of this kind give rise to ethical questions. If animals count morally for their own sake, then we must ask in which cases the satisfaction or frustration of the interests of humans and animals in conflict situations is justified or unjustified from an ethical perspective. In this article, we argue that limited aggregation accounts represent a promising means for resolving interspecies conflicts. The reason for this is that they can appropriately consider the qualitative relevance of interests, their relative importance to each other, and the number of individuals affected. For our argument, we start from the premise that animals count morally for their own sake, albeit to a lesser extent than humans. That is, we accept the view that animals may be used, for example, as a source of food or in animal research. However, as we will show, many basic interests of animals are sufficiently similar to human interests and can thus be compared to them. Hence, they ought to be aggregated in cases of conflict with human interests. We illustrate our account and its practical implications with the real-world example of a human-animal conflict during the outbreak of a zoonotic disease among farmed animals. We conclude that, in many cases, animal interests ought to be given more importance than they currently receive, which includes distributing the burdens and risks of farming practices more fairly.

The purpose of this article is to show that animal rights are not necessarily at odds with the use of animals for research. If animals hold basic moral rights similar to those of humans, then we should consequently extend the ethical requirements guiding research with humans to research with animals. The article spells out how this can be done in practice by applying the seven requirements for ethical research with humans proposed by Ezekiel Emanuel, David Wendler and Christine Grady to animal research. These requirements are i) social value, ii) scientific validity, iii) independent review, iv) fair subject selection, v) favorable risk-benefit ratio, vi) informed consent, and vii) respect for research subjects. In practice, this means that we must reform the practice of animal research to make it more similar to research with humans, rather than completely abolish the former. Indeed, if we banned animal research altogether, then we would also deprive animals of its potential benefits – which would be ethically problematic.

Over 60% of all epidemics have a zoonotic origin, that is, they result from the transmission of infectious diseases from animals to humans. The spill-over of diseases often happens because humans exploit and use animals. In this article, I outline the four most common interfaces that favour the emergence and spread of zoonotic infectious diseases: wildlife hunting, small-scale farming, industrialised farming practices and live animal markets. I analyse which practices serve human food security – and thus have a non-trivial purpose – and which predominantly have an economic purpose or serve as a symbol of wealth. I conclude that many practices that increase the risk for zoonotic infectious disease outbreaks actually do not contribute to the survival and food security of humans. I make two arguments in turn. First, I argue that in cases where the consumption and use of animal products does not contribute to the food security of a population, then this population has a duty to abstain from them, since they impose a grave and avoidable risk to themselves as well as to innocent third-parties. However, some communities must sometimes rely on practices that increase the risk of emergence and transmission of zoonotic infectious diseases, because they have no healthy alternatives. That is, the food security of the local population depends on the consumption and use of risky animal products. The second argument I advance is that, in such scenarios, the international community has a duty to provide the communities concerned with alternative food options, as well as economic and educational opportunities and technologies, in order to reduce the spill-over risk of infectious diseases. Given that abstention from such practices contributes signifcantly to the public good and benefits the international community, the latter has a corresponding duty to provide local communities which abandon such practices with alternatives.

Human encroachment on the habitats of wild animals and the dense living conditions of farmed animals increase spill-over risk of emerging infectious diseases from animals to humans (such as COVID-19). In this article, we defend two claims: First, we argue that in order to limit the risk of emerging infectious disease outbreaks in the future, a One Health approach is needed, which focuses on human, animal, and environmental health. Second, we claim that One Health should not solely be grounded in collaborations between veterinary, medical, and environmental scientists, but should also involve more dialogue with animal and environmental ethicists. Such an interdisciplinary approach would result in epidemiology-driven measures that are ethically legitimate.

Die Wildtierethik beschäftigt sich mit der Frage, ob moralische Akteure empfindungsfähigen wildlebenden Tieren aus ethischer Sicht positive Pflichten in der Form von Rettungs-, Hilfs- und Unterstützungspflichten schulden, und falls ja, was diese Pflichten genau beinhalten. Haben wir die Verpflichtung, Wildtiere aus Naturkatastrophen wie Buschfeuern und aus den Fängen von Raubtieren zu retten? Sollen wir die Lebensqualität wilder Tiere beispielsweise durch Impfungen verbessern? Oder haben diese das Recht auf ein Leben frei jeglicher menschlicher Einmischung?In der Literatur finden sich verschiedene Vorschläge, was man unter einem ›Wildtier‹ verstehen soll. Ortsorientierten Definitionen zufolge leben Wildtiere in von Menschen unberührten Gebieten. Nicht-domestizierte Tiere, welche sich in Städten wiederfinden, wie beispielsweise migrierende Vögel, Waschbären oder Füchse, fallen diesem Verständnis zufolge nicht in die Gruppe der Wildtiere. Dispositionelle Definitionen beziehen sich auf das Verhalten von Tieren. Wildtiere sind demzufolge Tiere, welche nicht gezähmt sind. Hunde und Hähne, welche vom Menschen gezielt mit unkontrollierbaren und aggressiven Charakterzügen gezüchtet wurden, zählen somit zu den Wildtieren. Konstitutiven Definitionen zufolge sind Wildtiere nicht-domestizierte Tiere, also Tiere, in deren Physiologie und Wesensart nicht durch Züchtung eingegriffen wurde und welche nicht vom Menschen abhängig sind. Die meisten Autorinnen und Autoren beziehen sich auf letztere Definition wenn sie von Wildtieren sprechen.