Anthony Longo

Digital technology has prompted philosophers to rethink some of the fundamental categories we use to make sense of the world and ourselves. Particularly, the concept of ‘identity’ and its reconfiguration in the digital age has sparked much debate in this regard. While many studies have addressed the impact of the digital on personal and social identities, the concept of ‘collective identity’ has been remarkably absent in such inquiries. In this article, I take the context of social movements as an entry point to discuss the reconfiguration of collective identity in social media environments. I do so by introducing a narrative approach to collective identity. I argue that Twitter’s affordances invite new ways of constructing collective identities and imply a shifting relationship between the individual and the collective.

This article challenges the dominant ‘black box’ metaphor in critical algorithm studies by proposing a phenomenological framework for understanding how social media algorithms manifest themselves in user experience. While the black box paradigm treats algorithms as opaque, self-contained entities that exist only ‘behind the scenes’, this article argues that algorithms are better understood as genetic phenomena that unfold temporally through user-platform interactions. Recent scholarship in critical algorithm studies has already identified various ways in which algorithms manifest in user experience: through affective responses, algorithmic self-reflexivity, disruptions of normal experience, points of contention, and folk theories. Yet, while these studies gesture toward a phenomenological understanding of algorithms, they do so without explicitly drawing on phenomenological theory. This article demonstrates how phenomenology, particularly a Husserlian genetic approach, can further conceptualize these already-documented algorithmic encounters. Moving beyond both the paradigm of artifacts and static phenomenological approaches, the analysis shows how algorithms emerge as inherently relational processes that co-constitute user experience over time. By reconceptualizing algorithms as genetic phenomena rather than black boxes, this paper provides a theoretical framework for understanding how algorithmic awareness develops from pre-reflective affective encounters to explicit folk theories, while remaining inextricably linked to users’ self-understanding. This phenomenological framework contributes to a more nuanced understanding of algorithmic mediation in contemporary social media environments and opens new pathways for investigating digital technologies.

This article examines how algorithms mediate the human faculty of judgment within the context of social media. Challenging the common view that algorithms ‘undermine’ or ‘eliminate’ human judgment, I argue instead that they mediate the human-world relations in which judgments emerge. Drawing on Hannah Arendt’s phenomenological approach to identity and judgment, the article deconstructs prevailing assumptions about ‘human judgment’ and ‘algorithmic judgment’ and proposes a different approach to understand user-algorithm relations as co-constitutive rather than oppositional. In line with the ‘empirical turn’ in the philosophy of technology, which emphasizes the importance of grounding philosophical inquiry in lived experience, the proposed philosophical approach is developed and illustrated through a case study of ADHD-related content on TikTok. The case study demonstrates how algorithmic amplification becomes part of self-apprehension and public discourse. Through this lens, the article explores the interplay between self-disclosure, judgment, and the collective formation of political subjectivity, revealing the productive and disruptive roles algorithms play in these processes.

Since the 1990s, political theorists have widely mobilized Arendt’s theory of political action to theorize and assess the impact of digital media on the public sphere. These contributions, however, refer directly to her substantive-normative concepts without attending to how she develops them. This approach, I argue, has obscured the complex interplay between technology and political action in Arendt’s analysis of the public sphere. Drawing from Arendt’s phenomenological methodology (rather than her substantive-normative concepts), I propose that a more effective approach begins with a phenomenological analysis of the “world” as already shaped by the technological environment. This approach centers around the phenomenological notion of “intentionality” that shows (i) the fundamentally intentional character of political action and (ii) how technology plays a key role in (de)stabilizing this intentional structure. The result of this article is a methodological blueprint, consistent with Arendt’s methodology, to re-examine the digital transformation of the public sphere.

This article critically addresses current debates on the digital transformation of the public sphere. It responds to two contrasting responses to this transformation: the school of destruction, which expresses pessimism about the design of social media, and the school of restoration, which advocates for the redesign of social media to align with normative conceptions of the public sphere. However, so far these responses have omitted an explicit philosophical reflection on the relationship between politics, technology and design. After tracing back the current discourse on politics and technology to the Platonic tradition of political thought, I propose to re-arrange the relationship between poiesis, praxis and theoria assumed in this tradition. By connecting Arendt’s phenomenology of the political to postphenomenology and Derrida’s notion of ‘artifactuality’, this article proposes a renewed approach to think the political implications of technological change consistent with the ‘empirical turn’ in philosophy of technology. This approach unfolds in two moves: first, it examines how the design (poiesis) of new technological conditions makes space and time for certain kinds of events to become public; second, it takes the praxis emerging in response to these new conditions as a starting point for re-theorizing the political in specific mediated contexts. The article concludes by advocating for a ‘practical turn’ in political theory of technology, emphasizing the importance of engaging with design practices and artistic practices to refine foundational concepts in political theory.

Since the 1990s, political theorists studied the impact of digital media on the public sphere. These debates extensively employ Arendt’s theory of the public sphere to evaluate whether social media meets the expectations and criteria set forth in her account. This common approach rests on a methodological assumption that is itself not critically examined: it asserts that one should start with a clear understanding of what political action ‘truly’ is and only then attend to its potential relation with technology. However, this article identifies two issues with this approach: it overlooks the complex interplay between technology and political action, and struggles to adapt Arendt’s pre-digital era theory to digital environments. Nonetheless, I argue that Arendt’s phenomenological methodology (i.e., how she develops her political theory) does offer an effective starting point to explore the changing relationship between politics and technology in the contemporary public sphere. This approach begins with an exploration of the technological conditions shaping political action rather than with a pre-established notion of political action. I demonstrate how this methodological blueprint can be expanded with a postphenomenological framework to bring Arendt’s political theory into the digital age, revealing how digital technologies continuously re-stabilize the intentional structure of political action.

The paper explores the possibilities and limits of naturalizing the experience of intersubjectivity. The existence of mirror neurons illustrates that an experience of intersubjectivity is already present on a more primitive, precognitive, and embodied level. A similar argument had been made in the first half of the twentieth century by phenomenologists, such as Edmund Husserl. This motivated Vittorio Gallese, one of the discoverers of mirror neurons, and other philosophers to connect the functioning of mirror neurons with Husserl’s phenomenology of intersubjectivity as presented in his Cartesianische Meditationen. I argue that such attempts are grounded in an inadequate interpretation of Husserl’s analysis and turn into a circular argument. As such, they bypass a more primordial experience of intersubjectivity, which Husserl thematizes in Ideen II as the experience of an “expressive unity,” and which resists any project of naturalization from within.

Digital technology has prompted philosophers to rethink some of the fundamental categories we use to make sense of the world and ourselves. Particularly, the concept of ‘identity’ and its reconfiguration in the digital age has sparked much debate in this regard. While many studies have addressed the impact of the digital on personal and social identities, the concept of ‘collective identity’ has been remarkably absent in such inquiries. In this article, I take the context of social movements as an entry point to discuss the reconfiguration of collective identity in social media environments. I do so by introducing a narrative approach to collective identity. I argue that Twitter’s affordances invite new ways of constructing collective identities and imply a shifting relationship between the individual and the collective.