•  3
  •  6
    IX-Against Requirements of Rationality
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1part2): 157-176. 2008.
    Are inferences, theoretical and practical, subject to requirements of rationality? If so, are these of the form 'if … ought …' or 'ought … if …'? If the latter, how are we to understand the 'if'? It seems that, in all cases, we get unintuitive implications if 'ought' connotes having reason. It is difficult to formulate such requirements, and obscure what they explain. There might also be a requirement forbidding self-contradiction. It is a good question whether self-contradiction constitutes, or…Read more
  •  34
    Varieties of pleasure in Plato and Aristotle
    Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 52 177-208. 2017.
  •  8
    This paper discusses two debated questions about how best to interpret the contribution to the Symposium that Socrates pretends to derive from Diotima: Within the Lesser Mysteries, is the erōs that is being defined and characterized, with appeal to the notion of “generation in beauty”, a generic erōs that is equivalent to Socratic desire in general, or a specific erōs that is erotic in our sense? Within the Greater Mysteries, is interpersonal erōs maintained, or supplanted? I find that neither a…Read more
  •  6
    Contextuality in Practical Reason (review)
    Analysis 69 (3): 586-587. 2009.
    Anthony Price's recent book presents a contextualist approach to practical rationality. Price develops his proposal in four chapters. In the first one, he outlines a contextual account of the validity of practical inferences. This chapter deals with logicism. Logicism assumes that ‘there is a form of rationality within practical thinking that connects with the logical validity of a practical entailment’. Price argues that although the principles of logic are ‘invariant and universal’, their rele…Read more
  •  36
    Mental Conflict
    Routledge. 1994.
    As earthquakes expose geological faults, so mental conflict reveals tendencies to rupture within the mind. Dissension is rife not only between people but also within them, for each of us is subject to a contrariety of desires, beliefs, motivations, aspirations. What image are we to form of ourselves that might best enable us to accept the reality of discord, or achieve the ideal of harmony? Greek philosophers offer us a variety of pictures and structures intended to capture the actual and the po…Read more
  •  19
    A Quietist Particularism
    In David Bakhurst, Margaret Olivia Little & Brad Hooker (eds.), Thinking About Reasons: Themes From the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy, Oxford University Press. pp. 218. 2013.
  •  19
    Projectivism
    In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Wiley-blackwell. 2013.
  •  22
    Virtue and Reason in Plato and Aristotle
    Oxford University Press. 2011.
    A.W. Price explores the views of Plato and Aristotle on how virtue of character and practical reasoning enable agents to achieve eudaimonia--the state of living or acting well. He provides a full philosophical analysis and argues that the perennial question of action within human life is central to the reflections of these ancient philosophers.
  •  181
    Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle
    Oxford University Press. 1989.
    This book explores for the first time an idea common to both Plato and Aristotle: although people are separate, their lives need not be; one person's life may overflow into another's, so that helping someone else is a way of serving oneself. Price considers how this idea unites the philosophers' treatments of love and friendship (which are otherwise very different), and demonstrates that this view of love and friendship, applied not only to personal relationships, but also to the household and e…Read more
  •  92
    Against requirements of rationality
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt2): 157-176. 2008.
    Are inferences, theoretical and practical, subject to requirements of rationality? If so, are these of the form 'if … ought …' or 'ought … if …'? If the latter, how are we to understand the 'if'? It seems that, in all cases, we get unintuitive implications if 'ought' connotes having reason. It is difficult to formulate such requirements, and obscure what they explain. There might also be a requirement forbidding self-contradiction. It is a good question whether self-contradiction constitutes, or…Read more
  • Aristotle on the ends of deliberation
    In Michael Pakaluk & Giles Pearson (eds.), Moral Psychology and Human Action in Aristotle, Oxford University Press. 2011.
  •  38
    Emotions in Plato and Aristotle
    In Peter Goldie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion, Oxford University Press. 2009.
    Without separating off emotions as such, Plato and Aristotle alert us to their compositional intricacy, which involves body and mind, cognition and desire, perception and feeling. Even the differences of interpretation to which scholars are resigned focus our minds upon the complexity of the phenomena, and their resistance to over-unitary definitions. Emotions, after all, are things that we feel; at the same time, emotionally is how we often think. Discarding too simple a Socratic focus upon con…Read more
  •  23
    Review. Aristotle and moral realism. R Heinaman
    The Classical Review 47 (1): 79-81. 1997.