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Anthony Price

Birkbeck, University of London
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    49
    • Most Recent
    • Most Downloaded
    • Topics
  •  Events
    3
  •  News and Updates
    3

 More details
  • Birkbeck, University of London
    Department of Philosophy
    Other faculty (Postdoc, Visiting, etc)
Areas of Specialization
Meta-Ethics
Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Action
  • All publications (49)
  •  1614
    Choice and Action in Aristotle
    Phronesis 61 (4): 435-462. 2016.
    There is a current debate about the grammar of intention: do I intend to φ, or that I φ? The equivalent question in Aristotle relates especially to choice. I argue that, in the context of practical reasoning, choice, as also wish, has as its object an act. I then explore the role that this plays within his account of the relation of thought to action. In particular, I discuss the relation of deliberation to the practical syllogism, and the thesis that the conclusion of the second is an action.
    Aristotle: Voluntary and InvoluntaryPractical Reason, Misc
  •  335
    Love and friendship in Plato and Aristotle
    Oxford University Press. 1989.
    This book explores for the first time an idea common to both Plato and Aristotle: although people are separate, their lives need not be; one person's life may overflow into another's, so that helping someone else is a way of serving oneself. Price considers how this idea unites the philosophers' treatments of love and friendship (which are otherwise very different), and demonstrates that this view of love and friendship, applied not only to personal relationships, but also to the household and e…Read more
    This book explores for the first time an idea common to both Plato and Aristotle: although people are separate, their lives need not be; one person's life may overflow into another's, so that helping someone else is a way of serving oneself. Price considers how this idea unites the philosophers' treatments of love and friendship (which are otherwise very different), and demonstrates that this view of love and friendship, applied not only to personal relationships, but also to the household and even the city-state, promises to resolve the old dichotomy between egoism and altruism.
    AristotlePhilosophy of Love, MiscPlato: Poltical Philosophy, MiscPlato: FriendshipPlato: ErosPlato: …Read more
    AristotlePhilosophy of Love, MiscPlato: Poltical Philosophy, MiscPlato: FriendshipPlato: ErosPlato: Ethics, MiscAristotle: Ethics
  •  234
    Are Plato’s Soul-Parts Psychological Subjects?
    Ancient Philosophy 29 (1): 1-15. 2009.
    It is well-known that Plato’s Republic introduces a tripartition of the incarnate human soul; yet quite how to interpret his ‘parts’ 1 is debated. On a strong reading, they are psychological subjects – much as we take ourselves to be, but homunculi, not homines. On a weak reading, they are something less paradoxical: aspects of ourselves, identified by characteristic mental states, dispositional and occurrent, that tend to come into conflict. Christopher Bobonich supports the strong reading in h…Read more
    It is well-known that Plato’s Republic introduces a tripartition of the incarnate human soul; yet quite how to interpret his ‘parts’ 1 is debated. On a strong reading, they are psychological subjects – much as we take ourselves to be, but homunculi, not homines. On a weak reading, they are something less paradoxical: aspects of ourselves, identified by characteristic mental states, dispositional and occurrent, that tend to come into conflict. Christopher Bobonich supports the strong reading in his Plato’s Utopia Recast: His Later Ethics and Politics. In his The Brute Within: Appetitive Desire in Plato and Aristotle, Hendrik Lorenz agrees with Bobonich that the parts of the soul are ‘the subjects or bearers of psychological states’. Any ascription to my Mental Conflict of the opposed, weak view needs qualification: my Plato is highly ambivalent.2 But my intention here is less to defend an earlier self – though I predict failing to escape it – than to reconsider tripartition in the Republic in the light of Bobonich’s virtuosity and Lorenz’s lucidity. They persuade me of the inexhaustibility of the text, notably within Book 4 from 436 to 439. About these pages we may indeed disagree: they find them decisive in favour of their view, as I don’t. When Socrates remarks, ‘Let us have our understanding still more precise, lest as we proceed we become involved in dispute’, he was not anticipating the dissensions of interpreters.
    Plato: Philosophy of Mind, MiscClassicsPlato: Divided Soul
  •  202
    IX-Against Requirements of Rationality
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1part2): 157-176. 2008.
    Are inferences, theoretical and practical, subject to requirements of rationality? If so, are these of the form 'if … ought …' or 'ought … if …'? If the latter, how are we to understand the 'if'? It seems that, in all cases, we get unintuitive implications if 'ought' connotes having reason. It is difficult to formulate such requirements, and obscure what they explain. There might also be a requirement forbidding self-contradiction. It is a good question whether self-contradiction constitutes, or…Read more
    Are inferences, theoretical and practical, subject to requirements of rationality? If so, are these of the form 'if … ought …' or 'ought … if …'? If the latter, how are we to understand the 'if'? It seems that, in all cases, we get unintuitive implications if 'ought' connotes having reason. It is difficult to formulate such requirements, and obscure what they explain. There might also be a requirement forbidding self-contradiction. It is a good question whether self-contradiction constitutes, or evidences, irrationality; but talk of a rational requirement causes trouble.
    Rational Requirements
  •  139
    Emotions in Plato and Aristotle
    In Peter Goldie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion, Oxford University Press. 2009.
    Without separating off emotions as such, Plato and Aristotle alert us to their compositional intricacy, which involves body and mind, cognition and desire, perception and feeling. Even the differences of interpretation to which scholars are resigned focus our minds upon the complexity of the phenomena, and their resistance to over-unitary definitions. Emotions, after all, are things that we feel; at the same time, emotionally is how we often think. Discarding too simple a Socratic focus upon con…Read more
    Without separating off emotions as such, Plato and Aristotle alert us to their compositional intricacy, which involves body and mind, cognition and desire, perception and feeling. Even the differences of interpretation to which scholars are resigned focus our minds upon the complexity of the phenomena, and their resistance to over-unitary definitions. Emotions, after all, are things that we feel; at the same time, emotionally is how we often think. Discarding too simple a Socratic focus upon contents of thought, Plato and Aristotle embrace the interconnections, within the emotions, of body and soul, and of perception, imagination, feeling, and thinking.
    Aristotle: Perception
  •  133
    The Posterior Analytics - Jonathan Barnes: Aristotle's Posterior Analytics. Pp. xix + 277. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975. Cloth, £7
    The Classical Review 28 (1): 86-87. 1978.
    Aristotle's Works in LogicClassicsAristotle: Logic and Philosophy of Language
  •  129
    Doubts about Projectivism
    Philosophy 61 (236). 1986.
    How, in pursuit of ontological neutrality, should one talk about values? I propose to say: there are values. Those three words do nothing to define within what kind of conception of a world values are at home.1 I take it that the ‘realist’ must have more to say about values and their world. I recognize that an ‘anti-realist’ may prefer to talk of value-terms ; I ask him to wait and see whether taking the linguistic turn is the only way to put values in their place.
    Moral Projectivism
  •  121
    Virtue and Reason in Plato and Aristotle
    Oxford University Press. 2011.
    A.W. Price explores the views of Plato and Aristotle on how virtue of character and practical reasoning enable agents to achieve eudaimonia--the state of living or acting well. He provides a full philosophical analysis and argues that the perennial question of action within human life is central to the reflections of these ancient philosophers.
    Aristotle: Moral VirtuesWeakness of WillAristotle: HappinessAction Theory, MiscellaneousPlato: Moral…Read more
    Aristotle: Moral VirtuesWeakness of WillAristotle: HappinessAction Theory, MiscellaneousPlato: Moral VirtuePlato: Ethics, Misc
  •  118
    Reasoning about Justice in Plato's Republic
    Philosophical Inquiry 30 (3-4): 25-35. 2008.
    Plato: RepublicPlato: Justice
  •  113
    Simon Blackburn, Essays in Quasi-Realism, New York, Oxford University Press, 1993, pp. 262
    Utilitas 7 (1): 172. 1995.
    Quasi-RealismMoral Judgment
  •  107
    Aristotle on Desire, Its Objects, and Varieties
    Polis 31 (1): 160-167. 2014.
    I discuss various crucial points, most notably the relation between desire and the good
    Ancient Greek and Roman PhilosophyAncient Greek and Roman Philosophy: TopicsClassical Greek Philosop…Read more
    Ancient Greek and Roman PhilosophyAncient Greek and Roman Philosophy: TopicsClassical Greek Philosophy
  •  99
    Mental Conflict
    Routledge. 1994.
    As earthquakes expose geological faults, so mental conflict reveals tendencies to rupture within the mind. Dissension is rife not only between people but also within them, for each of us is subject to a contrariety of desires, beliefs, motivations, aspirations. What image are we to form of ourselves that might best enable us to accept the reality of discord, or achieve the ideal of harmony? Greek philosophers offer us a variety of pictures and structures intended to capture the actual and the po…Read more
    As earthquakes expose geological faults, so mental conflict reveals tendencies to rupture within the mind. Dissension is rife not only between people but also within them, for each of us is subject to a contrariety of desires, beliefs, motivations, aspirations. What image are we to form of ourselves that might best enable us to accept the reality of discord, or achieve the ideal of harmony? Greek philosophers offer us a variety of pictures and structures intended to capture the actual and the possible either within a reason that fails to be resolute, or within a split soul that houses a play of forces. Reflection upon them alerts us to the elusiveness at once of mental reality, and of the understanding by which we hope to capture and transform it. Studying in turn the treatments of _Mental Conflict_ in Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics, A.W. Price demonstrates how the arguments of the Greeks are still relevant to philosophical discussion today.
    Stoics, MiscPlato, MiscPlato: Philosophy of Mind, MiscClassicsAristotlePhilosophy of Mind
  •  94
    Varieties of pleasure in Plato and Aristotle
    Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 52 177-208. 2017.
    History: PleasurePlato: Philosophy of MindAristotle: Philosophy of Mind, Misc
  •  94
    Martha Nussbaum’s Symposium
    Ancient Philosophy 11 (2): 285-299. 1991.
    ClassicsPlato: Symposium
  •  90
    Aristotle's ethical holism
    Mind 89 (355): 338-352. 1980.
    Aristotle
  •  87
    Review of John Ibberson: The language of decision: an essay in prescriptivist ethical theory (review)
    Ethics 98 (4): 841-842. 1988.
    Value TheoryMoral Prescriptivism
  •  87
    Review of M. Burnyeat & M. Frede, The Pseudo-Platonic Seventh Letter
    Plato: Letters
  •  86
    Before Sexuality (review)
    Ancient Philosophy 13 (2): 481-488. 1993.
    Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy, Misc
  •  81
    Aristotle (review)
    Ancient Philosophy 21 (1): 215-223. 2001.
    Aristotle's WorksClassical Greek Philosophy
  •  77
    Loving Persons Platonically
    Phronesis 26 (1). 1981.
    Plato: ErosPlato: Friendship
  •  77
    Book Review:Ethical Emotivism. Stephen Satris (review)
    Ethics 98 (3): 579-. 1988.
    Moral Emotivism and Sentimentalism
  •  74
    Praktisches Folgern und Selbst gestaltung nach Aristoteles (review)
    The Classical Review 34 (1): 134-135. 1984.
    Ancient Greek and Roman PhilosophyAristotleClassicsAnselm
  •  74
    Virtue and Knowledge: an Introduction to Ancient Greek Ethics (review)
    The Classical Review 41 (2): 499-500. 1991.
    Ancient Greek and Roman EthicsClassicsAncient Greek and Roman Philosophy: Introductions and Sourcebo…Read more
    Ancient Greek and Roman EthicsClassicsAncient Greek and Roman Philosophy: Introductions and Sourcebooks
  •  72
    Review. Aristotle and moral realism. R Heinaman
    The Classical Review 47 (1): 79-81. 1997.
    AristotleMoral RealismEthics
  •  63
    Colloquium 6: Was Aristotle a Particularist?
    Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 21 (1): 191-233. 2006.
    Moral Particularism
  •  63
    The Fabric of Character (review)
    Ancient Philosophy 10 (2): 332-337. 1990.
    ClassicsPlato: Philosophy of Mind, MiscPlato: Moral EducationAristotle: Ethics
  •  62
    Acrasia and self-control
    In Richard Kraut (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 234--254. 2006.
    The prelims comprise: Prelude Aristotle's Account Difficulties and Alternatives Aristotle's Motivation Acknowledgments Notes Reference Further reading.
    Aristotle
  •  60
    Plato’s Ethics (review)
    Ancient Philosophy 16 (1): 189-194. 1996.
    ClassicsPlato: Ethics, Misc
  •  59
    Essays on the nicomachean ethics. D. Henry, K.m. Nielsen bridging the gap between Aristotle's science and ethics. Pp. XIV + 304. Cambridge: Cambridge university press, 2015. Cased, £70, us$110. Isbn: 978-1-107-01036-9 (review)
    The Classical Review 66 (2): 368-369. 2016.
    Aristotle: EthicsAristotle: Natural Science
  •  54
    Listening to the Cicadas: A Study of Plato's Phaedrus
    with G. R. F. Ferrari
    Philosophical Review 99 (3): 447. 1990.
    Plato: Phaedrus
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