Beatriz Marques

In this paper we challenge the commonly held view that episodic memory necessarily involves conscious sensory mental imagery and, more generally, that it is best characterized in terms of the reexperiencing of past events. We do so based on the case of aphantasia, a condition that affects one’s ability to generate sensory mental images. If episodic memory necessarily involves sensory imagery, then global aphantasics should lack episodic memory. We compare aphantasics with patients with severe episodic amnesia and argue that, unlike them, aphantasics are capable of retrieving and representing events from their personal past. We also consider and reject the objection that aphantasics remember past events solely by means of semantic memory, and not episodic memory. In particular, we argue that aphantasics’ memories can include contextual information tied to a specific past occurrence, represented as belonging to one’s personal past. The upshot is that episodic memory does not depend on conscious sensory imagery. We conclude by proposing a characterization of episodic memory which highlights the importance of mental representations carrying specific contextual information regarding past personally experienced events, while remaining neutral about the conscious vehicles of those representations.

Tradicionalmente, a questão da identidade pessoal é considerada a questão a respeito ao que faz uma pessoa ser a mesma ao longo do tempo. Recentemente, porém, atenção à experiência fenomênica trouxe uma nova perspectiva ao debate. À luz dessa mudança de perspectiva, Klein sugere que indivíduos com amnésia episódica retrógrada retêm uma noção de quem são, além de terem senso de continuidade. Ele, portanto, argumenta que a memória episódica não é necessária para se ter sensação de si mesmo diacrônica. Desafiamos a conclusão de Klein apontando que existem tipos mais extremos de amnésia—amnésia psicogênica—que parecem problemáticos à sua proposta de que o senso de continuidade é suficiente para se ter sensação de si mesmo diacrônico. Esse é o caso, porque alguns exemplos de amnésia psicogênica são casos de amnésia dissociativa, que mostram que ter uma experiência consciente contínua não resolve o problema.

The debate about moral responsibility for one’s actions often revolves around whether the agent had the ability to do otherwise. An alternative account of moral responsibility, however, focuses on the actual sequence that produces the agent’s action and which criteria it must fulfil for the agent to be considered morally responsible for her action. Mental Time Travel allows the agent to simulate a possible future scenario; therefore, it is relevant for the selection of a course of action. I will argue that implicit prospection is a rudimentary form of Mental Time Travel and that the role that implicit prospection, or non-rudimentary forms of Mental Time Travel, plays in the production of intentional actions helps explain guidance control and, hence, moral responsibility. Keywords: implicit prospection, guidance control, feeling the future, plan, intention.