Benjamin James Mullins

This volume contains a selection of essays in normative ethics by Shelly Kagan published between 1988 and 2018. Its successor volume (Rethinking Intrinsic Value & Other Essays on the Good) collects essays on value, well-being, and desert. The essays contained in this volume have been grouped thematically into three sections. The volume opens with a cluster of essays that concern the structure of normative ethics. The second group of essays explores the various methods of normative ethics, critically examining the role of thought experiments and the practical difficulty of following moral principles given various epistemic limitations. The final section brings together essays on practical ethics. It contains a preface by Professor Kagan, an introduction by the two editors, as well as an editorial commentary that identifies interrelations between Kagan’s published works and points to various criticisms and developments of Kagan’s work by other philosophers.

Oftentimes many individual acts lead to a significantly (dis-)valuable outcome though the performance of each act makes no valuative difference to that outcome. Such cases give rise to a dilemma. For it seemingly doesn’t matter whether one performs an act (or not) if it doesn’t make a difference. Yet it matters a great deal when many of these acts are performed, provided they bring about a significant outcome. One might think, therefore, that at least some reason favours the performance of such acts. But in the absence of a valuative difference, it is difficult to say what that reason is, exactly. The above dilemma arises in both intrapersonal and interpersonal cases. For instance, in the intrapersonal case, it seemingly makes little difference to my goal of running the marathon whether I skip a single workout. Yet it makes a significant difference to my goal of running the marathon if I skip all of my workouts. And, in the interpersonal case, it seemingly makes no difference to the bad effects of climate change if I choose to be a vegan or not. Yet it makes a significant difference to the bad effects of climate change if we all choose to be vegans. This dilemma has generated a substantial body of literature in both ethics and rational choice. Surprisingly, however, there has been little crossover between the two fields of study. The motivation for the special issue was to offer an avenue to explore new solutions or perspectives on the dilemma through the lens of one, or both of these fields.