Benoit Gaultier

Following a common assumption, when one inquires into a question, one has an inquisitive attitude towards it. More precisely, I shall assume that there is an inquisitive attitude towards Q that all of those who inquire into Q have in common and in virtue of which they can be said to be in an inquisitive state of mind towards Q. This paper is about the nature of this attitude. I elucidate it by examining whether it boils down to doubt, curiosity, epistemic desire, or wondering. I shall do this by examining whether having these attitudes is necessary and sufficient for being in an inquisitive state of mind. The test will prove negative for the first three, but the case of wondering is more complex.

In this paper I examine two common conservative responses to two questions about social progress: How should social progress be pursued? And when does social change constitute social progress? These two responses can be summarised as follows: “Less teleologically, and less often, than non-conservatives generally think”. The first response is anchored in a criticism of the claims of reason in the pursuit of social progress. I reconstruct and examine this criticism and its variants, and then turn to the second response, and more specifically to a way of arguing for it based on value conservatism. I argue that, even if correct, value conservatism speaks less often against social change than conservatives generally think.

In this chapter I address the questions of whether philosophy is a progressive discipline, and of how it differs from other disciplines, by focusing on the case of philosophical disagreement. It is often argued that, from the widespread and distinctive lack of agreement we observe in philosophical debates about whether this or that philosophical view is right, two things follow. First, philosophical claims cannot be justified, and, a fortiori, cannot amount to knowledge, so we should be sceptics about them. Second, the appropriate doxastic attitude in philosophy is not belief but something weaker, more detached, like acceptance or supposition. I indicate how to resist these alleged consequences of the kind of dissensus that reigns in philosophy. In order to do this, I first present the line of reasoning that leads many authors to draw revisionary or epistemologically pessimistic conclusions from the kind of dissensus we observe in philosophy (§2). I then explain why this dissensus is not, in reality, as widespread as it seems, and hence leaves the epistemic status of most of our philosophical claims, and of our doxastic attitudes toward them, largely intact. I then indicate why the existence of dissensus does not in itself support the claim that philosophy is not a progressive discipline (§3). I then turn to the question of whether philosophy can qualify as a progressive discipline. I start by addressing the question of how to account for the distinctive way in which, as a matter of fact, we react to philosophical disagreement and, more generally, to philosophical testimony (§4). After indicating why the idea that autonomy plays a distinctive role in philosophy cannot by itself account for the distinctive way in which we react to philosophical testimony (§5), I explain why the idea that understanding plays such a role can do so (§6). Finally, I address the question of whether the increase in philosophical understanding that has indisputably taken place during the last century for instance is sufficient for philosophy to be a truly progressive discipline (§7).

This paper addresses the question of how to account for the distinctive way in which, as a matter of fact, we react to philosophical disagreement and, more generally, to philosophical testimony. The paper explains how exactly the idea that understanding occupies a central place in philosophy can account for this. It examines two interpretations of this idea and argues that the second, but not the first, can solve the so‐called puzzle of philosophical testimony. This second interpretation turns out to be compatible with the idea that philosophy aims at finding out or knowing substantive philosophical truths rather than at understanding them. The paper then turns to the question of whether this central place means that philosophy is not a collective discipline.

À la question de savoir quelles sont, parmi nos attitudes cognitives, celles qui admettent des degrés, c’est-à-dire celles qui sont gradables, on sera sans doute enclin à répondre qu’à première vue la chose est clairement vraie de la croyance et qu’elle ne l’est ni de la foi ni de la suspension de jugement. En effet, tandis qu’il semble faire parfaitement sens de dire qu’on ne croit pas complètement quelque chose mais qu’on y croit à moitié seulement, ne serait-il pas étrange d’affirmer qu’on a à moitié foi en quelque chose mais pas complètement ? La foi, pourrait-on ajouter, est une chose qu’on a ou qu’on n’a pas, une chose qu’on peut perdre ou qu’on peut conserver ; et l’on ne peut pas à moitié perdre une chose ni en partie la conserver (étant entendu qu’on peut évidemment en perdre ou en conserver une partie). Quant à la suspension, n’est-elle pas encore plus clairement que la foi affaire de tout ou rien ? N’est-il pas absurde de dire qu’on suspend légèrement, à moitié, ou presque entièrement son jugement sur une question donnée ? ou qu’à son propos tel individu suspend davantage son jugement que tel autre ? Dans ce chapitre, je voudrais montrer qu’aucune de ces affirmations n’est incontestable : il est possible de défendre une conception plausible de la croyance d’après laquelle cette dernière n’admet pas de degrés et des conceptions plausibles de la foi et de la suspension de jugement d’après lesquelles ces attitudes, quant à elles, en admettent.

Avant d’être tenu pour une relique d’une époque révolue dont on ne sait plus que faire, le progrès eût ses défenseurs et ses apôtres. Mais, étrangement, rares sont les penseurs du progrès à s’être réellement interrogés sur sa nature – comme si l’on pouvait être pour ou contre une chose sans savoir ce qu’elle est au juste, et si elle est même simplement possible. À rebours de cette tendance, ce livre examine la nature et la possibilité du progrès, en différents domaines : le progrès scientifique est-il exposé aux critiques radicales qui en sont parfois faites ? Le progrès de l’humanité pourrait-il être biomédical ? Quelle est la force des arguments que le conservatisme oppose au progrès social ? À quelles conditions un progrès moral est-il possible ? Et peut-on donner un sens à l’idée de progrès artistique ?

La variété des trente-six essais recueillis dans ce volume en hommage à l'œuvre de Claudine Tiercelin voudrait témoigner de l'impressionnante étendue de son travail philosophique. De Duns Scot à la métaphysique contemporaine, de Berkeley aux débats les plus actuels en épistémologie et en philosophie de l'esprit, du fondateur du pragmatisme Charles Peirce à la discussion des positions néo-pragmatistes, s'est développée chez Claudine Tiercelin, sur près d'un demi-siècle, une philosophie dont l’inspiration et les méthodes l'inscrivent dans la tradition analytique, mais qui évoque aussi par son intransigeance l’école rationaliste française, et par son ambition les plus grands systèmes de l’histoire de la philosophie.

Traditionnellement mobilisés en métaphysique, les cas de fission – qui mettent en scène la duplication d’états mentaux d’un individu afin qu’ils soient instanciés par d’autres individus – suscitent l’intuition suivante : une action accomplie avant une fission devrait être imputée aux individus qui en résultent dès lors que ces derniers héritent de la structure mentale de l’individu d’origine. Cette intuition entre toutefois en tension avec une autre, apparemment tout aussi forte, selon laquelle l’attribuabilité d’une action à une personne requiert qu’elle soit numériquement identique à celle ayant accompli cette action. Dans cet article, nous articulons d’abord ces deux intuitions puis montrons qu’aucune des principales théories de l’identité personnelle diachronique ne parvient à les rendre compatibles. Enfin, nous défendons l’abandon de l’exigence d’identité stricte portée par la seconde intuition, au profit d’un critère fondé sur la continuité psychologique. Cette approche, soutenons-nous, reflète plus fidèlement nos intuitions morales fondamentales en matière de justice.

This paper addresses the question of how to account for the distinctive way in which, as a matter of fact, we react to philosophical disagreement and, more generally, to philosophical testimony. The paper explains how exactly the idea that understanding occupies a central place in philosophy can account for this. It examines two interpretations of this idea and argues that the second, but not the first, can solve the so-called puzzle of philosophical testimony. This second interpretation turns out to be compatible with the idea that philosophy aims at finding out or knowing substantive philosophical truths rather than at understanding them. The paper then turns to the question of whether this central place means that philosophy is not a collective discipline.

The intuition that knowledge requires the satisfaction of some sort of anti-luck condition is widely shared. I examine the claim that modal robustness is sufficient for satisfying this condition: for a true belief to be non-luckily true, it is sufficient that this belief is safe and sensitive. I argue that this claim is false by arguing that, at least when it comes to beliefs in necessary truths, satisfying the anti-luck condition requires satisfying a non-modal condition. I also advance a plausible candidate for this condition and argue for the implausibility of mathematical Platonism on this basis.

Following a common assumption, when one inquires into a question, one has an inquisitive attitude towards it. More precisely, I shall assume that there is an inquisitive attitude towards Q that all of those who inquire into Q have in common and in virtue of which they can be said to be in an inquisitive state of mind towards Q. This paper is about the nature of this attitude. I elucidate it by examining whether it boils down to doubt, curiosity, epistemic desire, or wondering. I shall do this by examining whether having these attitudes is necessary and sufficient for being in an inquisitive state of mind. The test will prove negative for the first three, but the case of wondering is more complex.

My aim in this article is to elucidate the nature of a form of intellectual and practical neutrality that is not covered by existing accounts of suspension of judgment. After rejecting some inadequate characterizations of this attitude of neutrality, I provide a positive characterization of it: it is a successful effort to resist certain tendencies that are part of the dispositional profile of the doxastic state one is in on a given issue. I conclude by saying a few words about the reasons for which this effort can be made, and by answering in the negative the question of whether all the attitudes that can be characterized as attitudes of committed neutrality are of the same type.

We regularly intentionally expose ourselves to fictions we take to be likely to elicit in us emotions we generally find unpleasant when prompted by actual states of affairs. This is the so-called “paradox of tragedy.” We contribute to solving the paradox of tragedy by denying that, when fiction-directed, most of these emotions are in themselves unpleasant. We first provide strong evidence that these emotions, such as fear, sadness, or pity, are often enjoyed when fiction-directed. We then advance an explanation of what makes these fiction-directed emotions often not unpleasant, while their reality-directed counterparts are generally so. In the last section, we advance an explanation of what makes fiction-directed emotions often enjoyable, and argue that a complete solution to the paradox of tragedy should be pluralist.

Uniformism is the view that one and the same epistemology should apply for all modal knowledge. I argue that, whether or not all modal knowledge can be accounted for in terms of knowledge of essences, uniformism about knowledge of essences is untenable. I do this by showing that, while some essences are empirically discoverable, others are not. I then argue that the uniquely realisable–non-uniquely realisable distinction is a better metaphysical candidate for grounding this epistemic difference than the concrete–abstract distinction. I conclude by suggesting that the task of philosophy is to identify non-empirically discoverable essences.

Le pragmatisme semble etre devenu la chose du monde la mieux partagee. A la fois revolution philosophique et rehabilitation du sens commun, il est en tout cas difficile aujourd'hui de se declarer anti-pragmatiste sans apparaitre vouloir defendre une forme depassee de ratiocination scolastique. Cet etat de fait necessite qu'une reponse claire soit apportee a la question Qu'est-ce que le pragmatisme?. La these qui se trouve defendue dans cet ouvrage est que le coeur, a la fois historique et conceptuel, du pragmatisme consiste dans une theorie de la rationalite epistemique dont suit une theorie de la verite et, plus particulierement, de son role dans la croyance et l'enquete. Le commentaire du texte de Peirce permet d'aborder la question de la nature du faillibilisme et de la maniere dont l'enquete scientifique doit etre regulee.

How is it possible for deontic evaluations of beliefs to be appropriate if we do not have voluntary control over our beliefs? Gaultier argues that we should reject the claim that we can have indirect control over beliefs in virtue of the basic voluntary control we have over our actions. We have another kind of indirect control over beliefs: we can demonstrate doxastic strength or, on the contrary, doxastic weakness when forming our beliefs. That is, we can resist or, on the contrary, fail to resist the influence of some of our conative attitudes. And in the same way that we take our actions to be open to blame when they result from having demonstrated weakness of will even though this does not consist in doing something at will, we take our beliefs to be open to blame and hence subject to deontic evaluation, when they result from having demonstrated doxastic weakness even though this does not consist in doing something at will.

Charles S. Peirce holds some views about science and inquiry whose exact significance and ratio essendi are notoriously hard to grasp. One of these is particularly intriguing, namely, his frequently inferring from the intuitive ideas that science consists “in diligent inquiry into truth for truth’s sake”, and that the greatest threat to science is to “block the way of inquiry”, the conclusions that “belief […] has no place in science” and that the “scientific man”, when inquiring, has only “provisional” opinions. In this article, I examine the ground and validity of the infamous and, arguably, strongly counterintuitive thesis that “belief has...

It seems to be a platitude that the belief that p is correct iff it is true that p. And the claim that truth is the correct‐making feature of belief seems to be just another way of expressing this platitude. It is often thought that this indicates that truth constitutes a normative standard or criterion of correctness for belief because it seems to follow from this platitude that having a false belief is believing wrongly, and having a true belief is believing rightly or correctly. In this paper, I aim to show that when we judge the platitude in question to be indisputably true, we do not endorse that truth is normative for belief but merely the triviality that the belief that p is true iff it is true that p.

There clearly seems to be something problematic with certain forms of epistemic dependence. However, it has proved surprisingly difficult to articulate what this problem is exactly. My aim in this paper is to make clear when it is problematic to rely on others or on artefacts and technologies that are external to us for the acquisition and maintenance of our beliefs, and why. In order to do so, I focus on the neuromedia thought experiment. After having rejected different ways in which one might want to capture the intuition in question, I argue that this device deprives us of understanding and therefore of the most valuable epistemic good. I then address the question of whether the moral of the story is that we should not develop, be equipped with, or use devices such as the neuromedia.