Björn Lundgren

In the privacy literature, epistemic analyses of privacy are quite popular. However, epistemic accounts of the right to privacy face substantial challenges. Epistemic analyses of privacy also suffer from the prima facie puzzling alignment challenge (according to which there are cases when an individual’s right to privacy is violated even if their privacy is unaffected). A recent proposal by Lauritz Aastrup Munch provides a solution to these issues by defending the so-called “inquiry account of the right to privacy.” In this paper, it is argued that the inquiry account of the right to privacy must be rejected and that the project is misguided, as the underlying extensional evidence does not reveal much about the conceptual and normative nature of privacy and the right to privacy. That is, the alignment challenge is surprisingly not puzzling after all, because—as will be argued—it has a simple solution that has nothing to do with privacy and privacy rights as such, but generalizes to other values/interests and the rights thereto. Specifically, I will defend an idea from my earlier work according to which the right to privacy can be violated by actions that (substantially) risk the diminishment of someone’s privacy.

This chapter provides a theoretical lens on conceptual disruption. It offers a typology of conceptual disruption, discusses its relation to conceptual engineering, and sketches a programmatic view of the implications of conceptual disruption for the ethics of technology. We begin by distinguishing between three different kinds of conceptual disruptions: conceptual gaps, conceptual overlaps, and conceptual misalignments. Subsequently, we distinguish between different mechanisms of conceptual disruption, and two modes of conceptual change. We point out that disruptions may be induced by technology, but can also be triggered by intercultural exchanges. Conceptual disruptions frequently yield conceptual uncertainty and may call for conceptual and ethical inquiry. We argue that a useful approach to address conceptual disruptions is to engage in conceptual engineering. We outline what conceptual engineering involves and argue that discussions on conceptual disruption and conceptual engineering can benefit from closer integration. In closing, we discuss the relevance of studying conceptual disruption for technology ethics, and point to the promise of this line of research to innovate practical philosophy at large.

So-called “deepfakes” (i.e., highly believable but fabricated media) are infamous for their potential political application. However, they can also contain false information about individuals, which raises the question whether deepfakes can violate a moral right to privacy. This question is directly related to the often ignored but still highly contentious issue of whether the spreading or use of false or fake information can violate a moral right to privacy. While such queries normally turn on how we conceptualize a moral right to privacy, they are answered here based on premises that any conception of the moral right to privacy must adhere to.

Social AI systems have the potential to outperform humans in certain ways—raising the question of whether we should have AI systems (including robots) replace humans in the labor market (i.e., not only in non-social contexts). This article will first put forward three sets of pro tanto reasons why social AI systems should not be implemented, then it will consider three possible situations in which these reasons may be overridden, arguing that the use of social AI is only justified in a very circumscribed set of cases. Moreover, in situations in which replacement is justified, the AI systems’ social and informational capabilities should be limited. And finally, where social AI systems are utilized, they should be made to comply with certain social codes.

The AI Act advances a risk-based approach to the legal regulation of AI systems in the European Union. While we support this development, we argue that adequate AI governance requires paying attention to the broader implications of AI systems on the socio-technical landscape in which they are designed, developed, and used. In addition to risk-based impact assessments, this involves coming to terms with the socially disruptive implications of AI, which should be governed and guided in a dynamic ecosystem of regulation, law, ethics, and evolving human practice. In this paper, we outline a ‘social disruptiveness-based’ approach to AI governance aimed at addressing disruptions by AI that are not easily captured by legal regulation, but that are nonetheless of great societal and ethical concern. We argue that integrating the AI Act risk-based approach with a social disruptiveness-based approach can offer a more nuanced understanding of the dimensions of impact of AI systems on society at large, thus enhancing the governance of AI and other socially disruptive technologies.

Recently, Martin Smith defended a view he called the “normic de minimis expected utility theory”. The basic idea is to integrate a ‘normic’ version of the de minimis principle into an expected utility-based decision theoretical framework. According to the de minimis principle some risks are so small (falling below a threshold) that they can be ignored. While this threshold standardly is defined in terms of some probability, the normic conception of de minimis defines this threshold in terms of abnormality. In this article, we present three independent arguments against the normic de minimis expected utility theory, focusing on its reliance on the de minimis principle.

In the ancient example of the Ship of Theseus, a ship is restored, having all its parts replaced. Ancient philosophers in Athens wondered if the restored ship was identical to the original ship. About 2000 years later, Thomas Hobbes introduced a twist; after all of the parts of the original ship had been replaced, what if the original parts of the ship had been kept and were now reassembled into a ship? If so, which ship would be identical to the original ship (if any)? In this article, I argue that if an object has all its parts replaced and all those parts are reassembled in the same structural order as the original object, then the reassembled object is identical to the original one. Moreover, in response to the original query, I argue that the original ship survives restoration in cases when its old parts are destroyed in case none of the original parts are too significant. The arguments will rely on a philosophical method that—unlike standard methods of metaphysics—depends on bottom‐up rather than top‐down intuitions, by which I mean that I will rely on intuitions about ordinary macro‐world events rather than theories that depend on intuitions about fundamental metaphysical properties.

This book features a unique selection of works presented at the 2019 annual international conference of the International Association for Computing and Philosophy (IACAP). Every contribution has been peer-reviewed, revised, and extended. The included chapters are thematically diverse; topics include epistemology, dynamic epistemic logic, topology, philosophy of science and computation, game theory and abductive inferences, automated reasoning and mathematical proofs, computer simulations, scientific modelling, applied ethics, pedagogy, human-robot interactions, and big data, algorithms, and artificial intelligence. The volume is a testament to the value of interdisciplinary approaches to the computational and informational turn. We live in a time of tremendous development, which requires rigorous reflection on the philosophical nature of these technologies and how they are changing the world. How can we understand these technologies? How do these technologies change our understanding of the world? And how do these technologies affect our place as humans in the world? These questions, and more, are addressed in this volume which is of interest to philosophers, engineers, and computer scientists alike.

Online privacy policies or terms and conditions ideally provide users with information about how their personal data are being used. The reality is that very few users read them: they are long, often hard to understand, and ubiquitous. The average internet user cannot realistically read and understand all aspects that apply to them and thus give informed consent to the companies who use their personal data. In this article, we provide a basic overview of a solution to the problem. We suggest that software could allow users to delegate the consent process and consent could thus be automated. The article investigates the practical feasibility of this idea. After suggesting that it is feasible, we develop some normative issues that we believe should be addressed before automated consent is implemented.

Recently, Martin Smith defended a view he called the “normic de minimis expected utility theory”. The basic idea is to integrate a ‘normic’ version of the de minimis principle into an expected utility-based decision theoretical framework. According to the de minimis principle some risks are so small (falling below a threshold) that they can be ignored. While this threshold standardly is defined in terms of some probability, the normic conception of de minimis defines this threshold in terms of abnormality. In this article, we present three independent arguments against the normic de minimis expected utility theory, focusing on its reliance on the de minimis principle.

Although philosophy cites less than most other academic subjects, many scholars still take a lack of reference to and engagement with the relevant literature as a reason to reject a paper in philosophy. Here I argue against that idea. Literature requests should only in rare circumstances be an absolute requirement, and a lack of (engagement with) references is not a good reason to reject a paper. Lastly, I briefly discuss whether an author has reasons to provide references, and I argue that although there are special circumstances in which we ought to avoid referencing papers, there are strong reasons in favor of engaging with the literature. Hence there is an asymmetry between what the author has a reason to do in writing a paper and how reviewers and editors ought to evaluate it.

Most analyses of can and abilities accept what is known as the poss-ability principle (i.e. that an agent S is able to Φ only if it is possible for S to Φ). In this paper, I devise a new route to rejecting the poss-ability principle. I argue that the poss-ability principle is incompatible with some kind of agent, such as God; that the poss-ability principle has normatively unacceptable consequences (granted the existence of a certain kind of evil agent); and that analyses of abilities or ‘can’ based on the poss-ability principle are conceptually flawed.

Recent simulations by Scanlon et al. showed seemingly spectacular results for the Waymo self-driving vehicle in simulations of real accident situations. In this paper, it is argued that the selection criteria for accident situations must be modified in accordance with the relevant policy alternatives. While Scanlon et al. compare Waymo with old human-driven vehicles, it is argued here that the relevant policy question is whether we ought to use self-driven vehicles or human-driven vehicles in the future, which means that we need to consider whether other technological solutions, which are available but not broadly used in human-driven vehicles, could result in human-driven vehicles managing to avoid the same accidents. In this article, a proposal for a new standard of selection criteria is made.

Over the years, several counterexamples arguably establish the limits of control-based conceptions of privacy and the right to privacy. Some of these counterexamples focus only on privacy, while the control-based conception of the right to privacy is rejected because of conceptual consistency between privacy and the right to privacy. Yet, these counterexamples do not deny the intuitions of control-based conceptions of the right to privacy. This raises the question whether conceptual consistency is more important than intuitions in determining the right way to conceptualize the right to privacy. This article aims to show how the major alternative to control-based conceptions of the right privacy—that is, limited access—can be modified to make sense of, and provide alternative explanations for, these control-based intuitions.

The de minimis principle states that some risks are so trivial that they can be ignored or treated categorically differently from non-trivial risks. Lundgren and Stefánsson criticize the de minimis principle, arguing that it either has to be applied locally or globally and that problems arise whichever application is chosen. Aven and Seif respond to Lundgren and Stefánsson’s argument and defend the de minimis principle as a “meaningful and useful perspective for handling risk in practice.” The response highlights some aspects of the argument in Lundgren and Stefánsson that needs clarification, which is what we do in this note.

The introduction of self-driving vehicles gives rise to a large number of ethical issues that go beyond the common, extremely narrow, focus on improbable dilemma-like scenarios. This article provides a broad overview of realistic ethical issues related to self-driving vehicles. Some of the major topics covered are as follows: Strong opinions for and against driverless cars may give rise to severe social and political conflicts. A low tolerance for accidents caused by driverless vehicles may delay the introduction of driverless systems that would substantially reduce the risks. Trade-offs will arise between safety and other requirement on the road traffic system. Over-reliance on the swift collision-avoiding reactions of self-driving vehicles can induce people to take dangerous actions, such as stepping out in front of a car, relying on its fast braking. Children travelling alone can violate safety instructions such as the use of seatbelts. Digital information about routes and destinations can be used to convey commercial and political messages to car users. If fast passage can be bought, then socio-economic segregation of road traffic may result. Terrorists and other criminals can hack into a vehicle and make it crash. They can also use self-driving vehicles for instance to carry bombs to their designed places of detonation or to wreak havoc on a country’s road system.

Recently, Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu argued that an action that does not violate a moral right to privacy cannot violate that right if it is extended over time. Specifically, they argue that a moral right to privacy does not protect against gawking or stalking. In this reply the reverse position is defended. Specifically, it is argued that their arguments fails on according to their own definition of the right to privacy. Furthermore, it is argued and illustrated by examples that this conceptual conclusion holds for many other conceptions of the right to privacy. Moreover, it is argued that Persson and Savluescu fail to recognize the privacy-related harm extended to individuals through gawking or stalking. Lastly, the article ends by sketching how the role of privacy in public and consent relates to the given examples.

Recently, Jakob Thraine Mainz and Rasmus Uhrenfeldt defended a control-based conception of a moral right to privacy (Mainz and Uhrenfeldt, Res Publica, 2020)—focusing on conceptualizing necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for a privacy right violation. This reply comments on a number of mistakes they make, which have long reverberated through the debate on the conceptions of privacy and the right to privacy and therefore deserve to be corrected. Moreover, the reply provides a sketch of a general response for defending the limited access conception of the right to privacy against control-based intuitions.

Recently, Perry Hendricks argued that abortion is immoral even if the fetus is not a person. He did so by arguing that causing a future child to suffer from fetal alcohol syndrome is wrong because it is an impairment, and an abortion would be an even more substantial impairment. Here I reply that the argument depends on ignoring relevant facts that are essential for moral decision‐making. Moreover, if we adapt the argument to consider these essential facts, then the argument fails because it no longer applies to the case under consideration.