• Diagnosing Dialetheism
    In Graham Priest, J. C. Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.), The Law of Non-Contradiction, Clarendon Press. 2004.
  • Diagnosing Dialetheism
    In Graham Priest, J. C. Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.), The Law of Non-Contradiction: New Philosophical Essays, Clarendon Press. 2006.
  •  15
    An argument against Jago’s theory of truth
    Analytic Philosophy. forthcoming.
    Analytic Philosophy, EarlyView.
  • Philosophical Fictionalism (edited book)
    with Frederick Kroon
    Oxford University Press. 2019.
  •  13
    The Problem of (Fully) Empty Predicates
    with Frederick Kroon
    Australasian Philosophical Review 1 (2): 163-167. 2017.
    ABSTRACTIn our paper, we mount a novel argument, which trades on recent work by Roy Sorensen [2016], following work by Saul Kripke, against Yablo's preferred reading of if-thenism, which is an attempt to read problematically ontologically committing sentences in a way that does not carry such ontological commitments. Although our argument is directed at Yablo's proposed reading of if-thenism, if the argument is successful, other versions of if-thenism may be affected. After reviewing Sorensen's …Read more
  •  37
    The Law of Non-Contradiction - that no contradiction can be true - has been a seemingly unassailable dogma since the work of Aristotle. It is an assumption challenged from a variety of angles in this collection of original papers. Twenty-three of the world's leading experts investigate the 'law', considering arguments for and against it and discuss methodological issues that arise. The result is a balanced inquiry into a venerable principle of logic, one that raises questions at the very centre …Read more
  •  3
    Analysis 78 (4): 718-736. 2018.
  •  4
    with James A. Woodbridge
    Analysis 78 (4): 687-692. 2018.
    _ Pretense and Pathology: Philosophical Fictionalism and its Applications _Armour-GarbBradley and WoodbridgeJames A.Cambridge University Press, 2015. 286 pp.
  •  51
    Unifying the Philosophy of Truth (edited book)
    with T. Achourioti, H. Galinon, J. Martínez Fernández, and K. Fujimoto
    This anthology of the very latest research on truth features the work of recognized luminaries in the field, put together following a rigorous refereeing process. Along with an introduction outlining the central issues in the field, it provides a unique and unrivaled view of contemporary work on the nature of truth, with papers selected from key conferences in 2011 such as Truth Be Told (Amsterdam), Truth at Work (Paris), Paradoxes of Truth and Denotation (Barcelona) and Axiomatic Theories of Tr…Read more
  •  2
    Deflating Deflationism
    Dissertation, City University of New York. 1999.
    In this dissertation, I take a close look at the deflationary theory of truth, and deflationary semantics, generally. My thesis is that, as a theory about the nature and function of the property of truth, deflationism is well supported. However, deflationary semantics, which combines deflationism about truth with deflationism about meaning cannot be argued for by pointing to the expressive function of the truth predicate. ;Having shown that deflationism about meaning cannot be argued for in this…Read more
  •  116
    The pathology of validity
    with James A. Woodbridge
    Synthese 160 (1): 63-74. 2008.
    Stephen Read has presented an argument for the inconsistency of the concept of validity. We extend Read's results and show that this inconsistency is but one half of a larger problem. Like the concept of truth, validity is infected with what we call "semantic pathology," a condition that actually gives rise to two symptoms: inconsistency and indeterminacy. After sketching the basic ideas behind semantic pathology and explaining how it manifests both symptoms in the concept of truth, we present c…Read more
  •  36
    Truth, Pretense and the Liar Paradox
    with James A. Woodbridge
    In Kentaro Fujimoto, José Martínez Fernández, Henri Galinon & Theodora Achourioti (eds.), Unifying the Philosophy of Truth, Springer Verlag. pp. 339-354. 2015.
    In this paper we explain our pretense account of truth-talk and apply it in a diagnosis and treatment of the Liar Paradox. We begin by assuming that some form of deflationism is the correct approach to the topic of truth. We then briefly motivate the idea that all T-deflationists should endorse a fictionalist view of truth-talk, and, after distinguishing pretense-involving fictionalism (PIF) from error- theoretic fictionalism (ETF), explain the merits of the former over the latter. After present…Read more
  •  33
    Linguistic puzzles and semantic pretence
    with James A. Woodbridge
    In Sarah Sawyer (ed.), New Waves in Philosophy of Language, Palgrave-macmillan. pp. 250-284. 2009.
    In this paper, we set out what we see as a novel, and very promising, approach to resolving a number of the familiar linguistic puzzles that provide philosophy of language with much of its subject matter. The approach we promote postulates semantic pretense at work where these puzzles arise. We begin by briefly cataloging the relevant dilemmas. Then, after introducing the pretense approach, we indicate how it promises to handle these putatively intractable problems. We then consider a number…Read more
  •  233
    Semantic pathology and the open pair (review)
    with James A. Woodbridge
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3). 2005.
    In Vagueness and Contradiction (2001), Roy Sorensen defends and extends his epistemic account of vagueness. In the process, he appeals to connections between vagueness and semantic paradox. These appeals come mainly in Chapter 11, where Sorensen offers a solution to what he calls the no-no paradox—a “neglected cousin” of the more famous liar—and attempts to use this solution as a precedent for an epistemic account of the sorites paradox. This strategy is problematic for Sorensen’s project, ho…Read more
  •  159
    The Law of Non-Contradiction : New Philosophical Essays (edited book)
    with Graham Priest and Jc Beall
    Oxford University Press. 2004.
    The Law of Non-Contradiction - that no contradiction can be true - has been a seemingly unassailable dogma since the work of Aristotle, in Book G of the Metaphysics. It is an assumption challenged from a variety of angles in this collection of original papers. Twenty-three of the world's leading experts investigate the 'law', considering arguments for and against it and discussing methodological issues that arise whenever we question the legitimacy of logical principles. The result is a balanced…Read more
  • The Law of Non-Contradiction: New Philosophical Essays
    with Graham Priest and J. C. Beall
    Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 12 (1): 131-135. 2006.
  •  705
    The Story About Propositions
    with James A. Woodbridge
    Noûs 46 (4): 635-674. 2012.
    It is our contention that an ontological commitment to propositions faces a number of problems; so many, in fact, that an attitude of realism towards propositions—understood the usual “platonistic” way, as a kind of mind- and language-independent abstract entity—is ultimately untenable. The particular worries about propositions that marshal parallel problems that Paul Benacerraf has raised for mathematical platonists. At the same time, the utility of “proposition-talk”—indeed, the apparent lin…Read more
  •  46
    Why deflationists should be pretense theorists (and perhaps already are)
    with James A. Woodbridge
    In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth, Palgrave-macmillan. pp. 59-77. 2010.
    In this paper, we do two things. First, we clarify the notion of deflationism, with special attention to deflationary accounts of truth. Seocnd, we argue that one who endorses a deflationary account of truth (or of semantic notions, generally) should be, or perhaps already is, a pretense theorist regarding truth-talk. In §1 we discuss mathematical fictionalism, where we focus on Yablo’s pretense account of mathematical discourse. §2 briefly introduces the key elements of deflationism and expla…Read more
  •  340
    Truthmakers, paradox and plausibility
    with James A. Woodbridge
    Analysis 70 (1): 11-23. 2010.
    In a series of articles, Dan Lopez De Sa and Elia Zardini argue that several theorists have recently employed instances of paradoxical reasoning, while failing to see its problematic nature because it does not immediately (or obviously) yield inconsistency. In contrast, Lopez De Sa and Zardini claim that resultant inconsistency is not a necessary condition for paradoxicality. It is our contention that, even given their broader understanding of paradox, their arguments fail to undermine the insta…Read more
  •  74
    Wrestling with (and without) dialetheism
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (1). 2005.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  129
    Understanding and Mathematical Fictionalism
    Philosophia Mathematica 19 (3): 335-344. 2011.
    In a recent paper in this journal, Mark Balaguer develops and defends a new version of mathematical fictionalism, what he calls ‘Hermeneutic non-assertivism’, and responds to some recent objections to mathematical fictionalism that were launched by John Burgess and others. In this paper I provide some fairly compelling reasons for rejecting Hermeneutic non-assertivism — ones that highlight an important feature of what understanding mathematics involves (or, as we shall see, does not involve)
  •  73
    Deflationism and Paradox (edited book)
    with Jc Beall
    Oxford University Press. 2005.
    Deflationist accounts of truth are widely held in contemporary philosophy: they seek to show that truth is a dispensable concept with no metaphysical depth. However, logical paradoxes present problems for deflationists that their work has struggled to overcome. In this volume of fourteen original essays, a distinguished team of contributors explore the extent to which, if at all, deflationism can accommodate paradox. The volume will be of interest to philosophers of logic, philosophers of langua…Read more
  • Reflections on the Liar (edited book)
    Oxford University. 2017.
    There are a number of people who do great work in philosophy who have said very little about the Liar paradox. The purpose of this volume is to afford those philosophers the opportunity to address what might be described as reflections on the Liar.
  •  2
    The Relevance of the Liar (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2018.
  •  195
    Semantic defectiveness and the liar
    with James A. Woodbridge
    Philosophical Studies 164 (3): 845-863. 2013.
    In this paper, we do two things. First, we provide some support for adopting a version of the meaningless strategy with respect to the liar paradox, and, second, we extend that strategy, by providing, albeit tentatively, a solution to that paradox—one that is semantic, rather than logical.
  •  65
    Spandrels of Truth * By JC BEALL
    with L. Goldstein
    Analysis 70 (3): 586-589. 2010.
    (No abstract is available for this citation)
  •  256
    Sellars and Pretense on "Truth & 'Correspondence'"
    Discusiones Filosóficas 13 (21): 33-63. 2012.
    In this paper, we show how an internal tension in Wilfrid Sellars’s understanding of truth, as well as an external tension in his account of meaning attribution, can be resolved while adhering to a Sellarsian spirit, by appealing to the particular fictionalist accounts of truth-talk and proposition-talk that we have developed elsewhere
  •  26
    The Monotonicity of 'No' and the No-Proposition View
    American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (1): 1-14. 2012.
    This article reveals a tension between a fairly standard response to "liar sentences," of which (L) Sentence (L) is not true is an instance, and some features of our natural language determiners (e.g., 'every,' 'some,' 'no,' etc.) that have been established by formal linguists. The fairly standard response to liar sentences, which has been voiced by a number of philosophers who work directly on the Liar paradox (e.g., Parsons [1974], Kripke [1975], Burge [1979], Goldstein [1985, 2009], Gaifm…Read more