•  14
    Remarks on Ángel Pinillos’s Why We Doubt
    International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 1-9. forthcoming.
    In these brief remarks, I describe the author’s Bayesian explication of the narrow function of the meta-cognitive, heuristic algorithm (pbs) that is at the heart of his psychological explanation of why we entertain skeptical doubts. I provide some critical remarks, and an alternative Bayesian approach that is (to my mind) somewhat more elegant than the author’s.
  • Closure, Counter-Closure, and Inferential Knowledge
    In Rodrigo Borges, Claudio De Almeida & Peter D. Klein (eds.), Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem, Oxford University Press. pp. 312-324. 2017.
    The chapter begins with some general remarks about closure and counter-closure, and is followed with a discussion of the following: I (a) review some (alleged) counterexamples to counter-closure, I then continue by (b) discussing a popular strategy for responding to such counterexamples to counter-closure, and finally I (c) pose a dilemma for this popular strategy. Once I have discussed these three points I conclude the chapter by proposing that we reject counter-closure, but at the same time th…Read more
  •  726
    Deference Done Better
    with Kevin Dorst, Benjamin A. Levinstein, Bernhard Salow, and Brooke E. Husic
    Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1): 99-150. 2021.
    There are many things—call them ‘experts’—that you should defer to in forming your opinions. The trouble is, many experts are modest: they’re less than certain that they are worthy of deference. When this happens, the standard theories of deference break down: the most popular (“Reflection”-style) principles collapse to inconsistency, while their most popular (“New-Reflection”-style) variants allow you to defer to someone while regarding them as an anti-expert. We propose a middle way: deferring…Read more
  • Part IV. Collective entities and formal epistemology. Individual coherence and group coherence
    with Fabrizio Cariani Rachael Briggs and When to Defer to Supermajority Testimony
    In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Essays in Collective Epistemology, Oxford University Press. 2014.
  •  73
    Remarks on staffel on full belief
    Philosophical Studies 180 (2): 385-393. 2022.
  •  61
    A Problem for Confirmation Measure Z
    Philosophy of Science 88 (4): 726-730. 2021.
    In this article, I present a serious problem for confirmation measure Z.
  •  6
    Introduction
    Studia Logica 86 (2): 147-148. 2007.
  •  1002
    Four Approaches to Supposition
    Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8 (26): 58-98. 2022.
    Suppositions can be introduced in either the indicative or subjunctive mood. The introduction of either type of supposition initiates judgments that may be either qualitative, binary judgments about whether a given proposition is acceptable or quantitative, numerical ones about how acceptable it is. As such, accounts of qualitative/quantitative judgment under indicative/subjunctive supposition have been developed in the literature. We explore these four different types of theories by systematica…Read more
  •  178
    Two Approaches to Belief Revision
    with Ted Shear
    Erkenntnis 84 (3): 487-518. 2019.
    In this paper, we compare and contrast two methods for the revision of qualitative beliefs. The first method is generated by a simplistic diachronic Lockean thesis requiring coherence with the agent’s posterior credences after conditionalization. The second method is the orthodox AGM approach to belief revision. Our primary aim is to determine when the two methods may disagree in their recommendations and when they must agree. We establish a number of novel results about their relative behavior.…Read more
  •  36
    Confirmation, causation, and Simpson's paradox
    Episteme 14 (3): 297-309. 2017.
    ABSTRACTIn this paper, I review some recent treatments of Simpson's Paradox, and I propose a new rationalizing explanation of its paradoxicality.
  • Introduction
    with Cherie Braden
    In Cherie Braden, Rodrigo Borges & Branden Fitelson (eds.), Themes From Klein, Springer Verlag. 2019.
  •  277
    As every philosopher knows, “the design argument” concludes that God exists from premisses that cite the adaptive complexity of organisms or the lawfulness and orderliness of the whole universe. Since 1859, it has formed the intellectual heart of creationist opposition to the Darwinian hypothesis that organisms evolved their adaptive features by the mindless process of natural selection. Although the design argument developed as a defense of theism, the logic of the argument in fact encompasses …Read more
  •  137
    Measuring Confirmation and Evidence
    with Ellery Elles
    Journal of Philosophy 97 (12): 663-672. 2000.
  •  32
    Introduction
    Studia Logica 86 (3): 351-352. 2007.
  •  78
    Probability, confirmation, and the conjunction fallacy
    Thinking and Reasoning 14 (2): 182-199. 2008.
    The conjunction fallacy has been a key topic in debates on the rationality of human reasoning and its limitations. Despite extensive inquiry, however, the attempt of providing a satisfactory account of the phenomenon has proven challenging. Here, we elaborate the suggestion (first discussed by Sides et al., 2001) that in standard conjunction problems the fallacious probability judgments experimentally observed are typically guided by sound assessments of confirmation relations, meant in terms of…Read more
  •  260
    Logical Foundations of Evidential Support
    Philosophy of Science 73 (5): 500-512. 2006.
    Carnap's inductive logic (or confirmation) project is revisited from an "increase in firmness" (or probabilistic relevance) point of view. It is argued that Carnap's main desiderata can be satisfied in this setting, without the need for a theory of "logical probability." The emphasis here will be on explaining how Carnap's epistemological desiderata for inductive logic will need to be modified in this new setting. The key move is to abandon Carnap's goal of bridging confirmation and credence, in…Read more
  •  172
    Measuring confirmation and evidence
    with Ellery Eells
    Journal of Philosophy 97 (12): 663-672. 2000.
  •  106
    Think of confirmation in the context of the Ravens Paradox this way. The likelihood ratio measure of incremental confirmation gives us, for an observed Black Raven and for an observed non-Black non-Raven, respectively, the following “full” likelihood ratios
  •  22
    Review of Richard Jeffrey, Subjective Probability: The Real Thing (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (10). 2005.
  •  74
    This is a collection of new essays written in honor of the work of Peter D. Klein, who has had and continues to have a tremendous influence in the development of epistemology. The essays reflect the breadth and depth of Klein’s work by engaging directly with his views and with the views of his interlocutors.
  •  84
    Wayne, Horwich, and evidential diversity
    Philosophy of Science 63 (4): 652-660. 1996.
    Wayne (1995) critiques the Bayesian explication of the confirmational significance of evidential diversity (CSED) offered by Horwich (1982). Presently, I argue that Wayne’s reconstruction of Horwich’s account of CSED is uncharitable. As a result, Wayne’s criticisms ultimately present no real problem for Horwich. I try to provide a more faithful and charitable rendition of Horwich’s account of CSED. Unfortunately, even when Horwich’s approach is charitably reconstructed, it is still not completely s…Read more
  •  50
  •  44
    – Foundation: Probabilistic Confirmation (c) from a Logical POV ∗ cph, eq as a “relevant” quantitative generalization of pe  hq ∗ cph, eq, so understood, is not Prpe  hq or Prph | eq, etc. ∗ cph, eq is something akin (ordinally) to the likelihood ratio..
  •  302
    The paradox of confirmation
    Philosophy Compass 1 (1). 2006.
    Hempel first introduced the paradox of confirmation in (Hempel 1937). Since then, a very extensive literature on the paradox has evolved (Vranas 2004). Much of this literature can be seen as responding to Hempel’s subsequent discussions and analyses of the paradox in (Hempel 1945). Recently, it was noted that Hempel’s intuitive (and plausible) resolution of the paradox was inconsistent with his official theory of confirmation (Fitelson & Hawthorne 2006). In this article, we will try to explain h…Read more
  •  28
    A Rejoinder to Strevens
    with Andrew Waterman
    By and large, we think Strevens’s [6] is a useful reply to our original critique [2] of his paper on the Quine–Duhem (QD) problem [5]. But, we remain unsatisfied with several aspects of his reply (and his original paper). Ultimately, we do not think he properly addresses our most important worries. In this brief rejoinder, we explain our remaining worries, and we issue a revised challenge for Strevens’s approach to QD.
  •  49
    Overview Setting the Stage Consistency Redundancy Goodbye ? Conclusion & References Overview Setting the Stage Consistency Redundancy Goodbye ? Conclusion & References..
  •  8
    Solutions to Some Open Problems from Slaney
    Australasian Journal of Logic 13 (4). 2016.
    In response to a paper by Harris & Fitelson, Slaney states several open questions concerning possible strategies for proving distributivity in a wide class of positive sentential logics. In this note, I provide answers to all of Slaney's open questions. The result is a better understanding of the class of positive logics in which distributivity holds.