•  29
    How Not to Detect Design: Critical Notice of The Design Inference by William A. Dembski (review)
    with Brandon Fitelson, Christopher Stephens, and Elliott Sober
    Philosophy of Science 66 (3): 472-488. 1999.
  • How Not to Detect DesignThe Design Inference. William A. Dembski
    with Christopher Stephens and Elliott Sober
    Philosophy of Science 66 (3): 472-488. 1999.
  • Measuring Confirmation and Evidence
    with Ellery Elles
    Journal of Philosophy 97 (12): 663-672. 2000.
  •  18
    Introduction
    Studia Logica 86 (3): 351-352. 2007.
  •  37
    Probability, confirmation, and the conjunction fallacy
    with Crupi Vincenzo and Tentori Katya
    Thinking and Reasoning 14 (2): 182-199. 2008.
    The conjunction fallacy has been a key topic in debates on the rationality of human reasoning and its limitations. Despite extensive inquiry, however, the attempt of providing a satisfactory account of the phenomenon has proven challenging. Here, we elaborate the suggestion (first discussed by Sides et al., 2001) that in standard conjunction problems the fallacious probability judgments experimentally observed are typically guided by sound assessments of confirmation relations, meant in terms of…Read more
  •  143
    Logical Foundations of Evidential Support
    Philosophy of Science 73 (5): 500-512. 2006.
    Carnap's inductive logic (or confirmation) project is revisited from an "increase in firmness" (or probabilistic relevance) point of view. It is argued that Carnap's main desiderata can be satisfied in this setting, without the need for a theory of "logical probability." The emphasis here will be on explaining how Carnap's epistemological desiderata for inductive logic will need to be modified in this new setting. The key move is to abandon Carnap's goal of bridging confirmation and credence, in…Read more
  •  74
    Wason Task(s) and the Paradox of Confirmation
    Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1): 207-241. 2010.
    The (recent, Bayesian) cognitive science literature on The Wason Task (WT) has been modeled largely after the (not-so-recent, Bayesian) philosophy of science literature on The Paradox of Confirmation (POC). In this paper, we apply some insights from more recent Bayesian approaches to the (POC) to analogous models of (WT). This involves, first, retracing the history of the (POC), and, then, reexamining the (WT) with these historico-philosophical insights in mind.
  •  30
    • What’s essential to Newcomb’s problem? 1. You must choose between two particular acts: A1 = you take just the opaque box; A2 = you take both boxes, where the two states of nature are: S 1 = there’s $1M in the opaque box, S2 = there’s $0 in the opaque box.
  •  123
    Pollock on probability in epistemology (review)
    Philosophical Studies 148 (3). 2010.
    In Thinking and Acting John Pollock offers some criticisms of Bayesian epistemology, and he defends an alternative understanding of the role of probability in epistemology. Here, I defend the Bayesian against some of Pollock's criticisms, and I discuss a potential problem for Pollock's alternative account
  •  194
    Probability, confirmation, and the conjunction fallacy
    with Vincenzo Crupi and Katya Tentori
    Thinking and Reasoning 14 (2). 2007.
    The conjunction fallacy has been a key topic in debates on the rationality of human reasoning and its limitations. Despite extensive inquiry, however, the attempt to provide a satisfactory account of the phenomenon has proved challenging. Here we elaborate the suggestion (first discussed by Sides, Osherson, Bonini, & Viale, 2002) that in standard conjunction problems the fallacious probability judgements observed experimentally are typically guided by sound assessments of _confirmation_ relation…Read more
  •  31
    This is a high quality, concise collection of articles on the foundations of probability and statistics. Its editor, Richard Swinburne, has collected five papers by contemporary leaders in the field, written a pretty thorough and even-handed introductory essay, and placed a very clean and accessible version of Reverend Thomas Bayes’s famous essay (“An Essay Towards the Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances”) at the end, as an Appendix (with a brief historical introduction by the noted sta…Read more
  •  26
    Let L be a sentential (object) language containing atoms ‘A’, ‘B’, . . . , and two logical connectives ‘&’ and ‘→’. In addition to these two logical connectives, L will also contain another binary connective ‘ ’, which is intended to be interpreted as the English indicative. In the meta-language for L , we will have two meta-linguistic operations: ‘ ’ and ‘ ’. ‘ ’ is a binary relation between individual sentences in L . It will be interpreted as “single premise entailment” (or “single premise de…Read more
  •  115
    Review: Models and Reality-A Review of Brian Skyrms's Evolution of the Social Contract (review)
    with Martin Barrett, Ellery Eells, and Elliott Sober
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1). 1999.
    Human beings are peculiar. In laboratory experiments, they often cooperate in one-shot prisoners’ dilemmas, they frequently offer 1/2 and reject low offers in the ultimatum game, and they often bid 1/2 in the game of divide-the-cake All these behaviors are puzzling from the point of view of game theory. The first two are irrational, if utility is measured in a certain way.1 The last isn’t positively irrational, but it is no more rational than other possible actions, since there are infinitely ma…Read more
  •  63
    The Strongest Possible Lewisian Triviality Result
    Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (2): 69-74. 2015.
    The strongest possible Lewisian triviality result for the indicative conditional is proven
  •  19
    Axiomatic proofs through automated reasoning
    with Larry Wos
    Bulletin of the Section of Logic 29 (3): 125-36. 2000.
  •  28
    Carnap [1] aims to provide a formal explication of an informal concept (relation) he calls “confirmation”. He clarifies “E confirms H” in various ways, including: (∗) E provides some positive evidential support for H. His formal explication of “E confirms H” (in [1]) is: (1) E confirms H iff Pr(H | E) > r, where Pr is a suitable (“logical”) probability function, and r is a threshold value
  •  29
    • Two competing explanations (independence of S i favors R over CB): (CB) there is a coherence bias in a’s S -formation process.
  •  25
    detail a question that, for a quarter of a century, remained open despite intense study by various researchers. Is the formula XC B = e(x e(e(e( ) e( )) z)) a single axiom for the classical equivalential calculus when the rules of inference consist..
  •  65
    FEW 2009 Special Issue: Preface (review)
    Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (6): 591-591. 2010.
  •  34
    • Several recent Bayesian discussions make use of “approximation” – Earman on the Quantitative Old Evidence Problem – Vranas on Quantitative Approaches to the Ravens Paradox – Dorling’s Quantitative Approach to Duhem–Quine – Strevens’s Quantitative Approach to Duhem–Quine – rThere are also examples not involving confirmation: E.g.
  •  19
    In this talk, I will explain why only one of Miller’s two types of language-dependence-of-verisimilitude problems is a (potential) threat to the sorts of accuracy-dominance approaches to coherence that I’ve been discussing
  •  23
    Certain distributivity results for Lukasiewicz’s infinite-valued logic Lℵ0 are proved axiomatically (for the first time) with the help of the automated reasoning program Otter [16]. In addition, non -distributivity results are established for a wide variety of positive substructural logics by the use of logical matrices discovered with the automated model findingprograms Mace [15] and MaGIC [25].
  •  18
    Certain distributivity results for Lukasiewicz’s infinite-valued logic Lℵ0..
  •  8
    Review of Richard Swinburne (ed.), Bayes's Theorem (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2003 (11). 2003.
  •  83
    Symmetries and asymmetries in evidential support
    with Ellery Eells
    Philosophical Studies 107 (2). 2002.
    Several forms of symmetry in degrees of evidential support areconsidered. Some of these symmetries are shown not to hold in general. This has implications for the adequacy of many measures of degree ofevidential support that have been proposed and defended in the philosophical literature.
  •  26
    With the inclusion of an e ective methodology, this article answers in detail a question that, for a quarter of a century, remained open despite intense study by various researchers. Is the formula XCB = e(x e(e(e(x y) e(z y)) z)) a single axiom for the classical equivalential calculus when the rules of inference consist of detachment (modus ponens) and substitution? Where the function e represents equivalence, this calculus can be axiomatized quite naturally with the formulas (x x), e(e(x y) e(…Read more
  •  54
    Comparative Bayesian Confirmation and the Quine-Duhem Problem: A Rejoinder to Strevens
    with Andrew Waterman
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (2): 333-338. 2007.
    By and large, we think is a useful reply to our original critique of his article on the Quine–Duhem problem. But, we remain unsatisfied with several aspects of his reply. Ultimately, we do not think he properly addresses our most important worries. In this brief rejoinder, we explain our remaining worries, and we issue a revised challenge for Strevens's approach to QD.
  •  48
    ∗ C pp, qq as a “mutual confirmation” generalization of pp & qq Prpe  hq won’t work Prpp & qq won’t work ∗ C pp, qq, so understood, is not Prpp & qq or Prpq | pq, etc.
  •  118
    Too Odd (Not) to Be True? A Reply to Olsson
    with Luc Bovens, Stephan Hartmann, and Josh Snyder
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (4): 539-563. 2002.
    Corroborating Testimony, Probability and Surprise’, Erik J. Olsson ascribes to L. Jonathan Cohen the claims that if two witnesses provide us with the same information, then the less probable the information is, the more confident we may be that the information is true (C), and the stronger the information is corroborated (C*). We question whether Cohen intends anything like claims (C) and (C*). Furthermore, he discusses the concurrence of witness reports within a context of independent witnesses…Read more
  •  122
    Bayesian confirmation and auxiliary hypotheses revisited: A reply to Strevens
    with Andrew Waterman
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (2): 293-302. 2005.
    has proposed an interesting and novel Bayesian analysis of the Quine-Duhem (Q–D) problem (i.e., the problem of auxiliary hypotheses). Strevens's analysis involves the use of a simplifying idealization concerning the original Q–D problem. We will show that this idealization is far stronger than it might appear. Indeed, we argue that Strevens's idealization oversimplifies the Q–D problem, and we propose a diagnosis of the source(s) of the oversimplification. Some background on Quine–Duhem Strevens…Read more