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7Lampert on the Fixity of the PastOrganon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 31 (1): 90-93. 2024.
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10Anscombe On ‘I’Philosophical Quarterly 47 (189): 507-511. 1997.I examine the main arguments of Elizabeth Anscombe’s difficult but fecund paper ‘The First Person’. Anscombe argues that the first‐person singular is not a device of reference, and, in particular, that it is not a device of indexical reference. Both arguments fail, but in ways that we can learn from.
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114Response to GoldsteinAnalysis 72 (4): 742-744. 2012.In ‘The Sorites is disguised nonsense’ Analysis (2012) 77: 61–5 L Goldstein attempts to show that some of the conditionals in any Sorites argument are nonsensical, and hence no Sorites argument can be sound. I give four reasons why this is not the case
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177Vagueness and identityAnalysis 48 (3): 130. 1988.The thesis that there can be vague objects is the thesis that there can be identity statements which are indeterminate in truth-value (i.e., neither true nor false) as a result of vagueness (as opposed, e.g., to reference-failure), "the singular terms of which do not have their references fixed by vague descriptive means". (if this is "not" what is meant by the thesis that there can be vague objects, it is not clear what "is" meant by it.) the possibility of vague objects should not be taken, in…Read more
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12Some Thoughts on AnimalismIn Klaus Petrus (ed.), On Human Persons, Heusenstamm Nr Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag. pp. 41-46. 2003.
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162Personal identity and reductionismPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (June): 361-373. 1991.
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36Best‐candidate theories and identity: Reply to BrennanInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 31 (1). 1988.This note criticizes Andrew Brennan's attempt to defend best?candidate theories of the identity of artefacts over time against certain now familiar objections. Adoption of a mereological conception of individuals does not, in itself, provide the means for a satisfactory response to objections of Wiggins and Noonan (some of which are anyway ill?focused). The way forward consists in recognizing that the consequences of best?candidate theories which have been thought objectionable (in particular, c…Read more
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455Personal Identity and Self-ConsciousnessRoutledge. 1998._Personal Identity and Self-Consciousness_ is about persons and personal identity. What are we? And why does personal identity matter? Brian Garrett, using jargon-free language, addresses questions in the metaphysics of personal identity, questions in value theory, and discusses questions about the first person singular. Brian Garrett makes an important contribution to the philosophy of personal identity and mind, and to epistemology
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361Anscombe on `I'Philosophical Quarterly 47 (189): 507-511. 1997.I examine the main arguments of Elizabeth Anscombe’s difficult but fecund paper ‘The First Person’. Anscombe argues that the first‐person singular is not a device of reference, and, in particular, that it is not a device of indexical reference. Both arguments fail, but in ways that we can learn from
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18Defending Non‐Epiphenomenal Event Dualism 1Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (3): 393-412. 2000.
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97Wittgenstein and the first personAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (3). 1995.This Article does not have an abstract
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16Vitalism and teleology in the natural philosophy of Nehemiah GrewBritish Journal for the History of Science 36 (1): 63-81. 2003.This essay examines some aspects of the early history of the vitalism/mechanism controversies by examining the work of Nehemiah Grew in relation to that of Henry More , Francis Glisson and the more mechanistically inclined members of the Royal Society. I compliment and critically comment on John Henry's exploration of active principles in pre-Newtonian mechanist thought. The postulation of ‘active matter’ can be seen as an important support for the new experimental philosophy, but it has theolog…Read more
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141Non-reductionism and John Searle’s The Rediscovery of the MindPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1): 209. 1995.
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75Dummett on Bringing About the PastPhilosophia 44 (1): 113-115. 2016.In ‘Bringing about the Past’ Michael Dummett attempted to defend the coherence of the idea of bringing about the past. I agree that bringing about the past is conceptually no more problematic than bringing about the future, but argue, against Dummett, that there is no need to restrict the scope of an agent’s knowledge in order to make sense of intentionally bringing about past events
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203Causal Essentialism versus the Zombie WorldsCanadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (1): 93-112. 2009.David Chalmers claims that the logical possibility of ‘zombie worlds’ — worlds physically indiscernible from the actual world, but that lack consciousness — reveal that consciousness is a distinct fact, or property, in addition to the physical facts or properties.The ‘existence’ or possibility of Zombie worlds violates the physicalist demand that consciousness logically supervene upon the physical. On the assumption that the logical supervenience of consciousness upon the physical is, indeed, a …Read more
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10Bermúdez on Self–ConsciousnessPhilosophical Quarterly 53 (210): 96-101. 2003.I argue that José Luis Bermúdez has not shown that there is a paradox in our concept of self–consciousness. The deflationary theory is not a plausible theory of self–consciousness, so its paradoxicality is irrelevant. A more plausible theory, ‘the simple theory’, is not paradoxical. However, I do think there is a puzzle about the connection between self–consciousness and ‘I’–thoughts.
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169Bermudez on self-consciousnessPhilosophical Quarterly 53 (210): 96-101. 2003.I argue that José Luis Bermúdez has not shown that there is a paradox in our concept of self-consciousness. The deflationary theory is not a plausible theory of self-consciousness, so its paradoxicality is irrelevant. A more plausible theory, 'the simple theory', is not paradoxical. However, I do think there is a puzzle about the connection between self-consciousness and 'I'-thoughts
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128What the History of Vitalism Teaches Us About Consciousness and the "Hard Problem"Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3): 576-588. 2006.Daniel Dennett has claimed that if Chalmers' argument for the irreducibility of consciousness were to succeed, an analogous argument would establish the truth of Vitalism. Chalmers denies that there is such an analogy. I argue that the analogy does have merit and that skepticism is called for
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112Tim, Tom, Time and Fate: Lewis on Time TravelAnalytic Philosophy 57 (3): 247-252. 2016.In his well-known time travel story, David Lewis claims that there is a sense in which Tim can go back in time and kill his Grandfather and a (more inclusive) sense in which he cannot. Lewis describes Tim’s predicament as semi-fatalist, but holds that this does not compromise Tim’s freedom or his ability to kill Grandfather. I argue that if semi-fatalism is true of Tim, it is true of everyone, and that this is a troubling conclusion.
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96Santayana’s Treatment of TeleologyOverheard in Seville 28 (28): 1-10. 2010.Santayana's epiphenomenalism is best understood as part of his thinking about teleology and final causes. Santayana makes a distinction between final causes, which he rejects, and teleology, which he finds ubiquitous. Mental causation is identified with a doctrine of final causes which he argues is an absurd form of causation. Thus mental causes are rejected and Santayana embraces epiphenomenalism.
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35Some Remarks on Backwards CausationRevista Portuguesa de Filosofia 71 (4): 695-704. 2015.Resumo Neste texto, o autor concentra-se em dois artigos históricos: o de Max Black “Why cannot an effect precede its cause”? e o de Michael Dummett “Bringing about the Past”. O autor irá mostrar onde falha o “bilking argument” de Black, contra a possibilidade da causalidade invertida. Por conseguinte, o autor irá concordar com Dummett, na possibilidade de um agente actuar a fim de que algo possa ocorrer no passado, contudo, discordando da argumentação de Dummett face a um desafio céptico, que t…Read more
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89On the Epistemic Bilking ArgumentThought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (3): 139-140. 2015.The standard bilking argument is well-known and attempts to prove the impossibility of backwards causation. In this discussion note, I identify an epistemic bilking argument, which has not received sufficient attention in the literature, and indicate how best to respond to it. This response involves a parity argument based on a forwards causation case