Caio Cézar Silva

[4th SBFA Prize 2025 Winning Essay] In this paper I present an argument for causal necessity. Firstly, I introduce the theoretical background about necessary connections and discuss some of the senses of necessitation that can be found in the literature. After inconsistencies are detected in each of them, I develop an additional sense from one of the previous contributions: causal necessity is to be explained by causal production and simultaneous causality. Secondly, I present the contemporary conception of causality in metaphysics, which I call the received view. The received view has as two of its tenets an event ontology and a sequential approach to the structure of causality. Sequential causality is submitted to a recently developed counterargument to stress its untenability. Thirdly, I explore an alternative to sequential causality: simultaneous causality. I expand the argument against sequential causality and show how simultaneous causality entails causal necessity. Fourthly, I consider some potential replies to the argumented presented. Finally, some further considerations are drawn.

In this paper I object some of the criticisms Wahlberg (2017. “Meso-Level Objects, Powers, and Simultaneous Causation.” Metaphysica 18 (1): 107–25) wages against Mumford and Anjum's (2011. Getting Causes from Powers . Oxford: Oxford University Press) account of simultaneous causation. A brief outlook on Wahlberg’s argument in favour of sequential causation is introduced. A first objection is presented and it is shown that sequential causation cannot deal with one of Mumford and Anjum’s argument: the possibility of prevention. When sequential and simultaneous causation are put side by side and how the causal process in each of them interact with a subtractive preventer is analysed, sequential causation becomes visibly flawed while simultaneous causation accommodates the prevention. Then, a second objection argues that the solution Wahlberg puts forward is defective and the time intervals marking the beginning of the cause or effect merely change where the problem appears. Finally, I retort a series of concerns Wahlberg stresses about the structure of simultaneous causation: temporal directedness, causal configuration and non-negligible change and time.