Candice Delmas

What is wrong with disobedience? What makes an act of disobedience civil or uncivil? Under what conditions can an act of civil or uncivil disobedience be justified? Can a liberal democratic regime tolerate (un)civil disobedience? This Element book presents the main answers that philosophers and activist-thinkers have offered to these questions. It is organized in 3 parts: Part I presents the main philosophical accounts of civil disobedience that liberal political philosophers and democratic theorists have developed and then conceptualizes uncivil disobedience. Part II examines the origins of disobedience in the praxis of activist-thinkers: Henry David Thoreau on civil resistance, anarchists on direct action, and Mohandas Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr. on nonviolence. Part III takes up the question of violence in defensive action, the requirement that disobedients accept legal sanctions, and the question of whether uncivil disobedience is counterproductive and undermines civic bonds.

Can violent resistance ever be justified as a means of protest? Brought to the fore of national consciousness by protest movements such as Black Lives Matter, as well as the January 6th storming of the U.S. Capitol, questions around the ethics of uncivil unrest urgently call for a wider scholarly examination and debate. In this volume, editors Candice Delmas and Avia Pasternak bring together a collection of cutting-edge perspectives on the ethics of uncivil protest and resistance. The contributions in this book challenge the dominant consensus in liberal politics and philosophy that the only permissible form of illegal protest in democratic states is civil disobedience. The contributors argue instead that the distinction between civil and uncivil protest is far less rigid than was previously thought. The book explores the meaning of civility and incivility, as well as related concepts like power, resistance, activism, and legitimacy. The contributors draw new conceptual distinctions and offer new and bold defences of uncivil forms of protest, from rioting to prison escapes and revolutionary movements. Overall, the volume establishes uncivil protest as an important new area of study and presents new questions and new answers to these complex challenges.

What are our responsibilities in the face of injustice? Many philosophers argue for what is called political obligation—the duty to obey the law of nearly just, legitimate states. Even proponents of civil disobedience generally hold that, given this moral duty, breaking the law requires justification. By contrast, activists from Henry David Thoreau to the Movement for Black Lives have long recognized a responsibility to resist injustice. Taking seriously this activism, this book wrestles with the problem of political obligation in real world societies that harbor injustice. It argues that the very grounds supporting a duty to obey the law—grounds such as the natural duty of justice, the principle of fairness, the Samaritan duty, and associative duties—also impose obligations of resistance under unjust social conditions. The work therefore expands political obligation to include a duty to resist injustice even in legitimate states, and further shows that under certain real-world conditions, this duty to resist demands principled disobedience. Against the mainstream in public, legal, and philosophical discourse, the book argues that such disobedience need not always be civil. Sometimes, covert, violent, evasive, or offensive acts of lawbreaking can be justified, even required. Illegal assistance to undocumented migrants, leaks of classified information, hacktivism sabotage, armed self-defense, guerrilla art, and other modes of resistance are viable and even necessary forms of resistance. There are limits: principle alone does not justify lawbreaking. But uncivil disobedience can sometimes be required in the effort to resist injustice.

This paper reconsiders the role of punishment in theories of civil disobedience through three contributions. First, it shows that accepting punishment, as commonly understood, is neither essential to defining civil disobedience nor key to its success. Philosophical discussions have overlooked the complex path of civil disobedience through the political-legal system, where most cases never reach trial and outcomes depend heavily on state discretion. Second, it introduces “non-evasion,” a sequential set of civility-based demands that arise as disobedient agents confront law enforcement and courts: publicly risking arrest, submitting to arrest, cooperating with jail proceedings, appearing in court when summoned, respecting courtroom decorum, and abiding by judicial decisions. This framework clarifies what civility plausibly requires at each stage of interaction with the state. Third, it identifies conditions under which civility’s moral weight is lifted and defends “evasion”—deliberate departures from non-evasion—as sometimes morally permissible, albeit uncivil. The paper explores both instrumental and intrinsic grounds for evasion, highlighting its epistemic communicative, affective-expressive, and transformative-prefigurative value.

Prison officers play a vital role in shaping prison conditions. Assessing their responsibility for, and potential role in reforming, the prison's failures is an urgent and important task in corrective justice efforts. This article takes up this task, with a focus on the US prison context, by applying and critically examining two general theories of institutional action: the ‘outward’ perspective, which emphasizes rule-following to achieve institutional purposes, and the ‘inward’ perspective, which brings to the fore the relational aspect of institutional life and officeholders' interrelated responsibility for guiding institutional action. After presenting the prison's purpose and its documented failures in Section 2, I frame the ordinary liberal reformist approach in terms of the outward perspective in Section 3, and outline a more promising public ethic of office accountability with the inward perspective in Section 4. I sketch in Section 5 a third, ‘downward’ perspective to challenge both, given their neglect of the prison staff culture and the broader epistemically unjust landscape that deem incarcerated people dangerous and untrustworthy. I conclude that to correct the prison's dysfunctions and achieve its raison d'être, we need to distrust officers.

Hunger strikes are commonly repressed in prison and seen as disruptive, coercive, and violent. Hunger strikers and their advocates insist that incarcerated persons have a right to hunger strike, which protects them against repression and force-feeding. Physicians and medical ethicists generally ground this right in the right to refuse medical treatment; lawyers and legal scholars derive it from incarcerated persons’ free speech rights. Neither account adequately grounds the right to hunger strike because both misrepresent the hunger strike as noncoercive and nonviolent. I articulate an alternative, dual account of the right to hunger strike. On the remedial argument, the right to hunger strike should be legally protected as a right to petition for redress, in light of incarcerated people’s structural vulnerability to abuse and given inadequate grievance mechanisms. The constructive argument derives the right to hunger strike from the right to resist oppression and stresses the normative permissibility of the use of coercive tactics to defend one’s liberty interests in the face of carceral oppression.

This chapter examines the tension between the justification and the punishment of civil disobedience, and theorists’ common solutions to it, by focusing on two central questions: first, should the state punish civil disobedience? Second, should the civil disobedient accept punishment? It presents the theoretical lay of the land on each of these questions, with particular attention to American jurisprudence on civil disobedience. The third part takes a step back to ask anew, how should we think about civil disobedience? and uncovers some problematic assumptions behind the common theoretical approach to the “problem” of civil disobedience.

Ronald Dworkin argues in Justice for Hedgehogs that citizens have a moral duty to obey the law of polities structured by special and reciprocal concern for all, although they have no such obligation in political communities that violate their members’ dignity. In this chapter, I use Dworkin’s own theory to develop an account of citizens’ associative obligations in the face of political threats to, and violations of, dignity. I argue that four related obligations of resistance require citizens to communicate opposition to a law, policy, institution, or system, rectify oppressive arrangements, assert their dignity; and express solidarity with the oppressed. In light of the pervasiveness of laws that disregard human dignity, I conclude that citizens’ main role is to resist rather than obey the law.

In this paper, I argue that the principle of fairness can license both a duty of fair play, which is used to ground a moral duty to obey the law in just or nearly just societies, and a duty of resistance to unfair and unjust social schemes. The first part of the paper analyzes fairness’ demands on participants in mutually beneficial schemes of coordination, and its implications in the face of injustice. Not only fairness does not require complying with unfair and unjust social schemes, but it also prohibits benefiting from such schemes. I use the case of racial segregation in the U.S. to illustrate this latter argument, and consider some objections to my investigation, given the availability and straightforwardness of justice. The second part of the paper elaborates the argument for the duty to resist. The Radical Reform argument first establishes, by elimination of the alternatives (exit and restitution), that the principal way for citizens to cease benefiting from an unfair and unjust social scheme is to radically reform it. The Resistance Argument then shows that resistance is crucial to bring about reform, so that one ought to resist unfair and unjust schemes from which one benefits. Next, I offer two arguments for collective resistance and political solidarity, one based on empirical considerations and the other based on fairness. Finally, I consider the costs of the resistance efforts which fairness may require.

Technological measures meant to change sexual orientation are, we have argued elsewhere, deeply alarming, even and indeed especially if they are safe and effective. Here we point out that this in part because they produce a distinctive kind of ‘clinical collective action problem’, a sort of dilemma for individual clinicians and researchers: a treatment which evidently relieves the suffering of particular patients, but in the process contributes to a practice that substantially worsens the conditions that produce this suffering in the first place. We argue that the role obligations of clinicians to relieve the suffering of their patients put them in a poor position to solve this problem, though they can take measures to avoid complicity in the harms that would result from widespread use of individually safe and effective reorientation biotechnology. But in the end the medical community as a whole still seems obligated to provide these measures, if they become technologically feasible. Medical researchers are in a better position to prevent the harms that would result if reorientation techniques were safe, effective and widely available. We argue that the harms attendant on the development of safe and effective re-orientation techniques give researchers reason to avoid ‘applied‘ research aimed at developing these techniques, and to be careful in the conduct of basic orientation research which might be applied in this way.

What is wrong with government whistleblowing and when can it be justified? In my view, ‘government whistleblowing’, i.e., the unauthorized acquisition and disclosure of classified information about the state or government, is a form of ‘political vigilantism’, which involves transgressing the boundaries around state secrets, for the purpose of challenging the allocation or use of power. It may nonetheless be justified when it is suitably constrained and exposes some information that the public ought to know and deliberate about. Government whistleblowing should then be viewed, along the lines of civil disobedience, as a collective cognition- and legitimacy-enhancing device.

Joseph Raz’s much discussed service conception of practical authority has recently come under attack from Stephen Darwall, who proposes that we instead adopt a second- personal conception of practical authority.1 We believe that the best place to start understanding practical authority is with a pared back conception of it, as simply a species of normative authority more generally, where this species is picked out merely by the fact that the normative authority in question is authority in relation to action, rather than belief. We do not wish to deny that there might be properties of practical authority (as distinct from the species of authority that is concerned with belief) that are peculiar to it, but, unlike both Raz and Darwall, we do not believe that such features play a role in defining or delimiting practical authority

In this paper, I defend the existence of a moral duty to disobey the law and engage in civil disobedience on the basis of one of the grounds of political obligation—the Samaritan duty. Christopher H. Wellman has recently offered a ‘Samaritan account’ of state legitimacy and political obligation, according to which the state is justified in coercing each citizen in order to rescue all from the perilous circumstances of the state of nature; and each of us is bound to obey the law, as the state demands, because we each have a responsibility to help rescue others when this assistance is not unreasonably costly. Though Wellman recognizes that there can be reasons for disobeying the law and resisting injustice in otherwise legitimate states, he overlooks the possibility that at least some of these reasons could be Samaritan in nature, grounded in the duty to rescue people from peril. As I shall argue, the Samaritan duty supports obligations to disobey the law, when the law prohibits Samaritan rescues, and to engage in civil disobedience, when unjust laws and practices contribute to endangering people. The discussion proceeds as follows. After a brief overview of the Samaritan duty, I articulate my case for Samaritan duties to disobey the law, and duties to engage in civil disobedience when unjust laws, institutions, or practices enable what I call ‘persistent Samaritan perils’. I then examine and respond to several objections to my account: first, that the costs of law-breaking are unreasonable, and thus cannot be morally required; second, that individuals’ particular acts of protest and civil disobedience do not appear to make any difference to the rescue, and thus cannot be required; third, that I stretch the Samaritan duty beyond recognition; and fourth, that the Samaritan duty binds us to help people in need or peril anywhere, not particularly at home. I consider in conclusion the advantages and limits of my account of citizens’ Samaritan duties in the face of injustice.

On Christopher H. Wellman’s Samaritan account of political legitimacy, the state is justified in coercing its subjects because doing so is necessary to rescue them from the perils of the state of nature. Samaritanism – the principle that we are morally permitted to do what is necessary to rescue someone from serious peril if in doing so we do not impose unreasonable costs on others – only justifies a minimal state, in Wellman’s view. I argue contra Wellman that Samaritanism justifies an extensive, liberal-egalitarian state.

Is the civic duty to report crime and corruption a genuine moral duty? After clarifying the nature of the duty, I consider a couple of negative answers to the question, and turn to an attractive and commonly held view, according to which this civic duty is a genuine moral duty. On this view, crime and corruption threaten political stability, and citizens have a moral duty to report crime and corruption to the government in order to help the government’s law enforcement efforts. The resulting duty is triply general in that it applies to everyone, everywhere, and covers all criminal and corrupt activity. In this paper, I challenge the general scope of this argument. I argue that that the civic duty to report crime and corruption to the authorities is much narrower than the government claims and people might think, for it only arises when the state (i) condemns genuine wrongdoing and serious ethical offenses as “crime” and “corruption,” and (ii) constitutes a dependable “disclosure recipient,” showing the will and power to hold wrongdoers accountable. I further defend a robust duty to directly report to the public—one that is weightier and wider than people usually assume. When condition (ii) fails to obtain, I submit, citizens are released of the duty to report crime and corruption to the authorities, but are bound to report to the public, even when the denunciation targets the government and is risky or illegal.