Carlos Andrés Gómez Rodas

Aurélio Agostinho, when he was consecrated bishop in Hippo, had contact with a community in a situation of extreme social inequality, and adding to his understanding of bidirectional love (to God and neighbor), translated into nonconformity with the suffering of others, in the function as a bishop he had the opportunity to fight with the weapons at his disposal for a less undignified life for the poorest. Therefore, the concept of poverty that appears between the lines of his texts and sermons is translated as a lack of material resources that makes it impossible for people to get the basics for survival. Among the weapons used by the philosopher bishop is the exhortation in his sermons, which in addition to denouncing the intense inequality of society, pondered on ways to resolve this huge gap between rich and poor. Thus, in this article we will analyze Augustine's lucubrations in sermons: 345, 355, 60, 61, 161, 14, which critically reflect poverty and wealth. The aforementioned sermons stand out on the subject for their critical reflections, because, although they treat the rich and their accumulation of wealth very harshly, showing solidarity with the less favored, and at different times they also have a critical look at the poor they idealized as a dream., desire or life goal to possess riches.

The work is dedicated to highlighting the modern educational mission of the philosophy of education in Ukraine, since education is a tool for building a civil society, and the philosophy of education is its methodological and educational reference point. The theoretical basis of the work is the function of the civilizational purpose of the philosophy of education: to become a specific methodology for the awakening of the “human in a person”, the education of an intellectual personality through education. The work defines the main educational directions in the field of philosophy of education: scientific-educational and ethical-humanistic. The scientific-educational direction is aimed at the formation of rational knowledge: the intellectual development of the individual and the increase of the intellectual potential of society. The scientific-educational direction is determined by the unions of scientists and teachers interested in the development of education and science of their country: here the philosophy of education must work with such categories-tools as knowledge, reason, common sense, thinking, understanding – and its educational mission is to develop educational paradigms that allow for the development of individual intelligence. The ethical-humanist direction involves work on the moral improvement of generations, which most actively occurs during education and upbringing (acquiring knowledge and intellectual development) and the formation of moral qualities of the individual – “what one should be in order to be a person”. The algorithm of human education is based on the main human virtues outlined by the entire world philosophy: wisdom, justice, courage, moderation. The conclusions speak of the need for new enlightenment in Ukrainian society, and the practical goal of philosophical and educational enlightenment is defined as helping modern people to become more civilized – educated and highly moral.

There are surely few writers who have had a more profound impact on European culture, and in the broadest range of fields, than St. Augustine, and this despite the fact that he was North African. Nonetheless, while Augustine is still called upon in debates on interfaith dialogue and in theological and philosophical disputes, one area of his large corpus has received scant attention—his philosophy of education. Although there are references throughout Augustine’s writings to his philosophy of education, he devotes only a single text to its elaboration—De Magistro—On the Teacher. The fact that this work has been largely overlooked by scholars is disappointing, because the De Magistro, despite its use of theological language, retains a very modern and contemporary thematic with interesting insights for any contemporary theory of education. In this article we provide a primer in reading Augustine’s De Magistro.

A questão sobre Deus em Aristóteles aparece na teoria sobre o primeiro motor imóvel, demonstrada no livro XII da Metafísica. Tudo o que se move é movido por outro. Entende Aristóteles que no universo há uma série indeterminada de motores e movidos. Todos os movimentos têm uma causa anterior. Mas, não é possível regredir ao infinito, pois todos e cada um sempre dependeriam de outro. Por esta razão, conclui o Estagirita que é necessário que exista um primeiro motor imóvel que não seja movido por nenhum outro. Ora, se não existisse um primeiro motor absoluto, seria impossível o movimento gerado nos outros motores que compõem o universo. Neste estudo sobre a teoria aristotélica, que se tornou tradicional na teodiceia, apresentamos determinados passos da Metafísica com o auxílio de alguns comentadores sem, contudo, entrar em aporias importantes que o texto aristotélico vem suscitando entre os pesquisadores.

Subsidiarity is often implicitly conceived as an organizational model or a Weberian ideal type. The purpose of this paper is to show that, in contrast, subsidiarity is a principle in the sense of the tradition originating from Thomas Aquinas. Considered as an ideal type, subsidiarity may be perceived as impossible to apply because of its ideal status, abstracted from the circumstances. Here, we will demonstrate the consequences of the fact that subsidiarity is one of the common principles of practical moral reasoning of particular prudence. Because it is a principle, subsidiarity does not have a visualizable substance or prescribe an organizational model, unlike the ideal type. It thus avoids the indiscriminate application of organizational models to contexts that are not appropriate, and in the context of tension between external consultants and managers, it rehabilitates the prudence of leaders who know the circumstances of their organization.

El presente artículo examina la concepción de sujeto que Martha Nussbaum (1947) establece en el marco de su teoría cognitivo-evaluadora de las emociones. El objetivo es mostrar cómo la revalorización de la dimensión afectiva que la autora sugiere, supone a su vez, un reconocimiento de la vulnerabilidad humana entendida como una condición subjetiva universal. Esta nueva concepción de sujeto vulnerable implica una resignificación de la noción de dignidad humana. Dicho giro tiene fuertes implicancias desde un punto de vista ético, sobre todo, en lo que refiere a la tensión entre autonomía y vulnerabilidad que caracteriza nuestra existencia, las cuales serán abordadas a lo largo del trabajo.

El artículo comienza explorando la peculiar función política y legislativa que Nietzsche otorga a los filósofos y a la filosofía, de. A continuación, se explora la nítida inspiración platónica de estas ideas y se localizan ejemplos directos en los textos de Platón, de tal manera que se desvela el origen griego de muchos términos intempestivos de la filosofía nietzscheana. La filosofía y la cultura se presentan como sistemas de aculturación, sobre la base de paralelismos entre la cría de animales y la aculturación humana. Construyendo sobre la base de las conexiones Nietzsche-Platón, se incide en las tensiones entre ‘primeras’ y ‘segundas naturaleza’. Los aportes finales de Catherine Malabou se muestran cruciales para captar los circuitos de retroalimentación entre organismo y entorno, que se descubren como vínculos genealógicos entre lo biológico y lo simbólico. Platón, Nietzsche y Malabou comparten el deseo de redefinir y reorientar procesos formativos que ya en marcha en la sociedad. En último término, se trata de desvelar y tomar poder sobre la función ‘selectiva’ de la filosofía en su proceso de culturización.

L’objectif de cet article est d’évaluer le sens et la portée de la locution autourgous tês philosophias, qui apparaît dans le Banquet I, 5. J’espère montrer que cette locution en dit plus qu’elle n’en a l’air prima facie. Je soutiendrai que l’ensemble du passage dépasse la simple opposition entre la ( philo ) sophia gratuite de Socrate et la sophia non gratuite des sophistes, d’une part, et la richesse de Callias et la pauvreté des socratiques, d’autre part. Mon point de départ sera le prologue du Banquet, suivi d’une analyse des Mémorables I, 6, texte où l’on trouve une conception de philosophia en tant que diaita ; j’analyserai ensuite les textes du corpus xénophontien où figure le mot autourgos, lui aussi associé à la notion de diaita. Ce parcours analytique montrera qu’il y a deux visions de la philosophie en jeu dans le Banquet I, 5 : celle de Callias, qui croit que Socrate et les siens ont les âmes purifiées, mais qui, en même temps, ne comprend pas tout à fait leur pratique philosophique, et celle de Socrate qui, dans sa réplique à la provocation de Callias, lui présente de manière condensée sa vision de la philosophie.

The issue of the nature of the state is one of the most important issues in political philosophy, and any interpretation of it will follow an interpretation of government ends, ideal government, and the necessity to obey the government, political legitimacy and freedom in its own way. The present study, which is theoretical in terms of its fundamental content, applies the theoretical framework of Mouffe's radical democracy, and focuses on one of the prominent figures of the political philosophy of public law in the 20th century, and finally attempted to answer the main question of what is the ideal government the type and the nature of it in the political theology of Karl Schmitt? The results illustrate that the understanding and interpretation of the nature of the state as well as the desired government in Schmitt's political philosophy and political theology in the light of understanding the fundamental concepts in his thought such as political theology is political matter, rule friend/enemy/independent dictatorship, sovereignty, the concept of exception in criticism of European liberal parliamentary system, negative anthropology, adaptation of citizenship to political nationality, criticism of the concept of majority in liberal democracy. The results also state that Schmidt's ideal government is compatible with the identity-oriented type of radical democracy. The significance of the study dates back to the growing criticism of liberal democracy and the emergence of radical democratic governments, especially in Latin America.

En este trabajo proponemos una lectura de la filosofía política de Smith, a partir de su teoría de la obligación política, en tanto crítica del contractualismo. El autor rechaza la hipótesis del estado de naturaleza y el consentimiento de los individuos, proponiendo, en cambio, una teoría basada en la opinión, pero, sobre todo, en la ilusión de que la sociedad comercial nos conducirá a la felicidad. Rastrearemos estas ideas en tres de sus textos más importantes: La teoría de los sentimientos morales, La riqueza de las naciones y Lecciones de jurisprudencia.

Sommaire : Augustin est connu pour son esprit de service qui le porte à produire des écrits en réponse aux requêtes d’amis, de connaissances ou même de personnes étrangères qui sollicitent son aide. En 410, il reçoit une lettre (ep. 117) de Carthage, de la part de Dioscorus, jeune homme d’origine grecque, qui lui envoie de nombreuses questions sur les dialogues de Cicéron. Sa recherche est motivée par la crainte de paraître ignorant devant ceux qui lui poseraient des questions sur ces sujets de retour dans sa patrie. Augustin saisit l’occasion pour le détourner des ambitions de la vaine gloire et lui montre, en exposant sa connaissance des écoles philosophiques antiques, qu’il ne sert à rien de s’imbiber des opinions des philosophes quand on ne recherche pas dans l’humilité la vérité elle-même. Cet article présente et analyse l’exposé d’Augustin des théories et des contradictions de ces philosophies antiques, et montre les recours aux références bibliques presque inaperçues présentes dans la lettre.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:An Exposition of The Divine Names, The Book of Blessed Dionysius by Thomas AquinasMichael J. Rubin, Elizabeth C. Shaw, and Staff*AQUINAS, Thomas. An Exposition of The Divine Names, The Book of Blessed Dionysius. Translated and edited with an introduction by Michael A. Augros. Merrimack, N.H.: Thomas More College Press, 2021. xxv + 549 pp. Cloth, $65.00The profound influence that Pseudo-Dionysius had on Aquinas’s thought, especially in his metaphysics of participation and his apophatic theology, has been known for some time now, thanks to the excellent work of such scholars as Fran O’Rourke. One would therefore think that Aquinas’s Exposition of the Divine Names (his only commentary on the works of Pseudo-Dionysius) would have been translated a lot sooner. This delay is assuredly due not just to the difficulty of translating this work but also to a certain embarrassment felt by Thomists over Aquinas’s sincere belief that the “Dionysius” who wrote the Divine Names was the Areopagite whose conversion at the teaching of St. Paul is mentioned in the Acts of the Apostles. That the author calling himself “Dionysius” was in fact a theologian writing in the fifth or sixth centuries has been well established by modern scholarship. Hence, Thomists may have felt tempted to discount or at least pass over the influence of this author on Aquinas since it is discomfiting to think that the Church’s greatest theologian accorded such authority to an imposter.Michael Augros tackles these concerns head-on in the excellent introduction to his new translation of the Divine Names commentary. First, Augros points out that in past centuries a pseudonym was usually not an act of forgery but, rather, a way of concealing the author’s identity, which an early Christian theologian might well decide to do either out of humility or out of a desire “to avoid provoking certain prejudices” in those who disagreed with him in contemporary theological disputes. Moreover, it is likely that the work was never intended for the general public (who could easily mistake the pseudonym as genuine) but, rather, was written for those “already initiated in a particular Neoplatonic school of Christian theology,” who would recognize the author as being “one of their own” but without knowing his precise identity. Finally, in taking the particular name of “Dionysius,” the author of the Divine Names was indicating his intention for the work: Just as the biblical Dionysius was a Greek philosopher who converted to Christianity, so the works of Pseudo-Dionysius [End Page 345] are an attempt to reconcile Greek philosophy with the Christian faith.It therefore seems likely, as Augros observes, that Aquinas would still have accorded a great deal of respect to the Divine Names even if he had learned the truth of the author’s identity. The work would not have had the same deuterocanonical authority for him that comes with being written by a direct disciple of St. Paul himself, but “the inherent cogency, coherence, and beauty” of Pseudo-Dionysius’s theology would have been the same. Hence, Pseudo-Dionysius would surely have earned from Aquinas the “docile attitude” appropriate “for a philosopher and theologian of the first order, such as Boethius.”That Aquinas was right to see the author of the Divine Names as a master philosopher and theologian becomes evident when one dives into the text itself, in which Aquinas sees a truly dazzling order, both externally and internally. According to Aquinas, the Divine Names discusses those truths about God of which there are intelligible likenesses in creatures, such as goodness or wisdom, whereas the truths about God of which there are sensible likenesses (for example, “when God is called a lion, or a rock”) are treated by Pseudo-Dionysius in The Symbolic Theology; meanwhile, in the lost or fictional work The Divine Characteristics, Dionysius claims to have treated those truths about God (such as the Trinity) that cannot be known through any likenesses in creatures.Aquinas finds a still more intricate order within the Divine Names itself. Since this work is dedicated to “the divine names by which the processions of God to creatures are manifested,” the plan of the work...

A recent study has argued from theological and classicizing parallels that the first, anti-pagan book of Augustine’s De consensu euangelistarum belongs between 406 and 412 CE. This article defends the traditional dating ca. 400–405 CE, implied by Retractationes. Uncertainty over the dating of parallels in De trinitate 1–4 cautions against reliance on theological peculiarities (a variant of John 5:19 and the phrase unitas personae, both otherwise paralleled in the 410s CE or later), while a close review of the patterns of classical citation proves resemblance to De ciuitate dei to be superficial. Not only does Augustine demonstrably cite the same classical texts on widely separated occasions, De consensu euangelistarum 1 evinces little of Augustine’s later knowledge of Porphyry and Varro. The crowning proof comes, however, in a brief rebuttal to pagan complaints over contemporary misfortunes. Although he focuses on Rome’s religious history, Augustine omits any hint of Alaric’s sack (410 CE), the religious-political instability of 408–409 CE, or Radagaisus’ invasion of Italy (405–406 CE), all of key importance for later works. The book’s method, scope, and tenor place it neatly within the span 400–405 CE, as our first testimony to the interreligious milieu for which De ciuitate dei would later be aimed.

Scholars do not agree on where Augustine exactly stands regarding capital punishment and whether his position is still relevant for debates today. This paper establishes Augustine’s starting point for his considerations on the death penalty, identifies the scriptural input into his views, both critical and supportive of capital punishment, and, finally, examines how he approaches concrete cases of people facing the death penalty. On this basis, it makes a somewhat new proposal for understanding how Augustine sees capital punishment as legitimate in principle but problematic in concrete cases, in particular, cases involving the church.

First, we shall examine theoretical similarities and differences between two ethics: that of a Christian-Aristotelian Ethics as commented upon by Aquinas and Augustine and that of a Christian-Aristotelian Ethics as developed by Joseph Fletcher in his Situation Ethics. The deep similarity is that both ethics find that the highest virtue is that of love. The key difference is that for a Christian-Aristotelian Ethics developed by Aquinas and Augustine there are some actions and feelings that are evil in themselves and which have no Golden Mean whereas for a Christian-Aristotelian Ethics as developed by Fletcher there are no actions which are evil in themselves. This question of whether there are actions evil in themselves is the primary reason for writing this paper. Second, we shall examine (a) the positive practice of the virtues, arguing that there is little to no practical difference between a Christian-Aristotelian ethics as developed by Aquinas and Augustine and a Christian-Aristotelian situation ethics as developed by Fletcher in the positive practice of the virtues; and we shall examine (b) the practical differences between these two ethics in deciding whether there are some actions that are evil in themselves by reflecting upon the four conditions of the principle of the double effect. The paper will conclude by favoring a Christian-Aristotelian Ethics as developed by Aquinas and Augustine. Keywords: Christian-Aristotelian Ethics, Aquinas, Augustine, Joseph Fletcher

The article presents an overview of medieval approaches to understanding the phenomenon of intentionality. First, the author outlines the approach of Thomas Aquinas, according to which the process of cognition consists in assimilating the intellect to the object of cognition. This theory insists that there is no difference between the form of a real object, thanks to which it exists, and the form of this object in the mind of the cognizing subject. Duns Scotus makes this picture more sophisticated when he begins to distinguish in the mind the sensory image of the cognized thing (phantasma) and the intelligible representation (species) of this thing. William of Ockham, on the other hand, refuses to introduce any additional entities between the object of knowledge and the mind of the knower. This rejection, together with the nominalism, led to the emergence of the concept of mental language, in which there is no place for signs connecting thought and object, instead, a direct connection between the spoken word and the corresponding mental words is postulated. In conclusion, the author considers the problem of the justification and legitimacy of the discovery of proto-phenomenological concepts in medieval philosophy.

This work sought to carry out a comparative analysis of in vitro fertilization (IVF) vis-à-vis St. Thomas Aquinas’ Natural Law Theory. Both of them emanated from problem of infertility. IVF makes use of artificial insemination for fertilization which is quite contrary to the natural process of sexual reproduction. This work makes use of analytic method to analyse comparatively in vitro fertilization and St. Thomas Aquinas’ Natural Law Theory. Thus, this work conceives that IVF is one of the assisted reproductive technologies in the scientific exploration of genetic engineering and bio-technology which emanated to tackle the problem of genetic inheritance outside marriage. It contravenes the coital or natural reproduction which conforms to St. Thomas Aquinas’ second precept of natural law. Again, IVF is artificial as such it is pruned to many complications. There is no adequate information given by the medical practitioners or providers of this service on the health hazards or risks involve in IVF. In addition, in vitro fertilization makes provision for donor gamete and surrogate motherhood which may have many negative implications both for the couples, off-spring, gestation mother, and society at large.

El presente artículo explora el vínculo que las normas colombianas actuales sobre Registro Calificado y Acreditación de Alta Calidad de instituciones y programas de educación superior establecen entre enseñanza y aprendizaje. El vínculo allí explorado es analizado a partir de la duda que sobre el mismo asunto expusiera el filósofo antiguo Sexto Empírico. Su duda, y el trato que sobre ella elabora Agustín de Hipona, permite mostrar que hay al menos tres posturas sobre tal asunto: la escéptica, que niega que tal vínculo exista en absoluto; su contraria, que afirma la necesidad del vínculo; y la moderada, que afirma una conexión entre los signos y el aprendizaje. Las tres posturas son abordadas a partir del primer apartado del texto. El artículo, en el segundo apartado, muestra que en las normas se invisibiliza la enseñanza y que su función, de cara a la cuestión que aquí ocupa, la asume la acción y medios institucionales. Finalmente, en el tercer apartado, el artículo sostiene que las normas actuales afirman la necesidad de tal vínculo en la noción de Resultados de Aprendizaje. Así, desde un análisis filosófico, las normas deben ser cuestionadas.

Aquinas famously held that only intellectual beings can grasp the natures or essences of things and cognize universals per se. Below these intellectual beings, however, were the non-human animals who shared many of the interior sense faculties in common with man; such animals’ highest sense was merely what is called the estimative power. Aquinas’s account of animal cognition has largely been ignored in contemporary biological research, although hopes for a resurgence have been emerging in the Thomistic world. In this paper I seek to explicate Aquinas’s account of animal cognitive activities, particularly by explicating a more detailed account of animal cognitive action as found in the biological works of Aristotle known by Aquinas. I then turn to various contemporary biological findings to show that many purported modern discoveries (like dolphins rescuing a man or recognition of social hierarchies) shouldn’t be so surprising after all. Many such cognitive acts were already there in the texts of Aristotle read by Aquinas.

Experimental philosophy (or “x-phi”) is a way of doing philosophy. It is “tra- ditional” philosophy, but with a little something extra: In addition to the expected phil- osophical arguments and engagement, x-phi involves the use of empirical methods to test the empirical claims that arise. This extra bit strikes some as a new, perhaps rad- ical, addition to philosophical practice. We don’t think so. As this chapter will show, empirical claims have been common across the history of Western philosophy, as have appeals to empirical observation in attempting to support or subvert these claims. While conceptions of philosophy have changed over time, across these changes we find philosophers employing empirical methods in pursuing their philosophical questions. Our primary aim in this chapter is to illustrate this fact. We begin by discussing the relevance of history to experimental philosophy (Section 1.2), then offer a necessarily condensed and highly selective history of empirical work in Western philosophy, rang- ing from the ancients (Section 1.3), to the early moderns (Section 1.4), to the late mod- erns (Section 1.5), and on to the present (Section 1.6).