Carlos Andrés Gómez Rodas

This article helps fill a gap in studies on Augustine’s thought, by focusing on forgiveness—an ethical theme important to the Bishop of Hippo—with particular attention to the role forgiveness plays, or can and should play, in political life. The City of God (De ciuitate dei; ciu.) opens wide vistas for such study. Augustine’s reflections throughout his long work cast light on the many facets of forgiveness and related themes as they enter and impact social and civic life, characterized by our human condition in all its contingency, fallibility, and fallenness, while rooted deeply in divine creation and the goodness of nature, healed and elevated by grace even in this saeculum. The article’s first segment argues that the theme of forgiveness or pardon, pagan and Christian, frames the entire ciu. The second segment studies three exemplars of forgiveness in political life highlighted by Augustine: Julius Caesar, David, and Theodosius. The third section comprises a brief conclusion, observing a parallel Augustine discerns between Virgil’s and Jesus’s teaching. This surprising confluence offers a vision of friendship forged by generous “giving and forgiving” across religious and cultural divides, and thus perhaps a partial foundation for unitas in our “foundationless age.”

This essay makes three points. First, in his work Augustine sought to craft something like what Theodor Adorno called a “late style”—a style achieved after maturity has been realized, when a thinker or artist finds their work frustrated by the received cultural expectations, and they seek to overcome those expectations. So understood, a “late style” expresses both frustration and hope. However, second, Augustine’s late style differs from Adorno’s Romantic aesthetics, in both content and form, and usefully illuminates his overall project: It explains his repeated troubling of his own acts of writing and his culture’s practices of reading, and what reading was expected to produce in its practitioners. Across his whole career he struggled, increasingly self-consciously, against his culture’s formal expectations about authoritative teachings, and its material fantasy of a straightforwardly successful life. He attempted instead to communicate both his own flawed and ongoing path, and the inevitable difficulty and frustrations of post-lapsarian life, as he understood the Christian faith to depict it. The final manifestation of his late style is found in the City of God, where it produces a mode of writing, and a picture of the wayfaring Christian, capable of both skeptical critique, confessional affirmation, lively compassion, and humble gratitude. Third, recognizing and appreciating Augustine’s late style can provoke us to our benefit, in facing the challenges of religious life today, both as individuals and as people seeking to live together for the common good.

Augustine believed that humans are called to be both slaves and friends of God. John 15:15, Jesus tells his disciples that they are no longer his slaves, but are instead his friends, thus posed a significant interpretive problem for him. This paper surveys Augustine’s thirteen discussions of the passage, presenting several themes Augustine developed and interpretive strategies he tried out over two decades of interpreting the passage. His favorite strategy was reading the passage proleptically. The disciples were not yet friends of God at the time of Jesus’s speaking but could look forward to a certain future when they will be friends of God. But this strategy couldn’t solve the problem: Jesus treats slavery to and friendship with God as substitutes, not compossible. One theme was to associate slavery with fear. Augustine invoked this in his most extensive treatment of John 15:15, arguing that there are two species of slavery to God, each corresponding to a kind of fear. One fear, and thus one slavery, is compatible with friendship. The other is not. The paper concludes by identifying some further problems Augustine’s approach raised.

abstract: Aristotle concludes Nicomachean Ethics book VI (= Eudemian Ethics book V) with several puzzles, one of which has to do with the utility of practical wisdom (1143b21–28). I argue that scholars have neglected the importance of this puzzle, together with Aristotle’s reply to it, which, crucially, brings in his notion of natural virtue. Reflecting on this puzzle shows, first, that Aristotle has a robust understanding of natural virtue; and second, the role of practical wisdom as a correction of, and supplement to, the shortcomings of natural virtue. My argument has important consequences for Aristotle’s acceptance of the unity of the virtues.

The standard gloss of ‘intentionality’ as ‘aboutness’ may be insufficiently fine-grained to capture the complexity of medieval theories of intentionality. Using Thomas Aquinas as a case study, I show that he provides distinct accounts of two aspects of the phenomenon, which could be called ‘intentional presence’ and ‘intentional directing’. These distinct accounts are joined together through his theory of imitation into what I call a ‘theory of intentionality as active imitating’, but without giving relations of likeness any work to do in the account. In each part of the account, Aquinas draws on a general metaphysical schema that applies to both mental and non-mental being, contra interpretations that view intentionality as a sui generis feature of mental states.

Recent work in positive psychology demonstrates the importance of self-transcendence: understanding oneself to be part of something greater than the self, such as a family, community, or tradition of sacred practice. Self-transcendence is positively associated with wellbeing and a sense of meaning and purpose. Philosophers have argued that self-transcendent motivation has a central role in good character, or virtue. Positive psychologists are just now beginning to integrate the aim of developing such motivation in character interventions. In this paper we draw attention to an important but overlooked condition on effectively developing self-transcendent motivation constitutive of virtue: such a process must engage the subject’s will in the right way. If a process does not meet this condition it will fail to produce motivation constitutive of virtue according to leading philosophical accounts of virtue. We identify a suite of strategies for cultivating motivations that do meet this condition but have not been explored in relation to character interventions, namely, reappraisal strategies from the extended process model of emotion regulation (EPM-ER).

This essay examines how Aquinas’s philosophical psychology can suggest a way of analyzing the phenomenon of implicit bias. On the account sketched here, implicit bias should be understood, not as a submerged or unconscious belief, but as a pre-rational imaginative frame that may or may not accord with our intellectual beliefs. Such imaginative frames are common features of our experience, and they arise from a habituation of the cogitative power in tandem with imagination and memory. The essay explains how this notion works in Aquinas’s philosophical psychology, how it can be applied to provide an account of implicit bias, and why (given Aquinas’s account of justice) we are morally obligated to remediate our implicit biases wherever possible. The final sections offer a Thomistic response to the objection that “sometimes the stereotype is true,” and return to Aquinas’s philosophical psychology to identify some strategies for remediating implicit biases.

Daniel Russell has argued that virtue ethics requires a criterion for enumerating the virtues and suggests that reasons for action distinguish them (2009). This paper explores and defends Thomas Aquinas’s (ca. 1225–1274) view that virtues are distinguished by what makes us good in overcoming the difficulties we face. Aquinas’s account explains why agents can seemingly perform different virtuous actions for the same reasons while still satisfying the demands set by Russell for a theory of enumeration.

La filosofía de la psiquiatría ha experimentado en los últimos años un crecimiento notable como ámbito de discusión, ganando notoriedad y un lugar propio como espacio de trabajo de la filosofía contemporánea. Bajo el rótulo “filosofía de la psiquiatría” se hace referencia corrientemente a un conjunto de problemas diversos, abordados mediante un conjunto heterogéneo de aproximaciones teóricas y metodológicas. Los problemas que tradicionalmente han dado forma a este campo giran en torno a preguntas conceptuales fundamentales que atañen al concepto mismo de enfermedad o trastorno mental (¿qué es la enfermedad mental?, ¿son éstas enfermedades del cerebro?, ¿se trata de clases naturales, normativas, o una combinación de ambas?, entre otras), junto a problemas que conciernen también de modo general al conjunto de la psiquiatría como práctica médica (¿cuál es la relación entre la psiquiatría y la medicina somática?, ¿qué relaciones epistémicas y normativas estructuran la relación entre terapeutas y pacientes?, entre otras) o a sus instrumentos teóricos (p. ej., ¿qué criterios son apropiados para la construcción de clasificaciones de condiciones psiquiátricas?). De modo más reciente, una cantidad significativa de trabajo filosófico se ha abocado a iluminar problemas conceptuales acerca de etiquetas diagnósticas específicas. La filosofía ha tomado un papel mucho más activo en discusiones acerca del modo en que se definen diferentes categorías nosológicas, al igual que acerca de asuntos conceptuales y metodológicos específicos que tienen un papel importante en el intento de explicar diversas condiciones particulares.

Respecto al tema de la eternidad del mundo, suele atribuirse a santo Tomás de Aquino la siguiente postura: que el mundo, de hecho, tuvo un comienzo, pero que pudo haber existido desde siempre. Sin embargo, en ninguno de los textos del Aquinate se encuentra una defensa explícita de la posibilidad de un mundo eterno. Con todo, al menos dos autores ofrecen una defensa sistemática a favor de dicha atribución: John F. Wippel y Thomas Bukowski. El presente artículo defiende lo contrario: resulta impreciso atribuir a santo Tomás la tesis según la cual el mundo pudo haber existido desde siempre. Para ello, se revisa paso a paso la argumentación de los dos autores mencionados y se ofrece una contraargumentación para ambas. Luego se recurre a la distinción que el propio santo Tomás hace de los diversos sentidos de “posible” en el artículo 14 del De potentia y se utiliza para complementar el esquema de Egidio Romano, con el fin de ofrecer mayor claridad respecto de cuál es precisamente la postura del Aquinate sobre la posibilidad de un mundo eterno.

For Maine de Biran, one knows oneself through effort. Crucially, effort involves both a force and a resistance: thus, I am the relation between my soul and my body. Biran may seem to bring the body wholly within the sphere of the self’s interiority, and, indeed, he has often been credited with discovering the lived body of phenomenology. This article argues, however, drawing on Emmanuel Falque’s recent reading of Biran, that the Biranian myself turns out to be, to an extent, external to itself. For the organic resistance that I encounter in all my actions, and that is necessary for me to act at all, can never be wholly transparent to me. The very possibility of self-knowledge thus depends on a certain obscurity, even a certain alienation. The article concludes with a brief consideration of the compatibility of Biran’s late, religious writing with his philosophy of effort.

En este texto se sostiene la necesidad de subrayar el problema del mal en las reflexiones sobre el castigo jurídico y la justicia penal. Para desarrollar lo anterior, (1) se exploran las razones por las que esta discusión no tiene un lugar preponderante en la iusfilosofía contemporánea, principalmente: (a) la idea de que el mal es una reflexión exclusivamente religiosa o que solo tiene sentido como preocupación teológica, y (b) la idea de que el interés por el mal nos lleva necesariamente a derroteros antiberales. Después, (2) se da cuenta de algunos planteamientos básicos de la reflexión filosófica sobre el mal desarrollada durante el siglo XX, cuando ésta es rehabilitada tras las atrocidades de las grandes guerras. (3) Finalmente, se recupera el potencial de esta literatura en la reflexión sobre el castigo, especialmente en lo que respecta a la toma de consciencia sobre las experiencias del mal de nuestro tiempo, y la necesidad de afrontarlo y dar una respuesta.

El artículo explora la crítica de Santiago Ramírez a la clasificación de la analogía de Cayetano. Ramírez argumenta que la división tradicional de la analogía no refleja completamente la complejidad de las nociones de santo Tomás de Aquino. En particular, se introduce la "analogía de atribución intrínseca" como una categoría adicional dentro de la analogía de atribución. A través de un análisis detallado, el texto examina cómo esta forma de analogía mantiene elementos de la proporcionalidad y la atribución extrínseca, pero se distingue por ser una atribución "según el ser" y "según la intención". Se destacan las implicaciones teológicas y filosóficas de esta distinción, especialmente en relación con la predicación del concepto de verdad respecto a Dios, las criaturas y los juicios humanos.

Este artículo destaca la visión de Tomás de Aquino del ser humano como alguien que está hecho para contemplar la belleza y que es movido a lo largo de su existencia por el amor y el deseo de contemplarla. La apreciación de la belleza, de su integridad, proporción y claridad, generan en el contemplador la vivencia de gozo, alegría y también le permiten ver una finalidad y orden en el universo, que comunica una experiencia de paz en el contemplador, quien inevitablemente incrementa su anhelo por encontrar la perfección y la belleza ideal, misma que no encontrará de forma plena en este mundo, pero que nos une como hermanos en la salida de un común amor al ideal con vistas a las grandes obras comunes.

Este artículo examina la relevancia de santo Tomás de Aquino en nuestra época, considerando tanto su contexto histórico como los elementos atemporales de su pensamiento. En la primera parte, se destacan las características sociales, políticas y culturales de la Edad Media, y se analiza cómo estos factores influyeron en la vida y obra de Tomás de Aquino. La segunda parte se centra en la actualidad de su doctrina, abordando la constitución del pensamiento humano y su relación con la verdad, así como la construcción del mundo moral. Se resalta la importancia de la experiencia sensorial como base del conocimiento y la necesidad de una vida moralmente buena conforme a la razón. La obra de Tomás, presentada como un modelo de humildad intelectual y perseverancia en la búsqueda de la verdad, ofrece una filosofía que sigue siendo relevante para el entendimiento del ser humano y su realización personal.

Tanto en Francisco de Vitoria como en Domingo de Soto, cofundadores de la llamada Escuela de Salamanca, encontramos un cuidadoso tratamiento acerca de la gnoseología jurídica. El objeto del presente estudio consiste en el análisis de una serie de pasajes textuales en los que se demuestra la raíz iusnatural de ambas doctrinas. Vitoria y Soto, al mismo tiempo que consideran los preceptos de la ley natural como obligatorios e indispensables, enseñan que existe una serie de grados de conocimiento iusnatural. Con todo, no conviene perder de vista que la ley y el derecho naturales no son, para estos autores, unos elementos extrajurídicos; la ley positiva civil debe derivar de la ley natural y debe ser conforme al derecho natural. En esto estriba, pues, la importancia del acceso cognoscitivo del hombre a dicho fundamento iusnatural, fuente primera de toda deontología legal y jurídica.

En el marco de los estudios actuales de teoría y práctica de μίμησις en Rep. dePlatón, el objetivo es indagar la caracterización [ἠθοποιία] platónica de Sócrates.La hipótesis es que la opción por el diálogo está ligada al modo de comprender yde transmitir el saber filosófico y que, en tal marco, la figura del personaje Sócratesencarna un tipo de saber hacer. Para tal fin, por un lado, se indaga lacaracterización en los Progymnásmata para mostrar su función y el lugar queocupa Platón en esta tradición. Por otro lado, se analizan pasajes clave de Apologíay República I para echar luz sobre la composición narrativa y, a través de ella,intentar dar cuenta del quehacer filosófico en la caracterización socrática. Para estoúltimo, presentamos la distinción entre know that y know how de Ryle y Polanyi.

O objetivo desse artigo é tentar compreender como se processa a percepção visual, segundo Aristóteles. Para alcançar tal propósito, avançarei a hipótese interpretativa segundo a qual a ocorrência da visão é o resultado de uma ‘duplicidade causal’, na qual estão necessariamente envolvidos tanto fatores materiais, correspondentes à causa material-eficiente, quanto fatores ‘não-materiais’, referentes à causa formal-final. A escolha por privilegiar essa ‘duplicidade causal’ se deve ao fato que a mesma parece estar em perfeita consonância com o hilemorfismo aristotélico, algo que parece ser escamoteado tanto na interpretação ‘literalista’, quanto na ‘espiritualista’.

Robert Spaemann's aesthetics has yet to receive a comprehensive treatment, and this article is the first attempt to do so. Spaemann's way of resurrecting the Aristotelian notion of art as imitating nature is unusual, including for Aristotelians. The nature that is visibly imitated is, ultimately, invisible, and spiritual. This quasi-sacramental understanding leads Spaemann to appreciate contemporary art as well. Art's imitation of the invisible is a call to self-transcendence and a reminder of our own spiritual nature.

This article traces Augustine’s presentation of an exegetical rule for oneness based on scriptural patterns in three different anti-Homoian contexts throughout his life. First, his letter to Pascentius outlines how descriptions of oneness in Scripture that include an added phrase detailing “one what” indicate substantial difference. Pericopes without the additional “one what,” though, reveal that the beings are of the same substance. Then, Augustine’s De trinitate builds upon this initial distinction by outlining how Trinitarian unity becomes the soteriological aim for the believers’ oneness with one another. Just as the Father, the Son, and the Spirit are of one substance and of one mind and volition, so too humanity, who is already of one substance, must become of one mind and volition through the same faith. Finally, Augustine’s encounter with Maximinus toward the end of his life elaborates further by explicating the significance of a verb’s singularity or plurality in a biblical verse for substantial oneness. He incorporates an argument that has already appeared in his thought into his approach to oneness in Scripture. This article, therefore, contributes to a greater understanding of Augustine’s exegetical arguments against Homoian theology and the trajectory of his pro-Nicene explanations over his life.

Amor, éros, é o tópico que domina toda a primeira parte do Fedro. Os três discursos proferidos – o discurso de autoria de Lísias/Fedro (259e-262c) e os dois subsequentes proferidos por Sócrates (237a-241d; 257b-259d) – são variações desse mesmo tema. Esses três discursos – que ocupam, aliás, a maior parte do texto – não representam mera ilustração propedêutica acerca da retórica e de seu poder sobre os personagens, em vez disso, os dois discursos finais de Sócrates concretizam o próprio movimento dialético, segundo aquela definição que seria oferecida na segunda parte do próprio diálogo: o exercício de divisão (διαίρεσις) e reunião (συναγωηή), o método que ajuda a “falar e a pensar” (266b). Nesse artigo, pretendemos mostrar como os dois discursos de Sócrates são peças-chave para a compreensão global da dialética no Fedro, em suas relações com a retórica, com a psicagogía e com o tema de éros. Palavras-chave: Fedro; dialética; divisão; reunião; discursos. The dialectical contrapositions of Socrates' speeches in Plato's Phaedrus Abstract: Love, éros, is the topic that dominates the entire first part of the Phaedrus. The three speeches given – the speech by Lysias/Phaedrus (259e-262c) and the two subsequent ones given by Socrates (237a-241d; 257b-259d) – are variations on the same theme. These three speeches – which, in fact, occupy most of the text – do not represent a mere propaedeutic illustration of rhetoric and its power over characters. Actually, Socrates’ final two speeches concretize the dialectical movement itself, according to that definition that would be offered in the second part of the dialogue himself: the exercise of division (διαίρεσις) and reunion (συναγωηή), the method that helps to “speak and think” (266b). In this article, we intend to show how Socrates' two discourses are key pieces for the global understanding of dialectics in the Phaedrus, in its relations with rhetoric, with psychagogy and with the theme of éros. Keywords: Phaedrus; dialectics; division; reunion; speeches. Les contrapositions dialectiques des discours de Socrate dans le Phèdre de Platon Résumé: L'amour, eros, est le sujet qui domine toute la première partie du Phèdre. Les trois discours prononcés – le discours de Lysias/Phèdre (259e-262c) et les deux suivants de Socrate (237a-241d ; 257b-259d) – sont des variations sur le même sujet. Ces trois discours – qui, en fait, occupent la plus grande partie du texte – ne représentent pas qu’une simple illustration propédeutique de la rhétorique et de son pouvoir sur les personnages, en effet les deux derniers discours de Socrate concrétisent le mouvement dialectique lui-même, selon cette définition qui serait proposée dans la deuxième partie du dialogue : l'exercice de la division (διαίρεσις) et de la réunion (συναγωηή), la méthode qui aide à « parler et penser » (266b). Dans cet article, nous voulons montrer comment les deux discours de Socrate sont des pièces maîtresses pour la compréhension globale de la dialectique dans le Phèdre, dans ses rapports avec la rhétorique, avec la psychagogie et avec le sujet de l'éros. Mots-clés: Phèdre; dialectique; division; reunion; discours. [1] Este trabalho é um recorte da pesquisa de Doutorado, realizada na Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas da Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, que culminou com a tese defendida em 2019, intitulada: A dialética e as letras: imagens e paradigmas do pensar no Fedro de Platão, depositada e disponível no repositório institucional da UFMG. Data de registro: 01/08/2023 Data de aceite: 24/04/2024.

A principal hipótese deste trabalho é a de que Sócrates, na Apologia de Platão, utiliza determinados jogos de palavras como uma específica ferramenta retórica. O intuito disso parece ser convencer o leitor de uma prevalência da verdade no conjunto do discurso socrático. Para tanto, busca-se contrabalancear um jogo entre os termos discurso (logon 18b, 19b, 20e, 23d, 27c 28b, 31b, 34b; logos 20c, 26b, 34e; logou 23b; logoi 28c, 32d, 34a, 40b), verdade (aletheian, 17b, 20d, 33c; aletheiai 23b, 28d, 36d; aletheias 29e, 39b) e falsidade ou mentira (epseusanto 17a; pseude 18a; pseudei 26a; pseudetai 20e, 21b; pseudomenoi 34b; pseudos 34e). Nesse sentido, a proposta é apresentar como o discurso de defesa expõe, por meio desses termos, um sentido de hermenêutica socrática, como uma forma peculiar de interpretar oráculos e enigmas. Como obra dramática, a Apologia promove com essa encenação de Sócrates diante do tribunal um efeito retórico claro, pois o foco do discurso não é o júri, mas o leitor. Portanto, é necessário, no plano do discurso de defesa, que Sócrates utilize os recursos de linguagem que o mostrem ao leitor como distinto dos seus acusadores, que “muitas mentiras disseram” (ton pollon hon epseusanto). Palavras-chave: Sócrates; Hermenêutica; Verdade; Discurso. Speech, Truth and Enigma in the Apology Abstract: The main hypothesis of this work is that Socrates, in Plato's Apology, uses certain wordplays as a specific rhetorical tool. The purpose of this seems to be to convince the reader of the prevalence of truth in the whole of Socratic discourse. Therefore, we seek to counterbalance a game between the terms discourse (logon 18b, 19b, 20e, 23d, 27c 28b, 31b, 34b; logos 20c, 26b, 34e; logou 23b; logoi 28c, 32d, 34a, 40b), truth (aletheian, 17b, 20d, 33c; aletheiai 23b, 28d, 36d; aletheias 29e, 39b) and falsehood or lie (epseusanto 17a; pseude 18a; pseudei 26a; pseudetai 20e, 21b; pseudomenoi 34b; pseudos 34e). In this sense, the proposal is to present how the defense discourse exposes, through these terms, a sense of Socratic hermeneutics, as a peculiar way of interpreting oracles and enigmas. As a dramatic work, the Apology promotes with this staging of Socrates in front of the court a clear rhetorical effect, since the focus of the discourse is not the jury, but the reader. Therefore, it is necessary, at the level of the defense discourse, that Socrates uses the language resources that show him to the reader as distinct from his accusers, who “told many lies” (ton pollon hon epseusanto). Key-words: Socrates; Hermeneutics; Truth; Discourse. Discurso, verdad y enigma en la Apología Resumen: La principal hipótesis de este trabajo es que Sócrates, en la Apología de Platón, utiliza ciertos juegos de palabras como herramienta retórica específica. El propósito de esto parece ser convencer al lector del predominio de la verdad en todo el discurso socrático. Por lo tanto, buscamos contrapesar un juego entre los términos discurso (logon 18b, 19b, 20e, 23d, 27c 28b, 31b, 34b; logos 20c, 26b, 34e; logou 23b; logoi 28c, 32d, 34a, 40b), verdad (aletheian, 17b, 20d, 33c; aletheiai 23b, 28d, 36d; aletheias 29e, 39b) y falsedad o mentira (epseusanto 17a; pseude 18a; pseudei 26a; pseudetai 20e, 21b; pseudomenoi 34b; pseudos 34e). En ese sentido, la propuesta es presentar cómo el discurso de la defensa expone, a través de estos términos, un sentido de la hermenéutica socrática, como una forma peculiar de interpretar los oráculos y los enigmas. Como obra dramatica, la Apología promueve con esta puesta en escena de Sócrates frente a la corte un claro efecto retórico, ya que el centro del discurso no es el jurado, sino el lector. Por tanto, es necesario, a nivel del discurso de defensa, que Sócrates utilice los recursos lingüísticos que lo muestren al lector como distinto de sus acusadores, quienes “dijeron muchas mentiras” (ton pollon hon epseusanto). Palabras-clave: Sócrates; Hermenéutica; Verdad; Discurso. Data de registro: 02/08/2023 Data de aceite: 24/01/2024.