Charles E. Snyder

To reconstruct the philosophy of Philo of Larissa, and the changes he brought to the Academic orientation of philosophy, historians depend on the conceptual resources of the modern discipline of epistemology. This regime of concepts enables reconstructions of his thought to assert that at some point after becoming head of the Academy Philo departed from the skepticism of Carneades and Clitomachus, abandoning their epistemological position and rejecting ἐποχὴ περὶ πάντων. Accordingly, Philo is supposed to have adapted Carneades’ theory of the probable impression, either during or soon before his Roman period, formulating a fallibilist epistemology on its basis. Philo’s eventual rejection of ἐποχὴ περὶ πάντων represents a departure from the “epistemological pessimism” of his predecessors. This paper contests this epistemological framing. It presents an account of his innovations in terms of what Michel Foucault described as an ethics revolving around the care of the self. The argument for ἐποχὴ περὶ πάντων is repurposed by Philo as a therapeutic purgative to facilitate the transformation of those under his tutelage.

This paper maintains that the standard epistemological reconstructions of Academic argument against Stoic apprehension distort the meaning of “inapprehensibility” (ἀκαταληψία) and “the suspension of assent about all things” (ἐποχὴ περὶ πάντων). The paper therefore defends the few traces in recent scholarship of the ontological specifications of inapprehensibility and the suspension of assent. This paper’s purpose is to reinforce the view that the Academy’s attack on Stoicism extended to the latter’s ontological commitments

In The Hermeneutics of the Subject, Michel Foucault criticizes modern historiography for presupposing a factitious theory of the subject. Foucault rejects this presupposition and pursues an alternative style of historiography, organized by the analysis of epimeleia heautou (“care of the self”). Aiming his criticism solely at its theory of the purified subject, Foucault overlooks the deeper structural incoherence of modern historiography. This oversight leads Foucault to an uncritical embrace of a style of historiography that enacts its own form of purification. In the reading developed here, Foucault systematically purges the history of class struggle from the analysis of self-care. This essay introduces the outlines of a Marxian approach to ancient practices of care of the self that is nonreductive and nondeterminist in and through a reading of Foucault. In this approach, the organization of classes and the practices of care of the self that materialize within a society are to be understood historically as constantly shaping and influencing one another.

Focused on the reference to Socrates’ confession of ignorance at Academica 1.45, this paper challenges the common assumption that the passage transmits Arcesilaus’ conception of Socrates. This paper develops in two steps a more plausible reading of the passage. According to this reading, Cicero presents an interpretation of Arcesilaus’ historical relation to Socrates. In conclusion, the paper argues that traditional readings of Acad. 1.45 underestimate not only Cicero’s originality as an historical thinker, but also his clever reconstruction of Academic history, as it effectively opposes the controversial Academic history defended by Antiochus in the early first century BCE.

ABSTRACT In his 1981–82 lectures The Hermeneutics of the Subject, Michel Foucault claims that a significant portion of the modern historiography of ancient philosophy tends to discredit the ethical framework of epimeleia heautou (“care of the self”). The thematic analysis of knowledge in the historiography of ancient philosophy overshadows the theme of care of the self. Taking Foucault’s claim as a point of departure, the aim of this paper is twofold. First, the paper provides a genealogy of the early Hellenistic Academy, from Polemo to Arcesilaus. Second, the paper demonstrates that for Arcesilaus, the alleged pioneer of what modern historiography has designated the Academy’s epistemological scepticism, philosophy is not restricted to a continual search for knowledge at a theoretically rarefied level of challenging arguments or discursive statements. This paper situates Arcesilaus’ opposition to early Stoic epistemology within the framework of Academic epimeleia heautou, and defends the thesis that under Arcesilaus the Hellenistic Academy undergoes a shift in the practice of care of the self.

Charles E. Snyder considers the New Academy's attacks on Stoic epistemology through a critical re-assessment of the 3rd century philosopher, Arcesilaus of Pitane. Arguing that the standard epistemological framework used to study the ancient Academy ignores the metaphysical dimensions at stake in Arcesilaus's critique, Snyder explores new territory for the historiography of Stoic-Academic debates in the early Hellenistic period. Focusing on the dispute between the Old and New Academy, reveals the metaphysical dimensions of Arcesilaus' arguments as essential to grasping what is innovative about the so-called New Academy. Resisting the partiality for epistemology in the historical reconstructions of ancient philosophy, this book defends a new philosophical framework that re-positions Arcesilaus' attack on the early Stoa as key to his deviation from the metaphysical foundations of both Stoic and Academic virtue ethics. Drawing on a wide range of scholarship on Hellenistic philosophy in French, Italian, and German, Beyond Hellenistic Epistemology builds bridges between analytical and continental approaches to the historiography of ancient philosophy, and makes an important and disruptive contribution to the literature.

The focus of this paper is the argument between the Academic Arcesilaus of Pitane (ca. 316–240 BC) and the philosophy of Zeno of Citium. Scholars typically claim that Arcesilaus set out to attack Zeno’s epistemology or theory of knowledge. The framework of epistemology prevails in the modern reconstruction of Arcesilaus’s arguments. Proponents of this framework usually contend that the epistemic possibility of Stoic “cognition” or “apprehension” (κατάληψις) is the principal aim of Arcesilaus’s attack. The aim of this article is to contest the limited scope of the framework of epistemology in the interpretation of Arcesilaus’s attack, and reposition his critical arguments, in view of the fragmentary evidence, within the framework of an ontology of knowledge.

Scholars of Greek and Roman antiquity advance a variety of reasons to explain why the study of Hellenistic philosophy remains dependent on fragments and testimonies. Mansfeld observes such dependence in his use of the premise that philosophers of late antiquity based philosophical instruction and school curricula on a core set of writings from the classical period. On this basis, Mansfeld infers that schools of late antiquity continually transcribed and preserved writings of instructional significance. The schools routinely excluded other classical and Hellenistic writings from the curricula, thus ensuring that a sizable body of literature deemed less pedagogically significant would perish, along with the original material on which the inscriptions had been made. The main problem with this standard survey of reasons is that it fails to explain why we remain extraordinarily dependent on peripheral sources and later testimonies in studying the Hellenistic Academy.

Less than a century after Plato’s death, the Academy’s scholarch Arcesilaus of Pitane inaugurates a peculiar oral phase of Academic philosophy, deciding not to write philosophical works or openly teach his own doctrines. Scholars often attribute a radical change of direction to the school under his headship, taking early Stoic epistemology to be the primary target of the New Academy’s attack on Stoic philosophy. This paper defends a rival view of Arcesilaus’ Academic revolution. Shifting the focus of that attack from epistemology to ethics, the paper illuminates the continuity in development from Polemo to Arcesilaus and the evidence corroborating this continuity.

Interpreters of Theaetetus are prone to endorse the view that a god gave Socrates maieutic skill. This paper challenges that view. It provides a different account of the skill’s origins, and reconstructs a genealogy of Socratic philosophy that begins and has its end in human experience. Three distinct origins coordinate to bring forth a radically new conception of philosophy in the image of female midwifery: the state of wonder (1. efficient origin), the exercise of producing, examining and disavowing beliefs in the gradual cultivation of human nature’s lack of skill (2. material origin), and Socrates’ understanding of god’s assistance as an endorsement of his mental infertility and the benefit of a particular form of dialectical training (3. formal origin). The paper concludes by arguing that Socrates transforms philosophy into a pursuit of wisdom that has its telos in becoming like a woman.

Interpreters of Theaetetus are prone to endorse the view that a god gave Socrates maieutic skill. This paper challenges that view. It provides a different account of the skill’s origins, and reconstructs a genealogy of Socratic philosophy that begins and has its end in human experience. Three distinct origins coordinate to bring forth a radically new conception of philosophy in the image of female midwifery: the state of wonder (1. efficient origin), the exercise of producing, examining and disavowing beliefs in the gradual cultivation of human nature’s lack of skill (2. material origin), and Socrates’ understanding of god’s assistance as an endorsement of his mental infertility and the benefit of a particular form of dialectical training (3. formal origin). The paper concludes by arguing that Socrates transforms philosophy into a pursuit of wisdom that has its telos in becoming like a woman.