Charles Travis

Geographical Information Systems (GIS) – either as “standard” GIS or custom made Historical GIS (HGIS) – have become quite popular in some historical sub-disciplines, such as Economic and Social History or Historical Geography. “Mainstream” history, however, seems to be rather unaffected by this trend. More generally speaking: Why is it that computer applications in general have failed to make much headway in history departments, despite the first steps being undertaken a good forty years ago? With the “spatial turn” in full swing in the humanities, and many historians dealing with spatial and geographical questions, one would think GIS would be welcomed with open arms. Yet there seems to be no general anticipation by historians of employing GIS as a research tool. As mentioned, HGIS are popular chiefly among Historical Geographers and Social and Economic Historians. The latter disciplines seem to be predestined to use such software through the widespread quantitative methodology these disciplines have employed traditionally. Other historical sub-disciplines, such as Ancient History, are also very open to this emerging technology since the scarcity of written sources in this field can be mitigated by inferences made from an HGIS that has archaeological data stored in it, for example. In most of Modern History, however, the use of GIS is rarely seen. The intellectual benefit that a GIS may bring about seems not be apparent to scholars from this sub-discipline (and others). This book wants to investigate and discuss this controversy. Why does the wider historian community not embrace GIS more readily? While one cannot deny that the methodologies linked with a GIS follow geographical paradigms rather than historical ones, the potential of GIS as a 'killer application' for digital historical scholarship should be obvious. This book brings together authors from Geography and History to discuss the value of GIS for historical research. The focus, however, will not be on the "how", but on the "why" of GIS in history.

This essay outlines a certain 20th century Oxonian tradition in epistemology, contrasting it with another line of thought set out by Michael Ayers. The tradition begins with Cook Wilson and the idea that knowing is never having evidence, no matter how strong. It takes a turn in J.L. Austin, introducing two ideas into philosophy: disjunctivism and occasion-sensitivity. The last section considers whether either can really live without the other. The first part of the essay is a general consideration of the relation between two forms of awareness: perceptual, and ‘propositional’, and of how the first may furnish proof of the second. The second part considers Ayers’ view of the relation, particularly as expressed in his idea of primary and secondary knowledge, and its relation to disjunctivism about knowledge.

Introductory Remarks Reading these excellent commentaries we already wish we had written another book – a more comprehensive, clearer, and better defended one than what we have. We are, however, quite fond of the book we ended up with, and so we've decided that, rather than to yield, we'll clarify. These contributions have helped us do that, and for that we are grateful to our critics. We're lucky in that many (so far about twenty1) extremely able philosophers have read and commented on our work in print. A slightly discouraging fact is that all these commentators seem to think we are completely, utterly mistaken. On the positive side: Our critics seem to disagree about what we're completely wrong about. On the one hand, radical contextualists (e.g. Travis) find our objections against them off the mark, but our objections to moderate contextualism dead-on. On the other hand, the moderate contextualists (e.g. Szabo) think that our objections against them fail, but our objections to radical contextualism are strong (Szabo, concludes that we ‘present strong arguments against radical contextualism, but only a weak case against moderate contextualism’). This means we've got our work cut out for us – defending the middle ground from every which way – something we are more than pleased to do. We start with general points of clarification, points it will be useful to reference from time to time when discussing each commentary. (General Comment #4 is the most important, and we reference it repeatedly in what follows.) General Comment #1: Our View isn't Radical..

A simple idea: Perception is of what is in view (before the eyes), or making noise, or the noises made, or emitting odours, or the thus emitted (etc.). What we see is, say, a pig, or its perambulations, or its rooting beneath that oak. Sight offers us a certain form of awareness of this, characterized in one way by its objects. It _thus_ offers us occasion for another sort: we may recognize what we are aware of as, for example, a case of a pig rooting, or of an interminable drum machine. We take up the offer in exercising capacities for recognition such as they are. John McDowell has argued that this cannot be quite right (or anyway complete). For it needs to posit rational relations where there can be none. What follows argues that _McDowell_ cannot be quite right: if he were, _thought_ would cease to exist.

This book is about Gottlob Frege. The guiding thought is that Frege left philosophy a legacy which has been largely ignored, not least of all by his admirers. In order of logical priority, Frege's first concern was to locate the law-like behaviour of truths and falsehoods merely by virtue of their being such. The just-mentioned legacy lies in his first step towards that goal. It consists in winnowing the 'logical' from the 'psychological', the business of being true as such from that of holding, or holding forth as true-and to keep these separate. A first lesson: what belongs to what is thus abstracted cannot be read directly back into what it was abstracted from. This is what is most widely ignored. The book is divided in three parts. The first presents Frege's general picture of the business of being true-of what belongs to the abstraction. The second is primarily concerned with steps Frege takes between 1891 and 1895, to pave the way for what became, after logic itself, his central project, that whose attempted carrying out is contained in Grundgesetze I. The third part concerns views of logic, truth, the inexorableness of logic, which Frege eventually came to hold, and what it might be to study 'The Mind' as opposed to minds.

This article develops Frege's conception of answerability, and his correlative views on psychologism of the first sort. Compared to prior philosophers, such as British empiricists, Frege is a minimalist in the demands he sets on answerability. If he is ever less than minimalist, that is something that flows out of his particular conception of logic. The article then turns to Wittgenstein's conception of answerability, by which Frege is not quite minimalist enough. That allows us to see how the pursuit of answerability might lead to psychologism of the second kind.

Let us begin with a piece of intellectual history. The story begins in a period encapsulating the second world war – say the ‘40’s, give and take a bit. Around then, it began to be argued with force that an expression – e.g., an English one – while it well might mean something, does not say anything, and notably no one thing in particular. The principal behind the argument was surely J.L. Austin, though, I would claim, the same point was argued in a somewhat different way by Wittgenstein. The intended point was not merely a grammatical one: we say of an expression that it means such and such, but not that it says such and such. Be that as it may, the main point was quite substantive: typically, an English expression is such that, with its meaning fixed, there are a variety of distinct things to be said in using it on some production of it or other.

Comment garantir l’objectivité de notre rapport au monde? Le rationalisme et l’empirisme renvoient, chacun à leur manière, à une capacité générale de l’esprit humain – capacité désengagée du monde, décontextualisée. La nouveauté radicale qu’introduit Wittgenstein dans sa seconde philosophie est une vision contextualiste et proprement humaine de l’objectivité.Dans cet ouvrage, issu de leçons données au Collège de France en 2002, Charles Travis prend appui sur Frege, Wittgenstein et J.L. Austin pour montrer que l’opération de désangagement du monde propre aux différentes théories de la connaissance contemporaines ne permet plus à la pensée d’être objective et a fortiori d’être vraie. Elle ne permet pas de véritable rapport au monde. C’est plutôt au sein de nos pratiques les plus ordinaires que se fondent l’objectivité qui est la nôtre, la vérité, ainsi que les différents accords du monde avec le langage et la pensée. La vérité n’est pas abstraite, nos représentations sont situées. Toute signification, comme toute pensée, est sensible à l’occasion. Charles Travis propose ici une lecture originale de Wittgenstein, conjuguée à une approche particulière des grands problèmes de la philosophie analytique

What is an object? A prior question: What is objecthood?Au fond, and to logic’s eye,objectis a role to be played with respect to a thought (on a decomposition). It is to be a countable which that thought represent as being some way for such a countable to be; what restores the business of truth-of to that of truth outright. What plays that role for some given thought is then an object with respect to that thought. Given this, there are corresponding absolute notions,to be fit for this role, andto be fit only for this role. So the fundamental task here is identifying the conditions on playing this role at all. All this is a contribution, however limited, to a topic called ‘ontology’. This last word also occurs in the plural in several contexts. The end of this essay considers how these notions (non-countable, and the several countables) might relate, and what assumptions underlie what some have seen them to.

The role of words in thought expression is to make recognisable what thought is expressed. The role of a definite description in the expression of a singular thought is to make recognisable with respect to what object the thought is singular. That different definite descriptions may play this role for one object settles nothing as to how such thoughts are to be counted. What does settle this? The present brief is: nothing in the notion of a thought as such. For good reason. A way of counting thoughts is under two opposing constraints. First, it must serve the needs of proof. Second, it must yield thoughts which are shareable. Simultaneously satisfying both these demands requires there to be no one way of counting thoughts which is the right one tout court. That is, the notion same thought is an occasion-sensitive notion.

This essay looks at Thompson Clarke’s two published essays in the context of his doctoral dissertation. In the dissertation the topics of those essays fit into a general scheme. There is supposed to be a uniform form of “inquiry,” which, as Clarke sees it, is present in both the case for skepticism (a pessimistic view of the possibility of knowledge) and a supposed case for sense data. He uses the term ‘inquiry’ to stress that it is not an argument, but rather a particular way of raising the question, which makes both skepticism and sense data seem, where they do, inescapable. The essay, “Seeing Surfaces and Physical Objects,” is meant to be a simple example of an inquiry of the relevant type. The inquiry in the case of skepticism is carried out, or at least sketched in some detail, in the other published essay, “The Legacy of Skepticism,” which argues compellingly that that case collapses. The inquiry in the case of sense data was never spelled out, or at least in neither the essays nor the dissertation. The argument of the present essay is that there simply is no such inquiry. The idea of sense data does not parallel the idea of skepticism in such ways, which helps illuminate the difference between perceptual and cognitive awareness.