This article critically examines Mexico’s 2024–2025 judicial reform, which introduced the popular election of all federal judges, marking an unprecedented institutional change. Drawing on legal philosophy and democratic theory, the paper argues that the reform undermines constitutional guarantees, weakens the protection of fundamental rights, and distorts democratic representation. Rather than enhancing accountability, the reform politicizes the judiciary, erodes judicial independence, and dimin…
Read moreThis article critically examines Mexico’s 2024–2025 judicial reform, which introduced the popular election of all federal judges, marking an unprecedented institutional change. Drawing on legal philosophy and democratic theory, the paper argues that the reform undermines constitutional guarantees, weakens the protection of fundamental rights, and distorts democratic representation. Rather than enhancing accountability, the reform politicizes the judiciary, erodes judicial independence, and diminishes citizens’ right to impartial adjudication, as reflected in low electoral participation and international criticism. Situating the reform within a broader process of democratic backsliding, the article contends that judicial elections function less as a democratizing mechanism than as a tool of power concentration, posing serious risks to constitutionalism and the human rights discourse in Mexico
