Claudia Lorena García Aguilar

ABSTRACT The present article analyzes the notions of simplest bodies and substance in the light of the definition of individual as presented in the physical digression of the second part of Spinoza's Ethics. Our goal is to clarify the relationship between the notions of individual, simplest bodies and substance. Our hypothesis is that neither the simplest bodies nor the substance can be considered individuals. In order to do this, the work will be divided into two parts: the first one concerns the approach of the simplest bodies, the second, the approach of substance. At the end, final considerations will be outlined.

Resumen: Este artículo tiene como objetivo estudiar las nociones de fantasía y razón en dos obras de Margaret Cavendish: Fantasías filosóficas (1653) y Philosophicall Letters (Cartas filosóficas, 1664). La hipótesis que me interesa defender es que, a pesar de tratarse de una obra de juventud y una de madurez, esta distinción no hace mella en lo que respecta a la fantasía y la razón. Es decir, observamos una continuidad entre el planteo de la obra de juventud de 1653 y el de la obra de madurez de 1664. Asimismo, a pesar de ciertos cambios en los nombres, la filósofa mantiene en Philosophical Letters su postura original respecto del conocimiento de animales vegetales y minerales. Abstract: This paper aims to study the notions of fancy and reason in two works by Margaret Cavendish: Philosophicall Fancies (1653) and Philosophical Letters (1664). I argue that, despite one being an early work and the other a mature one, this distinction does not affect her notions of fancy and reason. Therefore, there is continuity on this topic between the early work of 1653 and the mature work of 1664. Likewise, despite some name changes, in Philosophical Letters Cavendish maintains her original position regarding the knowledge of animals, vegetables, and minerals.

El análisis de los modos infinitos spinozianos ha sido muy variado. Mi intención es resaltar la pertinencia de los modos infinitos sin negar su peculiaridad, es decir, sin confundirlos tanto con los modos finitos como con la sustancia. La hipótesis que me interesa defender es, en primer lugar, que los modos infinitos son eternos y no sempiternos. En segundo lugar, que los modos infinitos, en particular la faz de todo el universo, son imprescindibles a la hora de pensar las relaciones parte-todo, sustancia-modos, sustancia-modos finitos e, incluso, las relaciones intramodales.

After fieldwork conducted among young people in Sarajevo, we found arelation between the discourses sustained by them and the ethnic categories theyuse to classify people and to identify themselves. Also we have found that peopleself-affiliated as Bosnians play an important role in the network of multiethnicrelationships, in which strong ties, surprisingly, are still very important. Finallywe found a relationship between the composition of personal networks and theethnic discourses that are maintained.

After fieldwork conducted among young people in Sarajevo, we found arelation between the discourses sustained by them and the ethnic categories theyuse to classify people and to identify themselves. Also we have found that peopleself-affiliated as Bosnians play an important role in the network of multiethnicrelationships, in which strong ties, surprisingly, are still very important. Finallywe found a relationship between the composition of personal networks and theethnic discourses that are maintained.