Claus Schlaberg

Abstract The first part argues that being an image is an (at least) four part relation between the image itself (x2), properties of recipients (B), the object (x3), and properties of the object (M). Referring to Grice, Schiffer, and Meggle, a distinction is made between communicativity and non-communicativity (manipulativity) of x2 regarding to B, x3, and M. The second part substitutes sign and image by explicates that denote properties relevant for x2 being an image regarding to B, x3, and M, making thus clear why images are signs. Intentional relations and causal relations are the basis of this explication (influenced by Posner) that is also meant to give an idea of those properties that are typical of pieces of fine arts and of some other cultural practices. Additionally, it helps in understanding the difference between typical images and more abstract symbols. Im ersten Abschnitt werden Gründe dafür genannt, Bildsein als mindestens vierstellige Beziehung aufzufassen: als Beziehung zwischen dem Bild (x2), Rezipienteneigenschaften (B), dem Bildgegenstand (x3) und Eigenschaften (M) des Bildgegenstandes. Dabei wird – anknüpfend an Grice, Schiffer und Meggle – zwischen Kommunikativität und NichtKommunikativität (Manipulativität) von x2 bzgl. B, x3 und M unterschieden. Im zweiten Abschnitt wird die Rede von ›Zeichen‹ und von ›Bildsein‹ ersetzt durch Explikate, die Eigenschaften bezeichnen, welche relevant dafür sind, dass x2 ein Bild bzgl. B, x3 und M ist – derart, dass deutlich wird, inwiefern Bilder Zeichen sind. Basis dieser – von Posner angeregten – Explikationen sind intentionale Beziehungen und Bewirken. Aus den Begriffspräzisierungen ergeben sich Einsichten sowohl in Bezug auf Eigenschaften, die typisch für Werke Bildender Kunst und einige andere kulturelle Praktiken sind, als auch in Bezug auf eine Abgrenzung zentraler Vertreter der Kategorie ›Bild‹ von eher nur bildhaften Symbolen.

»Consciousness and Its Place in Nature« (Chalmers 2003) is the title of an article written by David Chalmers, which deals with the so called hard problems of consciousness, that means, with those problems that do not concern how functions are performed (Chalmers 1997:4), but deal with the emergence of consciousness in the sense of subjective experience. On the one hand, it is important to treat architecture from the very beginning not only as somehow stylish and useful heaps of stones that are additionally embedded in political and philosophical contexts (whatever that means). On the other hand, architecture belongs to nature just as much as trees, apes, and what apes produce. So architecture is situated between what can be grasped from a ›materialistic‹ point of view, on the one hand, and what depends on subjectivity, on the other hand. As far as a general theory of architecture is able to examine what is essential to architecture, one should keep in mind that we would probably not accept a set of characteristics as sufficient for a building being a piece of architecture as we have learned from Wittgenstein and others concerning categories in general (Kleiber 1993). Finding necessary conditions is not as simple as one may expect either. There is a closely related phenomenon however: Are not some individual buildings more representative of architecture as such than others? Gropius once designed a pigsty for the manufacturer Rosenthal. We are inclined to acknowledge it as a part of his architectural work due to the fact that the famous architect Gropius designed it and gave it a typical International Style appearance. Its being purely a pigsty, not a castle or a dwelling, however may be a reason to deny it this status as architecture (Isaacs 1984:1105)

This contribution builds on the idea of integrating truth-fulfilling entities into a truth-conditional semantics. It asks which kind of truth conditions are to be considered for statements of something being really there – as opposed to just being an intentional object. The adverbial theory of perception treats experiences, for example appearances (visual experiences), as ‘adverbially’ classified. As a further approach towards how an object is related to its appearance (being experienced visually), semantical externalism is considered. On this basis, it is proposed that the notion of existence can be understood as a disposition to be experienced: y being really there is explicated as a disposition to experiences that are adverbially characterized as y-experiences. This approach helps to understand the different perspectives of the natural sciences and the arts and humanities. While the natural sciences are directed towards y, the arts and humanities primarily deal with y-experiences.

Was sind Bilder? -Bild- ist keine scharf umrissene Kategorie. Was man zu den Bildern zahlt, hangt allerdings von Eigenschaften ab, die zueinander in systematischen Beziehungen ('Familienahnlichkeiten') stehen. Diese Eigenschaften werden in einer formalen Explikatsprache expliziert - so, dass deutlich wird, inwiefern Bilder eine Art Zeichen sind und: weshalb fur Bildende Kunst nicht Kommunikativitat, sondern Manipulativitat (in einem nicht wertenden Sinne) relevant ist. Die Arbeit ist ein Beispiel dafur, dass etablierte Mittel und Einsichten sowohl der sprachanalytischen Philosophie als auch der fruhen Phanomenologie einer bildsemiotischen Grundlagenforschung zugutekommen."

Was ist ‚wirklich‘? Trennt uns ein Schleier von der Wirklichkeit, den wir nicht beseitigen können? Diese stark beanspruchte Metapher kann einem gründlicheren Sprechen weichen, wenn man versucht, zu klären, was wir mit „vorhanden“, „real“, „wirklich“ und dergleichen meinen. Für die Wissenschaften sind Gegenstände unter einem Seinsmodus von Interesse, den Heidegger „Vorhandensein“ nannte. Mit dem Versuch, „vorhanden“ zu explizieren, geraten wir in den Strudel des Empirismus, der die theoretische Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts (einschließlich der Phänomenologie) prägte und wissenschaftlich Interessierte in die Philosophie überhaupt einführt. Tatsächlich ist schon in allgemeinbildenden Schulen eine Chemiestunde, wenn sie zwischen Versuch, Beobachtung (also Empirie) und Deutung unterscheidet, philosophischer als eine Stunde des Literaturunterrichts. Interessanterweise verweist uns der Modus des Vorhandenseins auf den Bereich, um den es in ‚Kunst und Kultur‘ eigentlich am meisten geht: darauf, ‚wie es ist‘, einen Monet zu betrachten, Bruckners Dritte zu hören oder Verse Hölderlins zu lesen. Es wird also eine systematische Verbindung zwischen den Gegenstandsbereichen von Naturwissenschaften und Kulturwissenschaften herausgestellt.

Observation is described as that which is informationally linked to the observed with the help of its being characterized both internally and externally. The external characterization refers to what perception really is (exemplified by seeing) in the manner semantic externalism treats natural kinds. Observable predicates are treated as reducible to appearance behaviour thus characterized. Referring to this way of semantical reduction distinguishes cultures of knowledge from cultures which acknowledge linguistic utterances as truthmakers. Introductory Remarks Theories of the sciences have mainly dealt with how observation confirms or disconfirms a hypothesis. The question why observation matters at all has hardly been dealt with. Instead of giving empirical evidence one could consider looking for evidence in books. Indeed, we use books in order to gain knowledge but in the sciences this is commonly justified for the reason that scientific books refer to formerly published empirical data utilized in current theories—because of their reference to observation. Imagine a text contains only true statements. Why not consider referring to it in order to decide upon the truth of a hypothesis? It does not matter whether I know for certain that its statements are true. Our concern is what I am justified to infer from the text, presupposing that its statements are true. A striking peculiarity is that in the sciences I am not justified to infer anything from it, even if the text leads me to true conclusions only. Obviously, the evidence I am finally allowed to rely on in the sciences is not a linguistic utterance be it a spoken or a written one. It seems that linguistic utterances do not count as reasonable truthmakers in the sciences as some utterances do in religion. (Quotes from the Bible or the Koran are examples.) It has traditionally been presupposed rather than justified that observation is basic in the sciences. To stress the role of observation seems trivial. How is observation related to scientific statements?