•  4
    Automaticity in virtuous action
    In Nancy Snow & Franco Trivigno (eds.), The Philosophy and Psychology of Character and Happiness, Routledge. pp. 75-90. 2014.
  •  5
    Automaticity in virtuous action
    In Nancy Snow & Franco Trivigno (eds.), The Philosophy and Psychology of Character and Happiness, Routledge. pp. 75-90. 2014.
  •  147
    Are intelligible agents square?
    Philosophical Explorations 17 (1): 17-34. 2014.
    In How We Get Along, J. David Velleman argues for two related theses: first, that ‘making sense’ of oneself to oneself and others is a constitutive aim of action; second, that this fact about action grounds normativity. Examining each thesis in turn, I argue against the first that an agent may deliberately act in ways which make sense in terms of neither her self-conception nor others' conceptions of her. Against the second thesis, I argue that some vices are such that the agents concerned would…Read more
  •  242
    I argue that lying is generally morally better than mere deliberate misleading because the latter involves the exploitation of a greater trust and more seriously abuses our willingness to fulfil epistemic and moral obligations to others. Whereas the liar relies on our figuring out and accepting only what is asserted, the mere deliberate misleader depends on our actively inferring meaning beyond what is said in the form of conversational implicatures as well. When others’ epistemic and moral obli…Read more
  •  1
    The Importance of Empathy
    Dissertation, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 2003.
    I argue that 'Empathy' is of considerable value in ethical theory and reasoning. In Part One, I explain the concept I refer to as 'Empathy', taking as my starting point Jonathan Bennett's article, 'The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn'. I argue that a focus on Empathy, rather than sympathy, can better explain our intuitive ethical evaluations of the characters Bennett considers. I briefly discuss various interpretations of the traditional distinction between reason and emotion. With respect to the…Read more
  •  102
    A Virtue Ethics Response to Implicit Bias
    In Michael Brownstein & Jennifer Saul (eds.), Implicit Bias and Philosophy, Volume 2: Moral Responsibility, Structural Injustice, and Ethics, Oxford University Press. pp. 191-214. 2016.
    Virtue ethics faces two challenges based in ‘dual-process’ models of cognition. The classic situationist worry is that we just do not have reliable motivations at all. One promising response invokes an alternative model of cognition which can accommodate evidence cited in support of dual-process models without positing distinct systems for automatic and deliberative processing. The approach appeals to the potential of automatization to habituate virtuous motivations. This response is threatened …Read more
  •  135
    Reclaiming the Conscience of Huckleberry Finn
    In Daniel Kolak & Raymond Martin (eds.), The Experience of Philosophy, Oxford University Press. 2006.
    Huck Finn’s emotional responses constitute perfectly good moral reasons not to betray his friend, even though Huck is unable to recognise them as such.