•  7
    Comments on Glasgow, The Solace
    Journal of Philosophical Research 48 275-282. 2023.
    In his book, The Solace: Finding Value in Death through Gratitude for Life, Joshua Glasgow recounts his thoughts as he tried to prepare for a conversation about death with his dying mother, whom he hoped to comfort. After rejecting certain possible sources of solace, he argues that our passing away itself has value, which it derives from the meaningfulness of our lives as a whole, and this value can provide the comfort we may seek. I raise a number of difficulties for and questions about Glasgow…Read more
  •  73
    From the Editors
    Ethics 134 (1): 1-3. 2023.
  •  3
    From the Editors
    with Mitchell Berman, Scott Hershovitz, and Scott Shapiro
    Legal Theory 29 (1): 1-1. 2023.
  •  78
    Ethics, Philosophy, and Moore's Legacy
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (S1): 21-29. 2003.
  •  283
    Moral motivation
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2006.
    In our everyday lives, we confront a host of moral issues. Once we have deliberated and formed judgments about what is right or wrong, good or bad, these judgments tend to have a marked hold on us. Although in the end, we do not always behave as we think we ought, our moral judgments typically motivate us, at least to some degree, to act in accordance with them. When philosophers talk about moral motivation, this is the basic phenomenon they seek to understand. Moral motivation is an instance of…Read more
  •  29
    From the Editors
    Ethics 132 (1): 1-3. 2021.
  •  23
    From the Editors
    Ethics 133 (1): 1-4. 2022.
  •  28
    From the Editors
    Ethics 131 (1): 1-3. 2020.
  •  163
    Editorial: The Review Process
    Ethics 130 (1): 1-4. 2019.
  •  12
    Darwall on Welfare and Rational Care
    Philosophical Studies 130 (3): 619-635. 2006.
  •  3
    From the Editors
    with Mitchell Berman, Scott Hershovitz, and Scott Shapiro
    Legal Theory 28 (1): 1-2. 2022.
  •  23
    Russ Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism: A Defence (review)
    Philosophical Review 115 (4): 536-539. 2006.
  •  28
    XV-Self-Interest and Self-Sacrifice
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt3): 311-325. 2009.
  •  19
    XV—Self‐Interest and Self‐Sacrifice
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt3): 311-325. 2009.
    Stephen Darwall has recently suggested that theories which identify a person's good with her own ranking of concerns do not properly delimit the ‘scope’ of welfare, making self‐sacrifice conceptually impossible. But whether a theory of welfare makes self‐sacrifice impossible depends on what self‐sacrifice is. I offer an alternative analysis to Overvold's, explaining why self‐interest and self‐sacrifice need not be opposed, and so why the problems of delimiting the scope of welfare and of allowin…Read more
  •  39
    Value, Welfare, and Morality
    with R. G. Frey and Christopher W. Morris
    Philosophical Review 104 (4): 603. 1995.
    This volume contains thirteen new essays covering various issues in value theory. Eight of the essays were presented at a conference by the same name at Bowling Green State University, five others were commissioned. The essays vary in quality, and some of them cover themes developed in previously published work. But overall, each essay provides a carefully argued point of view on an important issue.
  •  304
    The story of a life
    Social Philosophy and Policy 30 (1-2): 21-50. 2013.
    This essay explores the nature of narrative representations of individual lives and the connection between these narratives and personal good. It poses the challenge of determining how thinking of our lives in story form contributes distinctively to our good in a way not reducible to other value-conferring features of our lives. Because we can meaningfully talk about our lives going well for us at particular moments even if they fail to go well overall or over time, the essay maintains that our …Read more
  •  435
    The Normative Significance of Temporal Well-Being
    Res Philosophica 98 (1): 125-139. 2021.
  •  37
    The Conception of Value
    with Paul Grice
    Philosophical Review 102 (2): 267. 1993.
  •  100
  •  77
    Self-Interest and Self-Sacrifice
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt3). 2009.
    Stephen Darwall has recently suggested (following work by Mark Overvold) that theories which identify a person’s good with her own ranking of concerns do not properly delimit the ‘scope’ of welfare, making self-sacrifice conceptually impossible. But whether a theory of welfare makes self-sacrifice impossible depends on what self-sacrifice is. I offer an alternative analysis to Overvold’s, explaining why self-interest and self-sacrifice need not be opposed, and so why the problems of delimiting t…Read more
  •  10
    Russ Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism: A Defence (review)
    Philosophical Review 115 (4): 536-539. 2006.
  •  154
    Relational good and the multiplicity problem
    Philosophical Issues 19 (1): 205-234. 2009.
    No Abstract
  •  156
    Objectivism and relational good
    Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (1): 314-349. 2008.
    In his critique of egoism as a doctrine of ends, G. E. Moore famously challenges the idea that something can be someone. Donald Regan has recently revived and developed the Moorean challenge, making explicit its implications for the very idea of individual welfare. If the Moorean is right, there is no distinct, normative property good for, and so no plausible objectivism about ethics could be welfarist. In this essay, I undertake to address the Moorean challenge, clarifying our theoretical alter…Read more
  •  169
    Moral Realism: A Defence
    Philosophical Review 115 (4): 536-539. 2006.
    Book Information Moral Realism: A Defence. Moral Realism:\nA Defence Russ Shafer-Landau , Oxford : Clarendon Press ,\n2003 , x + 322 , {Â}\textsterling35 ( cloth ) By Russ\nShafer-Landau. Clarendon Press. Oxford. Pp. x + 322.\n{Â}\textsterling35 (cloth:)
  •  45
    Normativity and the Planning Theory of Law
    Jurisprudence 7 (2): 307-324. 2016.
    In this essay, I focus on what appear to be Shapiro’s views about the normativity of law, as well as with his surprising claim that law necessarily has a moral aim. I argue that even if Shapiro offers a more compelling reply to the problem of the normativity of law than Hart offers in The Concept of Law, the moves that he makes appear to be equally available to a defender of Hart’s theory, and so in this respect, the planning theory has no particular advantage over the practice theory. As for th…Read more