Cyril Hédoin

How can societies justify collective choices that interfere with individual freedom when citizens disagree about fundamental values? In Social Choice and Public Reason, economist and philosopher Cyril Hédoin addresses this challenge facing diverse liberal societies by combining social choice theory with public reason liberalism. The book introduces the Public Reason Model of Social Choice, which merges social choice theory’s formal structure with key concepts from public reason liberalism—persons, consent, values, and public reason—to establish conditions for publicly justified collective decisions. This framework is articulated with a game-theoretic account of how conventions, social norms, and law shape society’s choices, while acknowledging that some effective rules may lack public justification. The book examines how this model operates in pluralistic societies marked by deep disagreement, identifying various forms of dissent from tentative to foundational. The framework reveals how democratic and non-democratic choice mechanisms, along with polycentric governance, can address liberal sectarianism—the unjustified dismissal of particular reasons in collective decision-making. Drawing on normative economics, game theory, and political philosophy, Social Choice and Public Reason offers a rigorous theoretical framework for understanding how diverse societies can justify collective choices despite fundamental disagreements about values and social arrangements. The work bridges abstract social choice theory with practical questions of political legitimacy in contemporary liberal democracies.

This article discusses the justification of jurisdictional rights in the context of public reason liberalism. Public reason liberals emphasize the importance of jurisdictional rights within liberal social morality. For them, recognizing jurisdictional rights is at the same time an implication of the liberal premise that persons are free and equal moral agents and a condition for living together based on liberal principles and institutions. I argue, however, that while the public justification of jurisdictional rights is based on solid ground, at least if we accept some fundamental liberal premises, the possibility of justifying a specific system of jurisdictional rights is less obvious. I identify several difficulties related to the perception of moral externalities and collectively harmful practices that explain why, for each potential system of rights, some persons may have intelligible and decisive reasons to reject it. Ultimately, the choice seems to be between a form of sectarian public reason liberalism where some reasons based on selected perspectives are arbitrarily discarded and the promotion of a more inclusive social contract with potential illiberal implications.

This essay explores the possible justification that liberal perfectionism may provide to an epistocratic regime. I suggest that epistocratic mechanisms and rules can maintain and improve epistemic autonomy, which itself contributes to the form of personal autonomy to which perfectionists grant a moral priority. Though not decisive, I claim that the Perfectionist Argument for Epistocracy partially justifies epistocracy. Because this argument is developed in the context of liberal social forms, this indicates the conceptual possibility of liberal epistocracy.

Rawls’s political turn is the result of his struggle with the problem of stability in his theory of justice. Rawls’s late solution uses the concept of public reason. It requires that the members of the well-ordered society should abide by a political conception of justice for shared public reasons, thus fostering an overlapping consensus. This solution has been criticized by post-Rawlsian scholars endorsing a Diversity-Convergence account of the stability problem. I complement Rawls’s model of public reason by arguing that the stability problem can be solved if members of the well-ordered society are community-based reasoners. This leads to a Wittgensteinian reinterpretation of the concept of public reason. This solution is only partial, however. At the bottom, stability without a minimal form of consensus is unlikely.

This article proposes two interpretations of the concept of belief hierarchies in Bayesian game theory: the behaviorist interpretation and the mentalist interpretation. On the former, belief hierarchies are derived from the players’ preferences over acts. On the latter, they are causal mechanisms that are responsible for the players’ choices and preferences over acts. The claim is that the epistemic program in game theory is potentially confronted with a dilemma regarding which interpretation should be adopted. If the behaviorist interpretation of belief hierarchies is retained, then Bayesian game theory cannot account for the players’ reasoning that leads to the generation of specific belief hierarchies and thus to the implementation of a specific strategy profile in a game. If the mentalist interpretation is retained, then belief hierarchies appear to be unnecessarily and unrealistically complex objects and that as a result they fail to provide reasonable epistemic foundations for various solution concepts. In other words, neither interpretation seems to allow the epistemic program to fulfill all its aims. I suggest however that the mentalist interpretation can be arranged to escape this dilemma.

This article discusses the role played by interpersonal comparisons in matters of justice and equity. The role of such interpersonal comparisons has initially been made explicit in the context of social choice theory through the concept of extended preferences. Social choice theorists have generally claimed that extended preferences should be taken as being uniform across a population. Three related claims are made within this perspective. First, though it is sometimes opposed to social choice theory, the social contract approach may also consider the possibility of interpersonal comparisons. This is due to the fact that justice principles may be partially justified on a teleological basis. Second, searching for the uniformity of interpersonal comparisons is both hopeless and useless. In particular, moral disagreement does not originate in the absence of such uniformity. Third, interpersonal comparisons should be accounted for both in social choice and social contract theories in terms of sympathetic identification based on reciprocal respect and tolerance, where each person’s conception of the good partially takes care of others’ good. From the moral point of view, any person’s conception of the good should thus be ‘extended’ to others’ personal conceptions. This extension is, however, limited due to the inherent limitations in sympathetic identification and is a long way from guaranteeing the uniformity assumed by social choice theorists.

This paper explores the extent to which behavioral public policies can be both efficient and democratic by reflecting on the conditions under which individuals could rationally consent to them. Consent refers to a moral requirement that a behavioral public policy should respect what I call a person’s value autonomy and conception of the good. Behavioral public policies can take many forms. Based on a social choice framework, I argue that fully paternalistic and prudential behavioral public policies are unlikely to trigger a hypothetical form of rational consent. Non-fully paternalistic behavioral public policies with partially non-prudential motivations are less problematic in this perspective. In any case, a public deliberative stage preceding the implementation of policies seems to be the best democratic way to justify them.

Cet article envisage deux types de fondements possibles pour une « économie du bien-être néo-samuelsonnienne ». On défend l’idée que l’approche néo-samuelsonnienne en économie mène à un problème de réconciliation entre l’économie positive et l’économie normative, en raison du fait que l’agent économique n’est plus nécessairement l’unité normativement pertinente. Deux formes de réconciliation ayant des implications radicalement différentes pour le statut de l’économie normative sont envisagées. La première consiste à adopter une approche normative en termes de « welfarisme formel » prétendant à une complète neutralité quant à l’identité du sujet et l’unité de mesure de l’analyse normative. L’implication principale est de faire de l’économie du bien-être une branche de l’économie positive. Une seconde approche consiste à une donner une importance axiologique particulière aux personnes, non parce qu’elles sont des prototypes d’agents économiques, mais parce qu’elles sont dotées de la capacité de se représenter, auprès des autres et d’elles-mêmes, comme des entités raisonnables au travers de processus de construction narrative. Cette capacité donne une justification à la vision selon laquelle le bien-être est constituée des préférences d’une personne, dans le sens où ces préférences sont fondées sur des raisons et valeurs définissant l’identité personnelle.

La plupart des économistes comportementaux considèrent que leurs résultats expérimentaux ont des implications normatives de nature paternalistes. Ces derniers tendent en effet à défendre l’idée que les résultats de l’économie comportementale impliquent logiquement l’extension du champ d’intervention de l’État dans le fonctionnement de l’économie de marché. Cet article montre que cette conclusion dépend d’un raisonnement normatif implicite difficilement défendable en raison de l’adhésion de l’économie comportementale à l’économie du bien-être standard. On propose une reconstruction de la défense du paternalisme par les économistes comportementaux en termes de fonction de bien-être social comportementale à maximiser et tenant compte du fait que les individus font des choix incohérents. Cependant, cette défense nécessite une théorie des préférences rationnelles dont l’économie comportementale est dépourvue. Il est de plus montré que la défense du paternalisme dans un cadre welfariste amène à ignorer la dimension de la personne en tant qu’agent. D’autres défenses du paternalisme sont envisageables mais elles impliquent en toute probabilité l’abandon par l’économie comportementale normative du welfarisme.

This paper pursues a naturalist endeavor in social ontology by arguing that the Beliefs-Rules-Equilibrium account of institutions can help to advance the debate over the nature of social kinds. This account of institutions emerges from a growing number of works in economics that use game theory to study the role and the functioning of institutions in human societies. I intend to show how recent developments in the economic analysis of rules and institutions can help solve issues that are generally considered constitutive of any ontological inquiry. I argue that the Beliefs-Rules-Equilibrium account of institutions can contribute to advancing the debate on an issue of particular importance, regarding the specific form of dependence characterizing the relation between institutions and individuals’ attitudes about them. I tackle this issue by taking Francesco Guala's claims about the nature of institutions made in his book “Understanding Institutions” as a point of departure. In particular, I reject Guala’s functionalism about institutions. On the basis of the Beliefs-Rules-Equilibrium account, I claim that it is futile to search for constitutive features of general institutions (money, property rights, family…) and that the best we can have is a knowledge of what are the rules within a specific institution, which the agents consider to be essential in their institutional practice.

This paper provides a conceptual exploration of the implication of Jeffrey’s rule of belief revision to account for rule-following behavior in a game-theoretic framework. Jeffrey’s rule reflects the fact that in many cases learning something new does not imply that one has full assurance about the true content of the information. In other words, the same information may be both perceived and interpreted in several different ways. I develop an account of rule-following behavior according to which, in the context of strategic interactions, following a rule is defined by two conditions. First, that agents must frame the interaction in a sufficiently similar way and be aware of the same salient properties, i.e. they must have the same partition of the event. Second, they must ascribe to others the same revised probabilities to what they take to be the common partition. In a game-theoretic framework, this also indicates that rule-following behavior cannot be identified merely to the existence of a common prior.

This article provides a critical examination of Ken Binmore’s theory of the social contract in light of philosophical discussions about moral naturalism and moral conventionalism. Binmore’s account builds on the popular philosophical device of the original position but gives it a naturalistic twist. I argue that this makes it vulnerable to moral skepticism. I explore a possible answer to the moral skeptic’s challenge, building on the fact that Binmore’s account displays a variant of moral conventionalism. I ultimately conclude however that the conventionalist answer leads to a purely behaviorist view of morality, which implies that there is nothing special about morality and fairness norms. I propose alternative interpretations of conventionalism. These accounts escape most of the difficulties because they place emphasis on the reasons that establish a moral convention.

Economic theories of team reasoning build on the assumption that agents can sometimes behave according to beliefs or preferences attributed to a group or a team. In this paper, I propose a different framework to introduce collective intentionality into game theory. I build on John Searle’s account, which makes collective intentionality constitutive of institutional facts. I show that as soon as one accepts that institutions are required to solve indetermination problems in a game, it is necessary to assume a form of collective intentionality that comes from what I call a common understanding of the situation among the players. This common understanding embodies the epistemic requirements for an institution to be a correlated equilibrium in a game. As a consequence, I question recent claims made by some economists according to which game-theoretic accounts of institutions do not need to assume collective intentionality.

:Most game-theoretic accounts of institutions reduce institutions to behavioural patterns the players are incentivized to implement. An alternative account linking institutions to rule-following behaviour in a game-theoretic framework is developed on the basis of David Lewis’s and Ludwig Wittgenstein's respective accounts of conventions and language games. Institutions are formalized as epistemic games where the players share some forms of practical reasoning. An institution is a rule-governed game satisfying three conditions: common understanding, minimal awareness and minimal practical rationality. Common understanding has a strong similarity with Ludwig Wittgenstein's concept of lebensform while minimal awareness and minimal practical rationality capture the idea that rule-following is community-based.

This paper evaluates Nancy Cartwright’s critique of economic models. Cartwright argues that economics fails to build relevant “nomological machines” able to isolate capacities. In this paper, I contend that many economic models are not used as nomological machines. I give some evidence for this claim and build on an inferential and pragmatic approach to economic modeling. Modeling in economics responds to peculiar inferential norms where a “good” model is essentially a model that enhances our knowledge about possible worlds. As a consequence, models and experiments are very different knowledge-producing devices, at least in economics.

This paper evaluates how Amartya Sen’s critique of revealed preference theory stands against the latter’s contemporary, ‘neo-Samuelsonian’ version. Neo- Samuelsonians have argued that Sen’s arguments against RPT are innocuous, in particular once it is acknowledged that RPT does not assume away the existence of motivations or other latent psychological or cognitive processes. Sen’s claims that preferences and choices need to be distinguished and that external factors need to be taken into account to analyze the act of choice then appear to be irrelevant. However, while it is true that contemporary revealed preference theory partially evades Sen’s critique, I show that the latter is still relevant outside the restricted areas of consumer choice and market dynamics. In particular, Sen’s views regarding the importance of incomplete preferences and the multiplicity of levels of agency can hardly be integrated into the framework of CRPT. This is a significant limit, given the imperialistic claims of some of the proponents of the latter.

This article presents a community-based account of salience as an alternative and a complement to the ‘natural salience’ approach which is endorsed by almost all game theorists who use this concept. While in the naturalistic approach, salience is understood as an objective and natural property of some entities, the community-based account claims that salience is a function of community membership. Building on David Lewis’s theory of common knowledge and on some of its recent refined accounts, I suggest that salience acts as a correlating device in a correlated equilibrium. What is constitutive of salience is common understanding, the fact that agents have common knowledge that they share the same modes of reasoning with respect to a well-identified set of events. I argue that the basis for common understanding is community membership. The relevance of this account stems from the fact that it answers the objection that salience is either unnecessary or unable to account for coordination between rational agents.