Dan Taylor

Before achieving success as a novelist, George Eliot spent several years translating Spinoza’s Ethics. Previous scholarship on Spinoza and Eliot has generally assumed that Eliot’s novels are wholly influenced by Spinoza, or that they can even be read as ‘translations’ of Spinoza. In this article, I instead argue that Eliot’s shift from Spinoza translation to novel-writing reflects an initial repudiation of, followed by a contention with, unresolved problems in Spinoza’s social philosophy as regards the role of sympathy, fellow-feeling, and the knowledge of others as distinct and different beings. I also explore how Eliot’s own views develop between the early novel Adam Bede and the later Middlemarch to argue against a reading of ‘sympathy’ in Eliot as something wholly consistent or uniform. Her efforts to fashion a post-Spinozan art of sympathy in Adam Bede, in which a morality of fellow-feeling is emphasised and explored in narratives of love and self-renunciation, resulted in internal problems concerning the reliability of the imagination and the power of societal relations to condition how this fellow-feeling is experienced. The later Eliot draws on a conceptual imagery of ‘threads’ of relationality and a ‘fabric’ of opinion in Middlemarch to emphasise the integration of thinking and feeling, and the role of beneficent action, in a manner consistent with aspects of Spinoza’s social philosophy. I show that Eliot here makes useful progress through and beyond lacunae in the Ethics, contributing to a wider set of debates about sympathy, difference, ethics, and epiphanies through the concept of sympathetic knowledge.

_The Autobiography of Malcolm X_ highlights the eponymous subject’s conversion from aimless rage and criminality to a form of militant study while in prison, a conversion dedicated to understanding the societal foundations of power and racial inequality. Central to this understanding is the idea that new philosophical perspectives and ‘thought-patterns’ are necessary to reprogramme dominant or ‘brainwashed’ mindsets towards organising political resistance. In this article, I explore Malcolm X’s concepts of ‘conversion’ and ‘prison’, identifying them, not only as mere spatiotemporal locations, but also as larger frames in which Malcolm conceives of domination and freedom. I identify Malcolm’s three-aspect account of domination through which radical education and mental liberation drive his project of Black nationalism. I then consider the significance of an unexpected ally invoked by Malcolm: the 17th century philosopher Benedict de Spinoza, described as a ‘Black Spanish Jew’ and presented as an oppositional figure to the western philosophical canon. While this alliance is partly rhetorical, if overlooked, both work through problems of ‘epistemic agency’ and ‘democratic civic agency’ as vital for ameliorating domination and enhancing freedom. Malcolm and Spinoza offer distinct but significant contributions to ideas of domination and freedom in terms of both an individual and a collective capacity to think and act.

In his final, incomplete Tractatus Politicus (1677), Spinoza’s account of human power and freedom shifts towards a new, teleological interest in the ‘highest good’ of the state in realising the freedom of its subjects. This development reflects, in part, the growing influence of Aristotle, Machiavelli, Dutch republicanism, and the Dutch post-Rampjaar context after 1672, with significant implications for his view of political power and freedom. It also reflects an expansion of his account of natural right to include independence of mind, a model of autonomy that in turn shapes the infamous sui juris exclusions of his unfinished account of democracy. This article focuses specifically on the Tractatus Politicus, a hitherto under-addressed work in Spinoza’s corpus and one too often considered indistinct from his earlier Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (1670). It argues for a reconsideration of its importance to early modern political thought, particularly regarding the role of the state in realising the freedom and harmony of its subjects through reasonable laws.