Danesh Singh

This study examined how and why extension workers shared farming videos with farmers, revealing divergent appropriation patterns and their implications for digitization in agriculture. 294 extension workers in Bihar (India) were asked to circulate three wheat agronomy videos with farmers. Extension workers’ circulation of these videos was observed using link tracking, phone surveys, and follow-up interviews. Results were analyzed using a novel analytic framework based in affordance theory. Extension workers varied widely in how much, how, and why they shared the farming videos. This variation was underpinned by extension workers’ differing incentives and goals. In other words, extension workers heterogeneously appropriated—rather than homogeneously deployed—the practice of sharing farming videos. Some but not all of these appropriations were desirable from the perspective of service managers. For theory, extension workers’ appropriations of farming videos demonstrate that prevalent conceptualizations of digital agricultural technologies do not account for the adaptation of these technologies by farmers and other actors in agricultural innovation systems. For digital agriculture evaluators, the findings caution against the prevalent focus on averaging effects of interventions and highlight the need to examine the variability of these effects within and across interventions. For extension service managers, the findings emphasize the importance of engaging extension actors with farmer-aligned incentives and goals. This study was limited in focusing on the video-sharing behaviors of human extension actors and not on algorithmic extension actors, like YouTube or farming advisory chatbots powered by large language models. However, the findings have implications for both: just as human actors variably appropriate digital tools, algorithmic extension actors also embed implicit goals that shape how agricultural information circulates. Future research should examine the goals and behaviors of these algorithmic actors that have increasing influence in agricultural innovation systems.

Recent advancements in socially assistive robotics (SAR) have shown a significant potential of using social robotics to achieve increasing cognitive and affective outcomes in education. However, the deployments of SAR technologies also bring ethical challenges in tandem, to the fore, especially in under-resourced contexts. While previous research has highlighted various ethical challenges that arise in SAR deployment in real-world settings, most of the research has been centered in resource-rich contexts, mainly in developed countries in the ‘Global North,’ and the work specifically in the educational setting is limited. This research aims to evaluate and reflect upon the potential ethical and pedagogical challenges of deploying a social robot in an under-resourced context. We base our findings on a 5-week in-the-wild user study conducted with 12 kindergarten students at an under-resourced community school in New Delhi, India. We used interaction analysis with the context of learning, education, and ethics to analyze the user study through video recordings. Our findings highlighted four primary ethical considerations that should be taken into account while deploying social robotics technologies in educational settings; (1) language and accent as barriers in pedagogy, (2) effect of malfunctioning, (un)intended harms, (3) trust and deception, and (4) ecological viability of innovation. Overall, our paper argues for assessing the ethical and pedagogical constraints and bridging the gap between non-existent literature from such a context to evaluate better the potential use of such technologies in under-resourced contexts.

In Zhuangzi’s philosophy, the intellectual virtues of humility and open-mindedness are best understood in the context of his epistemic perspectivism. The method, which urges knowers to pursue various and diverse points of view and incorporate them into a broad perspective, is justified by a second-order realization that all perspectives are partial and limited. This in turn urges a meta-virtue of humility, defined as a disposition in which knowers become aware of their epistemic limitations. Humility, consequently, encourages the virtue of open-mindedness, defined as the willingness and ability to surpass existing personal perspectives. Zhuangzi endorses the method and its attendant virtues to achieve what he calls great knowing. I propose that we gain a clearer sense of the role of humility and open-mindedness by also considering Zhuangzi’s treatment of the vices, which are addressed with as much frequency as the virtues. Zhuangzi’s treatment of arrogance and closed-mindedness reveals how humility and open-mindedness operate as corrective virtues, in the sense that they compensate for evident and familiar deficiencies in the epistemic practices of knowers in Zhuangzi’s time. Humility and open-mindedness enable knowers to acquire new points of view that reliably produce knowledge.

Nietzsche and Zhuang Zi both believe that the supposed value of certain emotions they deem harmful should be questioned and that reflection can be utilized to change the emotions. They intend to disabuse those of their respective times of conventional morality, with the aim of achieving a state in which negative moral emotions are eliminated and a more natural way of life is embraced. Specifically, Nietzsche examines guilt, a remnant of an ascetic morality endorsed by the religious elite; Zhuang Zi, similarly, considers grief, a moral emotion tied to traditional culture and endorsed by Confucian morality. Living naturally involves the absence of psychic conflict that accompanies negative emotions; it also involves a psychological ease within ourselves and with the world.

Critical readers can reasonably judge Zhuangzi’s 莊子 notion of wuwei 無爲 to offer a persuasive reply to Xunzi’s objection to Zhuangzi’s emphasis on living naturally, in light of recent theories of action. For Zhuangzi, self-cultivation is possible only when individuals attune themselves to the processes inherent in nature . Daoist wuwei depends crucially on two descriptive claims that Zhuangzi endorses and Xunzi rejects. The first claim, backed by Dreyfus’ theory of skill acquisition, is that views of self-cultivation which rely on formulas and concepts stand opposed to the Way. The second claim, supported by Elster and Csikszentmihalyi’s theories of action, is that conscious deliberation is unable to facilitate self-cultivation. Zhuangzi’s normative vision requires that individuals indirectly create conditions for spontaneity, rather than pursue spontaneity directly, since any deliberate attempt at being spontaneous is self-defeating