Daniel Molto

I maintain that polysemy is a contextual phenomenon, but that the nature of the context-dependence of polysemy has been misunderstood, a fact which is brought out by the especially difficult case of copredication. In this paper, I offer a truth-conditional semantics that can accommodate copredicative sentences, in which polysemous terms are being used in more than one sense, and thus have more than one extension simultaneously. I argue, further, that my account is compatible with externalism, which is significant because the existence of polysemy is often thought to pose a problem for externalism. Context is required to play an important role in this semantics, which, as I will show, is substantially different from accounts currently on the market.

This paper offers a new account of polysemy, which can explain the intuitions that utterances of copredicative sentences like ‘lunch was delicious, but went on forever’ involve polysemous terms, that they are true in some contexts, and that the truth of such utterances depends on the extensions of the component parts of the sentence. The goal of the paper is to show that we need not make a choice between truth-conditional semantics and acknowledging that copredicative sentences are genuinely polysemous. Rather, truth-conditional semantics is compatible with polysemy. As a preliminary, we shall discuss some of the current accounts of copredicative sentences in the literature, and argue that the existing attempts to make sense of polysemy in the framework of a truth-conditional semantics suffer from a number of drawbacks. Beginning in Sect. ‘A New Truth-Conditional Account of Polysemy’, we offer our own account. We show that our own account can account for a wider range of polysemous expressions than existing proposals.

In this paper, I consider Peter Geach (Rew Metaphys 21:2–12, 1967) infamous argument against the existence of an “absolute” identity relation. One objection to Geach’s argument which has been raised is that Geach claims that no characterization of “absolute” identity is possible, while ignoring the model-theoretic characterization ( : x D). I reconstruct Geach’s likely attitude towards the model-theoretic characterization of identity from Geach’s views on reference and the nature of domains of discourse. I argue that, while Geach does not have the resources to sustain his case for the conclusion that the relation of “absolute” identity does not exist, nevertheless, if his views about reference are correct, specifically, the view that terms can be simultaneously both singular and shared, this would still show something very interesting. It would show that, for some replacements for D, the relation ( : x D) is not a relation of identity. I then consider whether there is any support available for his account of reference. I finish by arguing that well-known examples of sentences involving copredication do provide prima facie support for Geach’s view.

This paper offers a novel account of polysemous copredicative sentences. The solution, which it is argued enjoys a number of advantages over the alternative accounts currently on the market, is inspired by Donald Davidson’s first attempt to deal with ambiguity. Specifically, the account involves mapping ambiguities in the object language (in this case polysemous singular terms) onto ambiguities in the metalanguage. If this account is coherent and superior to its rivals, it tells us something important about logical form: the value of logical form does not lie in the elimination all lexical ambiguity.

We present a new understanding of Christ’s real presence in the Eucharist on the model of Stump’s account of God’s omnipresence and Green and Quan’s account of experiencing God in Scripture. On this understanding, Christ is derivatively, rather than fundamentally, located in the consecrated bread and wine, such that Christ is present to the believer through the consecrated bread and wine, thereby making available to the believer a second-person experience of Christ, where the consecrated bread and wine are the way in which she shares attention with him. The consecrated bread and wine are then, in a sense, icons of Christ.

In response to John Bishop's (2007) account of passionally caused believing, Dan-Johan Eklund (2014) argues that conscious non-evidential believing is (conceptually) impossible, that is, it's (conceptually) impossible consciously to believe that p whilst acknowledging that the relevant evidence doesn't support p's being true, for it conflicts with belief being a truth-oriented attitude, or so he argues. In this article, we present Eklund's case against Bishop's account of passionally caused believing, and we argue that it's unpersuasive, at least to those who accept permissivism about evidence, that is, that it's possible for there to be more than one rational response to a given body of evidence. We do this through a novel application of a case of nurtured belief, that is, of a person holding a belief simply because she was caused to do so by her upbringing, and we use it to show exactly where Eklund's argument goes wrong. We conclude by drawing a general lesson drawn from this debate: if permissivism about evidence is true, then belief being truth-oriented is consistent with non-evidential believing being possible.

In this paper, I consider the philosophical consequences of one tradition in Trinitarian theology, which emphasizes that each of the persons of the Trinity is wholly God. I pay special attention to Leftow’s claim that the persons of the Godhead must be divine in the same sense of the word ‘divine’ as the Godhead itself. I argue that the existing philosophical account of the Trinity which best captures this view is what I have termed the ‘Strong Theory of Relative Identity,’ first proposed Peter Geach. I then develop what I take to be the most pressing objection to this account of the Trinity, namely that it cannot be supplemented with a coherent model-theoretic semantics. I end with a suggestion for responding to this objection.

If there are true contradictions, where are they? In language or in the world? According to one important view, best represented by Jc Beall (2009), only the former. In this paper, we raise a problem for this view. In order to defend a “merely semantic” version of dialetheism (aka ‘glut theory’), Beall adopts transparent accounts of truth and falsity, which gives rise to “dialethic ascent” on which true contradictions are also, contradictorily, untrue contradictions. This is a consequence of trying to restrict contradictions to language and keep them out of the world. However, in this paper, we show that this ascent carries over intensional contexts, so that, on this version of dialetheism, even if there are true contradictions, no one knows a true contradiction. This shows that contradictions have not been kept out of the world. We end by connecting this issue with the infamous ‘just true’ problem.