Daniel Toupin

This article re-examines the distinction between the libertarian approach and the egalitarian approach to the regulation of campaign finance. The conventional approach (as exemplified by the work of Owen Fiss and Ronald Dworkin) is to reconcile the competing values of liberty and equality. By contrast, this article advances the normative claim that democracies should seek to incorporate both the libertarian and the egalitarian approaches within constitutional law. I argue that instead of emphasizing one value over the other, the ideal position is one that simultaneously recognizes the values of liberty and equality despite the irreconcilable tension between them. Rather than choosing one value over the other, or reconciling these values by redefining them, I claim that it is vital to maintain the tension between liberty and equality by instantiating the conflict in law. Democracy is better served when the law contains an explicit tension between these foundational values.After setting forth this normative framework, I then apply it to the campaign finance decisions of the Supreme Courts of the United States and Canada, respectively. I make two main claims. First, I argue that although the libertarian/egalitarian distinction is usually presented as a binary choice, the laws of a given jurisdiction often simultaneously display both libertarian and egalitarian characteristics. For this reason, I claim that the libertarian/egalitarian distinction is better conceived of as a “libertarian-egalitarian spectrum.” Second, I argue that in recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Canada, respectively, have privileged one value—liberty or equality—at the expense of the other. The U.S. Supreme Court has over-emphasized the value of liberty (most notably in itsCitizens Uniteddecision), with the result that political equality is markedly undermined. By the same token, the Supreme Court of Canada’s commitment to equality has become too one-sided in recent cases (HarperandBryan), with the result that there are significant impairments to free speech liberties. I argue that both of these approaches are detrimental to democratic participation and governance. Finally, this article offers a preliminary proposal for how courts and legislatures can allow for the conflict between liberty and equality to be instantiated in law.

Mathematics is one of the most successful human endeavors—a paradigm of precision and objectivity. It is also one of our most puzzling endeavors, as it seems to deliver non-experiential knowledge of a non-physical reality consisting of numbers, sets, and functions. How can the success and objectivity of mathematics be reconciled with its puzzling features, which seem to set it apart from all the usual empirical sciences? This book offers a short but systematic introduction to the philosophy of mathematics. Readers are introduced to all of the classical approaches to the field, including logicism, formalism, intuitionism, empiricism, and structuralism. The book also contains accessible introductions to some more specialized issues, such as mathematical intuition, potential infinity, the iterative conception of sets, and the search for new mathematical axioms. The exposition is always closely informed by ongoing research in the field and sometimes draws on the author’s own contributions to this research. This means that Gottlob Frege—a German mathematician and philosopher widely recognized as one of the founders of analytic philosophy—figures prominently in the book, both through his own views and his criticism of other thinkers.

Philosophers have had a lot to say about moral blameworthiness, but much less about moral praiseworthiness. In this book, Zoë Johnson King bucks the trend: she offers a conceptual framework with which to theorize about praiseworthiness in its own right, and a comprehensive theory of the types of thing for which people can be praiseworthy and the substantive conditions under which they are praiseworthy for things of each type. Johnson King argues that what people are fundamentally praiseworthy for—what makes them good people, to the extent that they are—are what they care about and what they try to do. She then argues that people can also be praiseworthy for what they successfully do and bring about to the extent that their actions are deliberate and are coming from a good place. In developing this account, Johnson King draws on resources from moral metaphysics, moral epistemology, moral metasemantics, and philosophy of action, as well as from the philosophical literature on agency and responsibility. She then uses her account to shed light on some practical issues concerning improving one’s own praiseworthiness by working on oneself, the prevalence of moral luck, and the impact of oppression and injustice on praiseworthiness. The final chapter turns from praiseworthiness to the ethics of praise: Johnson King takes the backlash against praise of essential workers during the COVID-19 pandemic as a case study that illustrates an array of pitfalls around which one must delicately skirt when attempting to praise the praiseworthy.

This book is an accessible introduction to the central themes of contemporary metaphysics. It carefully considers accounts of causation, freedom and determinism, laws of nature, personal identity, mental states, time, material objects, and properties, while inviting students to reflect on metaphysical problems. The philosophical questions discussed include: What makes it the case that one event causes another event? What are material objects? Given that material objects exist, do such things as properties exist? What makes it the case that a person may exist at two different times? An Introduction to Metaphysics makes these tough questions tractable by presenting the features and flaws of current attempts to answer them. Intended primarily for students taking a first class in metaphysics, this lucid and well-written text would also provide an excellent introduction for anyone interested in knowing more about this important area of philosophy.

In this paper we argue that the problem of conspiracy theories circulating through specific social groups runs deeper than is appreciated. The epistemic networks involved in the propagation of conspiracy theories cannot always be deemed to be irrational, with motivated reasoning at their heart. There are, after all, rational epistemic bubbles—those that rightly ignore unreliable information sources. We provide a rational reconstruction of conspiratorial thinking, which suggests that, under such a characterisation, many interventions aimed at reducing conspiracy belief are no longer tenable. In particular, we argue that popular competence and containment strategies discussed in the philosophical and psychological literatures and pursued by governments and social media corporations are not fit for purpose.

It is becoming more common that the decision-makers in private and public institutions are predictive algorithmic systems, not humans. This article argues that relying on algorithmic systems is procedurally unjust in contexts involving background conditions of structural injustice. Under such nonideal conditions, algorithmic systems, if left to their own devices, cannot meet a necessary condition of procedural justice, because they fail to provide a sufficiently nuanced model of which cases count as relevantly similar. Resolving this problem requires deliberative capacities uniquely available to human agents. After exploring the limitations of existing formal algorithmic fairness strategies, the article argues that procedural justice requires that human agents relying wholly or in part on algorithmic systems proceed with caution: by avoiding doxastic negligence about algorithmic outputs, by exercising deliberative capacities when making similarity judgments, and by suspending belief and gathering additional information in light of higher-order uncertainty.

Simple idealized models seem to provide more understanding than opaque, complex, and hyper-realistic models. However, an increasing number of scientists are going in the opposite direction by utilizing opaque machine learning models to make predictions and draw inferences, suggesting that scientists are opting for models that have less potential for understanding. Are scientists trading understanding for some other epistemic or pragmatic good when they choose a machine learning model? Or are the assumptions behind why minimal models provide understanding misguided? In this paper, using the case of deep neural networks, I argue that it is not the complexity or black box nature of a model that limits how much understanding the model provides. Instead, it is a lack of scientific and empirical evidence supporting the link that connects a model to the target phenomenon that primarily prohibits understanding.

Until relatively recent times very few philosophical studies about thought experiments were available. Among these pioneering works are those of Ernst Mach, Karl R. Popper and Thomas S. Kuhn, respectively. In this article, I begin by analyzing the way in which Mach understood this type of experiment. Later, I will review the positions developed by Popper and Kuhn on the matter. Afterwards I will analyze a thought experiment, the so-called “Stevin on the Inclined Plane”, in order to show that Mach reading of it is incorrect. At the end of the text I will discuss these three positions with the aim of showing that they contain, after all, the germ for a better understanding of thought experiments.

This paper considers the prospects for a quantum perspectivism that seeks to reconcile competing approaches to quantum theory as distinct scientific perspectives on quantum reality. In other areas of the philosophy of science, perspectivism holds the promise of a way to embrace pluralism without contradiction—what appear to be competing theories can be accepted because they each provide a distinct “window on the same reality.” The contemporary situation in quantum foundations is arguably a case of underdetermination. If this is so, this brand of perspectivism may offer a resolution.

This open access monograph argues established democratic norms for freedom of expression should be implemented on the internet. Moderating policies of tech companies as Facebook, Twitter and Google have resulted in posts being removed on an industrial scale. While this moderation is often encouraged by governments - on the pretext that terrorism, bullying, pornography, “hate speech” and “fake news” will slowly disappear from the internet - it enables tech companies to censure our society. It is the social media companies who define what is blacklisted in their community standards. And given the dominance of social media in our information society, we run the risk of outsourcing the definition of our principles for discussion in the public domain to private companies. Instead of leaving it to social media companies only to take action, the authors argue democratic institutions should take an active role in moderating criminal content on the internet. To make this possible, tech companies should be analyzed whether they are approaching a monopoly. Antitrust legislation should be applied to bring those monopolies within democratic governmental oversight. Despite being in different stages in their lives, Anne Mette is in the startup phase of her research career, while Frederik is one of the most prolific philosophers in Denmark, the authors found each other in their concern about Free Speech on the internet. The book was originally published in Danish as Dit opslag er blevet fjernet - techgiganter & ytringsfrihed. Praise for 'Your Post has been Removed' "From my perspective both as a politician and as private book collector, this is the most important non-fiction book of the 21st Century. It should be disseminated to all European citizens. The learnings of this book and the use we make of them today are crucial for every man, woman and child on earth. Now and in the future.” Jens Rohde, member of the European Parliament for the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe “This timely book compellingly presents an impressive array of information and analysis about the urgent threats the tech giants pose to the robust freedom of speech and access to information that are essential for individual liberty and democratic self-government. It constructively explores potential strategies for restoring individual control over information flows to and about us. Policymakers worldwide should take heed!” Nadine Strossen, Professor, New York Law School. Author, HATE: Why We Should Resist It with Free Speech, Not Censorship.

This paper provides a unified account of the nature of blame by taking a broader look at the connection between individual blaming reactions and the moral practices of communities. The methodological proposal is that to understand what blame is, we need to understand what it does, but to understand what it does, we need to understand what problems it helps solve. This, in turn, requires looking at the kinds of problems that communities have qua communities, namely, developing agents who are competent norm-followers and who are motivated to exercise this competence. The reason blame seems so heterogeneous is that it has not one, but several, connected effects: it signals, sanctions and sensitises. Signalling provides assurance that norms will be upheld and enforced. Sanctioning deters norm violations. Sensitising produces agents who have internalised the norms and who are skilled at complying with them. These effects combine to produce agents who are robustly disposed to uphold norms, which is a very valuable thing to create. This account not only solves a number of puzzles about the nature of blame, it does so while providing a simple and principled story, one which emphasises our own nature as norm-sensitive beings.