•  85
    The Virtual as the Digital
    Disputatio 11 (55): 453-486. 2019.
    I reply to seven commentaries on “The Virtual and the Real”. In response to Claus Beisbart, Jesper Juul, Peter Ludlow, and Neil McDonnell and Nathan Wildman, I clarify and develop my view that virtual are digital objects, with special attention to the nature of digital objects and data structures. In response to Alyssa Ney and Eric Schwitzgebel, I clarify and defend my spatial functionalism, with special attention to the connections between space and consciousness. In response to Marc Silcox, I …Read more
  •  130
    How Can We Solve the Meta-Problem of Consciousness?
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6): 201-226. 2020.
  •  135
    Is the Hard Problem of Consciousness Universal?
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6): 227-257. 2020.
  •  10
    Availability: The cognitive basis of experience
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1): 148-149. 1997.
    Although A-consciousness and P-consciousness are conceptually distinct, a refined notion of A-consciousness makes it plausible that the two are empirically inseparable. I suggest that the notion of direct availability for global control can play a central role here, and draw out some consequences.
  •  263
    Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism
    Amherst Lecture in Philosophy 8. 2013.
    I present an argument for panpsychism: the thesis that everything is conscious, or at least that fundamental physical entities are conscious. The argument takes a Hegelian dialectical form. Panpsychism emerges as a synthesis of the thesis of materalism and the antithesis of dualism. In particular, the key premises of the causal argument for materialism and the conceivability argument for dualism are all accommodated by a certain version of panpsychism. This synthesis has its own antithesis in tu…Read more
  •  240
    Thinking Just Happens
    Stance 11 132-150. 2018.
  •  741
    The Virtual and the Real
    Disputatio 9 (46): 309-352. 2017.
    I argue that virtual reality is a sort of genuine reality. In particular, I argue for virtual digitalism, on which virtual objects are real digital objects, and against virtual fictionalism, on which virtual objects are fictional objects. I also argue that perception in virtual reality need not be illusory, and that life in virtual worlds can have roughly the same sort of value as life in non-virtual worlds.
  •  5
    Brain Drain or Intellectual Traffic
    with Julian Disney, Hugo Graeme, John Quiggin, Patricia Ranald, Ian Henschke, and Adelaide Festival Corporation
    Adelaide Festival of Ideas session, Bonython Hall, 2:30pm, Saturday 9 July, 2005. Chaired by Ian Henschke.
  •  11
    The Puzzle of Consciousness
    with Peter Goldsworthy and Adelaide Festival Corporation
    Adelaide Festival of Ideas session, Brookman Hall, 1:45pm, Sunday 10 July, 2005. Chaired by Peter Goldsworthy.
  •  2
    The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory
    Oxford University Press USA. 1996.
    What is consciousness? How do physical processes in the brain give rise to the self-aware mind and to feelings as profoundly varied as love or hate, aesthetic pleasure or spiritual yearning? These questions today are among the most hotly debated issues among scientists and philosophers, and we have seen in recent years superb volumes by such eminent figures as Francis Crick, Daniel C. Dennett, Gerald Edelman, and Roger Penrose, all firing volleys in what has come to be called the consciousness w…Read more
  • Toward a science of consciousness: the first Tucson discussions and debates
    with R. Hameroff, A. W. Kaszniak, and A. C. Scott
    In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness: The First Tucson Discussions and Debates, Mit Press. 1996.
  •  4
    What the papers say: Glowing reports on biorhythm research
    with Charalambos P. Kyriacou
    Bioessays 15 (11): 755-756. 1993.
  •  304
  •  97
    Response to Searle
    New York Review of Books 44 (8). 1997.
    In my book _The Conscious Mind_ , I deny a number of claims that John Searle finds "obvious", and I make some claims that he finds "absurd". But if the mind/body problem has taught us anything, it is that nothing about consciousness is obvious, and that one person's obvious truth is another person's absurdity. So instead of throwing around this sort of language, it is best to examine the claims themselves and the arguments that I give for them, to see whether Searle says anything of substance th…Read more
  •  417
    Précis of The Conscious Mind (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2): 435-438. 1999.
    Chapter 1: Two Concepts of Mind. I distinguish the phenomenal and psychological concepts of mind. I argue that every mental state is a phenomenal state, a psychological state, or a hybrid of the two. I discuss the two mind-body problems corresponding to the two concepts of mind, and discuss the various senses of the term “consciousness”. Chapter 2: Supervenience and Explanation. I distinguish varieties of supervenience, especially logical and natural supervenience, where supervening properties c…Read more
  •  37878
    The Meta-Problem of Consciousness
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 25 (9-10): 6-61. 2018.
  •  1
    Toward a Theory of Consciousness
    Dissertation, Indiana University. 1993.
    This work is a study of the place of conscious experience in the natural order. In the first part, I examine the prospects for a reductive explanation of consciousness of the kind that has proved successful for other natural phenomena. I develop a systematic framework centered on the notion of supervenience for dealing with the metaphysical and explanatory issues involved, and apply this framework to consciousness. I give a number of arguments to the conclusion that consciousness is not logicall…Read more
  •  46
    Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings (edited book)
    Oxford University Press USA. 2002.
    What is the mind? Is consciousness a process in the brain? How do our minds represent the world? Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings is a grand tour of writings on these and other perplexing questions about the nature of the mind. The most comprehensive collection of its kind, the book includes sixty-three selections that range from the classical contributions of Descartes to the leading edge of contemporary debates. Extensive sections cover foundational issues, the nature of…Read more
  •  211
    The Character of Consciousness
    Oxford University Press. 2010.
    What is consciousness? How does the subjective character of consciousness fit into an objective world? How can there be a science of consciousness? In this sequel to his groundbreaking and controversial The Conscious Mind, David Chalmers develops a unified framework that addresses these questions and many others. Starting with a statement of the "hard problem" of consciousness, Chalmers builds a positive framework for the science of consciousness and a nonreductive vision of the metaphysics of c…Read more
  •  3374
    Structuralism as a Response to Skepticism
    Journal of Philosophy 115 (12): 625-660. 2018.
    Cartesian arguments for global skepticism about the external world start from the premise that we cannot know that we are not in a Cartesian scenario such as an evil-demon scenario, and infer that because most of our empirical beliefs are false in such a scenario, these beliefs do not constitute knowledge. Veridicalist responses to global skepticism respond that arguments fail because in Cartesian scenarios, many or most of our empirical beliefs are true. Some veridicalist responses have been mo…Read more