•  71
    The extra ingredient
    Biology and Philosophy 36 (2): 1-4. 2021.
    Birch et. al. see their model as incompatible with higher-order-thought (HOT) theories of consciousness, on which a state is conscious if one is in some suitable way aware of that state. They see higher-order (HO) awareness as an “extra ingredient”. But since Birch et al go on to say that “[t]his is not the place for a detailed discussion of HOT theories,” they don’t address why they take HO awareness to be an extra ingredient or why HOT theorists are convinced that it’s needed. In this comme…Read more
  •  57
    Res Cogitans: An Essay in Rational Psychology
    Journal of Philosophy 73 (9): 240-252. 1976.
  •  9
    The Nature of Consciousness
    Mind 113 (451): 581-588. 2004.
  •  21
    Chalmers' Meta-Problem
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10): 194-204. 2019.
    There is strong reason to doubt that the intuitions Chalmers' meta-problem focuses on are widespread or independent of proto-theoretical prompting. So it's unlikely that they result from factors connected to the nature of consciousness. In any case, it's only the accuracy of the problem intuitions that matters for evaluating theories of consciousness or revealing the nature of consciousness, not an explanation of how they arise. Unless we determine that they're accurate about consciousness, we m…Read more
  • Higher-order Theories of Consciousness
    In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, Oxford University Press. 2009.
  •  21
    The Disappearance of Introspection (review)
    Philosophical Review 101 (2): 425. 1992.
  •  15
    Memory (review)
    Journal of Philosophy 66 (1): 17-22. 1969.
  •  93
    Dintre fenomenele mentale, nici unul nu pare să reziste atât de bine explicaţiei precum conştiinţa. Parţial, dificultatea se datorează faptului că folosim termenul „conştient” şi alţii înrudiţi să dea seama de anumite fenomene distincte ale căror legături nu sunt întotdeauna clare. Iar acest lucru duce adesea la amestecarea acestor fenomene distincte. De aceea, orice încercare de a explica conştiinţa trebuie să înceapă prin a distinge diferitele lucruri pe care le numim conştiinţă. Un astfel de …Read more
  •  17
    Moore's paradox and Crimmins's case
    Analysis 62 (2): 167-171. 2002.
  •  42
    Quality-space theory in olfaction
    with Benjamin D. Young and Andreas Keller
    Frontiers in Psychology 5. 2014.
    Quality-space theory (QST) explains the nature of the mental qualities distinctive of perceptual states by appeal to their role in perceiving. QST is typically described in terms of the mental qualities that pertain to color. Here we apply QST to the olfactory modalities. Olfaction is in various respects more complex than vision, and so provides a useful test case for QST. To determine whether QST can deal with the challenges olfaction presents, we show how a quality space (QS) could be construc…Read more
  •  8
    XV-Unity of Consciousness and the Self
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (1): 325-352. 2003.
  •  14
    The necessity of foreknowledge
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 1 (1): 22-25. 1976.
  •  18
    Sensory quality and the relocation story
    Philosophical Topics 26 (1-2): 321-50. 1999.
  •  203
    Measuring away an attentional confound?
    with Jorge Morales, Yasha Mouradi, Claire Sergent, Ned Block, Vincent Taschereau-Dumouchel, Piercesare Grimaldi, and Hakwan Lau
    Neuroscience of Consciousness 3 (1): 1-3. 2017.
    A recent fMRI study by Webb et al. (Cortical networks involved in visual awareness independent of visual attention, Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2016;113:13923–28) proposes a new method for finding the neural correlates of awareness by matching atten- tion across awareness conditions. The experimental design, however, seems at odds with known features of attention. We highlight logical and methodological points that are critical when trying to disentangle attention and awareness.
  •  88
    , encapsulates his deep hostility to Marxist thinking. his deep hostility to Marxist thinking. his deep hostility to Marxist thinking. his deep hostility to Marxist thinking. By contrast, my own allusion is friendly, By contrast, my own allusion is friendly, and is meant to point up a nice parallel and is meant to point up a nice parallel my argument has with a schematic my argument has with a schematic aspect of Marx’s thinking. aspect of Marx’s thinking.
  •  138
    A striking difference between those fields we classify as humanities and those we regard as sciences is the attitude within each field toward its history. Learning about literature, music, or the visual arts requires becoming knowledgeable about a significant amount of the history of those areas. And education in these fields, at whatever level, invariably involves some study of great accomplishments in the past. By contrast, scientific work and standard scientific textbooks make little referenc…Read more
  •  1
    Applied Ethics and Ethical Theory (edited book)
    with David M. Rosenthal and Fadlou Shehadi
    University of Utah Press. 1988.
  •  170
    Color, mental location, and the visual field
    Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1): 85-93. 2001.
    Color subjectivism is the view that color properties are mental properties of our visual sensations, perhaps identical with properties of neural states, and that nothing except visual sensations and other mental states exhibits color properties. Color phys- icalism, by contrast, holds that colors are exclusively properties of visible physical objects and processes
  •  290
    Moore's paradox and Crimmins's case
    Analysis 62 (2): 167-171. 2002.
    Moore’s paradox occurs with sentences, such as (1) It’s raining and I don’t think it’s raining. which are self-defeating in a way that prevents one from making an asser- tion with them.1 But Mark Crimmins has given us a case of a sentence that is syntactically just like (1) but is nonetheless assertible. Suppose I know somebody, and know or have excellent reason to believe that I know that very person under some other guise. I do not know what that other guise is, though I do know that I believe…Read more
  •  235
    I begin by considering Ned Block's widely accepted distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness. I argue that on Block's official characterization a mental state's being access conscious is not a way the state's being conscious in any intuitive sense; that if phenomenal consciousness itself corresponds to an intuitive way of a state's being conscious, it literally implies access consciousness; and that Block misconstrues the theoretical significance of the commonsense distinction. The…Read more
  •  190
    Metacognition and higher-order thoughts
    Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2): 231-242. 2000.
    Because there is a fair amount of overlap in the points by Balog and Rey, I will organize this response topically, referring specifically to each commentator as rele- vant. And, because much of the discussion focuses on my higher-order-thought hypothesis independent of questions about metacognition, I will begin by addressing a cluster of issues that have to do with the status, motivation, and exact formulation of that hypothesis.
  •  253
    Consciousness and Mind
    Oxford University Press UK. 2005.
    Consciousness and Mind presents David Rosenthal's influential work on the nature of consciousness. Central to that work is Rosenthal's higher-order-thought theory of consciousness, according to which a sensation, thought, or other mental state is conscious if one has a higher-order thought that one is in that state. The first four essays develop various aspects of that theory. The next three essays present Rosenthal's homomorphism theory of mental qualities and qualitative consciousness, and sho…Read more
  •  69
    Edited in hypertext by Andrew Chrucky. Reprinted with the permission of Professor David Rosenthal. Editor's Note: Due to the limitation of current hypertext, the following conventions have been used. In general, if an expression has some mark over it, that mark is placed as a prefix to the expression. All Greek characters are rendered by their names. Subscripts are placed in parentheses as concatenated suffixes: thus, e.g., HO is the chemical formula for water. Sellars' dot quotes are expressed …Read more
  •  5
    State Consciousness and Transitive Consciousness
    Consciousness and Cognition 2 (4): 355-363. 1993.
  •  108
    Book reviews 581 (review)
    The focus of Mark Rowlands’s admirable, richly argued book is phenomenal consciousness, in particular, how such consciousness arises from processes that are not themselves phenomenally conscious. Rowlands examines several views on this question, arguing that their failures point toward his own intriguing, novel position, which he develops in the final three chapters.
  •  5
    First-Person Operationalism and Mental Taxonomy
    Philosophical Topics 22 (1/2): 319-349. 1994.
  •  166
    in Mind and Consciousness: Five Questions, ed. Patrick Grim, New York and London: Automatic Press, forthcoming.