Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München
Faculty of Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Study of Religion
PhD, 1991
Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
  •  5
    A negação do número 2 em Grundgesetze e § 46 de Grundlagen: Resposta a Pedro Barbalho
    Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 27 (2): 369-372. 2023.
    Na sua resenha do meu artigo A Negação Fregeana do Número 2, Pedro Barbalho criticou a minha tentativa de mostrar que, dada a reconstrução da sintaxe e da semântica do sistema em Grundgesetze que apresentei num artigo anterior, a suposição de Frege de que “|Ø-- 2” é uma expressão bem-formada com um sentido e uma referência pode ser satisfatoriamente explicada. Pedro Barbalho oferece uma explicação alternativa que é sugerida pela tese Fregena no § 46 de Grundlagen de que uma afirmação sobre um nú…Read more
  •  34
    Essays on Frege's Conception of Truth (edited book)
    Rodopi. 2007.
    In his writings on the foundations of logic, Gottlob Frege, the father of modern logic, sketched a conception of truth that focuses on the following questions: What is the sense of the word "true"? Is truth a definable concept or a primitive one? What are the kinds of things of which truth is predicated? What is the role of the concept of truth in judgment, assertion and recognition? What is the logical category of truth? What is the significance of the concept of truth for science in general an…Read more
  •  161
    Whereas the relationship between truth and propositional content has already been intensively investigated, there are only very few studies devoted to the task of illuminating the relationship between truth and illocutionary acts. This book fills that gap. This innovative collection addresses such themes as: the relation between the concept of truth and the success conditions of assertions and kindred speech acts the linguistic devices of expressing the truth of a proposition the relation betwee…Read more
  •  12
    A tension in quine’s naturalistic ontology of semantics
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 89 (1): 161-183. 2014.
  • Liste der Autoren List of Contributors
    with Jose L. Bermiidez, Nino Cocchiarella, Leila Haaparanta, Ludger Jansen, Dale Jacquette, Reinhard Kahle, Franz von Kutschera, Wolfgang Neuser, and Priv Doz Dr Christof Rapp
    History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 4 239. 2001.
  •  17
    In his logical foundation of arithmetic, Frege faced the problem that the semantic interpretation of his system does not determine the reference of the abstract terms completely. The contextual definition of number, for instance, does not decide whether the number 5 is identical to Julius Caesar. In a late writing, Quine claimed that the indeterminacy of reference established by Frege’s Caesar problem is a special case of the indeterminacy established by his proxy-function argument. The present …Read more
  •  6
    Ontological Indifference of Theories and Semantic Primacy of Sentences
    Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 35 (2): 167-190. 2021.
    In his late philosophy, Quine generalized the structuralist view in the philosophy of mathematics that mathematical theories are indifferent to the ontology we choose for them. According to his ‘global structuralism’, the choice of objects does not matter to any scientific theory. In the literature, this doctrine is mainly understood as an epistemological thesis claiming that the empirical evidence for a theory does not depend on the choice of its objects. The present paper proposes a new interp…Read more
  •  21
    Freges Konzeption der Wahrheit
    Georg Olms. 2003.
    Frege hat über Jahrzehnte hinweg an einem Buch über die Grundlagen der Logik gearbeitet, dessen erster Teil folgenden Fragen gewidmet sein sollte: Ist Wahrheit definierbar oder ein „logisches Urelement“? Ist Wahrheit die Übereinstimmung eines inneren Bildes mit der Realität, oder ein Spezialfall der Beziehung zwischen dem Sinn eines Zeichens und seinem Bezug? Welchen Beitrag leistet der Sinn des Wortes ,wahr’ zu dem Sinn der Sätze, in denen es vorkommt? Sind die Wahrheitswerte – „das Wahre“ und…Read more
  •  12
    Individuating Abstract Objects: The Methodologies of Frege and Quine
    History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 4 (1): 121-142. 2001.
  •  4
    Kants Ableitung der Formel des kategorischen Imperativs aus seinem bloßen Begriff
    History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 6 (1): 97-111. 2003.
  •  9
    A tension in Quine's naturalistic ontology of ssemantics
    Grazer Philosophiseche Studien 89 (1): 161-183. 2014.
  •  49
    Frege on negative judgement and assertion
    Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 59 (140): 409-428. 2018.
    ABSTRACT In “Die Verneinung”, Frege discusses two types of negation, a semantic one and a pragmatic one. Semantic negation consists in the application of the logical function denoted by ‘it is false that p’ to a thought, and pragmatic negation in the act of asserting or judging a thought as false. According to the standard interpretation, Frege does not acknowledge pragmatic negation, because it is logically redundant. He therefore rejects the classical dualistic view that both truth and falsity…Read more
  •  3
    Introduction
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 89 (1): 109-112. 2014.
  •  23
    Davidson's Criticism of the Proximal Theory of Meaning
    Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 9 (1-2). 2005.
    According to the proximal theory of meaning, which is to be found in Quine’s early writings, meaning is determined completely by the correla-tion of sentences with sensory stimulations. Davidson tried to show that this theory is untenable because it leads to a radical form of skepticism. The present paper aims to show, first, that Davidson’s criticism is not sound, and, second, that nonetheless the proximal theory is untenable because it has a very similar and equally unacceptable consequence: i…Read more
  •  88
    "No Entity Without Identity"
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 60 (1): 13-29. 2000.
    Quine has persuasively shown that the empiricist "dogma of reductionism", which is the belief that each meaningfiil statement of science can be reduced to statements about immediate sense experience, must be abandoned. However, Quine's methodology of ontology seems to incorporate an analogous physicalistic dogma according to which the identity conditions of each scientifically respectable sort of abstract objects can be reduced to the identity conditions of physical objects. This paper aims to s…Read more
  •  2
    Individuating abstract objects: the methodologies of Frege and Quine
    History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 4. 2001.
    According to Frege, the introduction of a new sort of abstract object is methodologically sound only if its identity conditions have been satisfactorily explained. Ironically, this ontological restriction has come to be known by Quine's criticism of Frege's intensional semantics, as the precept "No entity without identity." The aim of the paper is to reconstruct Frege's methodology of the introduction of abstract objects in detail, and to defend it against the more restrictive methodology underl…Read more
  •  47
    Die idee hinter tarskis definition Von wahrheit
    Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 28 (1): 121-158. 1997.
    The Idea behind Tarski's Definition of Truth. In Tarski's presentations of his truth-definition, the steps of the construction are not sufficiently explained. It is not clear, on what general strategy the construction is based, what the fundamental ideas are, how some crucial steps work, and especially how the transition from the definition of satisfaction to the definition of truth should be understood. The paper shows that the account given in the model-theoretic literature, which is supported…Read more
  • A Negação Fregeana Do Número 2
    O Que Nos Faz Pensar 41-50. 2008.
  •  7
    Of truth1
    In Dirk Greimann & Geo Siegwart (eds.), Truth and Speech Acts: Studies in the Philosophy of Language, Routledge. pp. 5--90. 2007.
  • „Jacksons Argument des unvollständigen Wissens und die Identitätstheorie der Wahrheit
    Facta Philosophica: Internazionale Zeitschrift für Gegenwartsphilosophie: International Journal for Contemporary Philosophy 5 (1-2): 87-104. 2003.
  •  107
    Frege’s Performative Argument Against the Relativity of Truth
    Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 3 (2). 2015.
    The purpose of this paper is to reconstruct Frege’s argument against the relativity of truth contained in his posthumous writing Logic from 1897. Two points are made. The first is that the argument is a performative version of the common objection that truth relativism is incoherent: it is designed to show that the assertion of the relativity of truth involves a performative incoherence, because the absoluteness of truth is a success condition for making assertions. From a modern point of view, …Read more
  •  4
    Frege hat in seinen Schriften zu den philosophischen Grundlagen der Logik eine eigenwillige Konzeption der Wahrheit skizziert, der zufolge das Wahre und das Falsche keine Eigenschaften von Sätzen oder Gedanken sind, sondern Gegenstände, die von Sätzen bezeichnet werden. In dem vorliegenden Sammelband werden zentrale Komponenten dieser Konzeption näher beleuchtet: die Thesen der Undefinierbarkeit der Wahrheit und der Redundanz des Wortes „wahr“, die Auffassung der Wahrheitswerte als Gegenstände, …Read more
  •  13
    Chateaubriand’s view of truth as identification is based on the assumption that there is a close parallelism between sentences and definite descriptions with regard to their connection with reality. The paper aims to show that this parallelism does not actually obtain
  •  149
    What is Frege's Julius caesar problem?
    Dialectica 57 (3): 261-278. 2003.
    This paper aims to determine what kind of problem Frege's famous “Julius Caesar problem” is. whether it is to be understood as the metaphysical problem of determining what kind of things abstract objects like numbers or value‐courses are, or as the epistemological problem of providing a means of recognizing these objects as the same again, or as the logical problem of providing abstract sortal concepts with a sharp delimitation in order to fulfill the law of excluded middle, or as the semantic p…Read more
  • Frege's Performative Argument against Truth Relativism
    Journal of the History of Analytic Philosophy 3 1-17. 2015.
  •  60
    "No Entity Without Identity"
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 60 (1): 13-29. 2000.
    Quine has persuasively shown that the empiricist "dogma of reductionism", which is the belief that each meaningfiil statement of science can be reduced to statements about immediate sense experience, must be abandoned. However, Quine's methodology of ontology seems to incorporate an analogous physicalistic dogma according to which the identity conditions of each scientifically respectable sort of abstract objects can be reduced to the identity conditions of physical objects. This paper aims to s…Read more
  •  13
    Ist Kants Ethik ontologisch unschuldig?
    Kant Studien 95 (1): 107-127. 2004.