Donatella Donati

Personal ethical preferences are key enablers for the design of autonomous systems that respect humans’ moral rights and values. This goes beyond embedding ethical and legal principles in the design of the system once and for all. It requires the ability to elicit personal soft ethical preferences, represent them in a digitally useable format, and link them to the individual for use when interacting with digital systems. The aim of this paper is to represent soft ethical preferences through dispositions. Dispositions are properties that are instantiated by any kind of entity and that may manifest if properly triggered; we will focus on moral dispositions of individuals. The dispositional properties in which we are interested are ethical and behavioural ones. We propose a general and formal model to elicit and handle individual moral preferences. The model allows for the examination of real-life situations involving moral dilemmas. Users engage with these scenarios, respond based on how they would act, and provide justifications for their choices. Their responses are then analysed to identify tendencies toward certain actions, which are represented as dispositions. These dispositions can subsequently serve as the foundation for disposition manifestation mechanisms.

Artificial intelligence (AI) technologies are now embedded in daily life and their adoption has polarized opinions—some fear AI will replace human roles, while others see it as a means to augment human abilities. Central to this debate is the need to determine whether these technologies replace or augment human abilities and how these outcomes impact society. Despite its importance, the distinction between replacement and augmentation remains unclear and domain-dependent. To address this challenge, we propose fRAme, a framework designed to evaluate the impact of autonomous intelligent systems by analyzing both the technology and human abilities—specifically, their dispositions—within a given context and for a specific task. This approach aims to clarify the nuanced relationship between replacement and augmentation, providing a foundational tool for promoting responsible AI development, enhancing transparency, and enabling more informed decision-making among diverse stakeholders.

This thesis focuses on two related though different topics: first, the metaphysics of dispositions; second, the relation between dispositionalism and time. For this reason, the thesis is divided in two main parts: the first part concerns the first topic, and the second part concerns the second. The aim of the project is to argue that dispositionalism faces two different problems: first, there is no viable metaphysics for dispositional properties; second, there is no viable theory of time that can fit in a dispositional framework.

Dispositionalism is the theory of modality according to which all (metaphysical and natural) modal truths are made true by some actual irreducibly dispositional property. The relationship between Dispositionalism and time is yet to be satisfactorily explored. In this paper we contribute to this task by examining how Dispositionalism deals with ‘dated truths’: propositions involving a specific time, e.g. “It might rain at 12.30”. We examine two possible accounts: the first, 'Dated Manifestations Strategy', is the idea that powers are very fine-grained, and tend towards temporally very specific manifestations. We argue that such strategy should not be adopted, for it leads to unnecessary violations of ontological parsimony; it is unable to accommodate an ontology of platonic universals; and it is incapable of offering a principled explanation of the forward-looking nature of powers. We offer an alternative account, the "Duration Strategy", which relies on an independently determined arrow of time and the existence of some “duration facts” that specify how long a power takes to bring about its manifestation. We argue that the Duration Strategy is to be preferred. We then flesh out the account by exploring the connection between powers, duration facts, and processes.

In this paper we provide an analysis of dynamic dispositionalism. It is usually claimed that dispositions are dynamic properties. However, there is no exhaustive analysis of dynamism in the dispositional literature. We will argue that the dynamic character of dispositions can be analyzed in terms of three features: (i) temporal extension, (ii) necessary change and (iii) future orientedness. Roughly, we will defend the idea that dynamism entails a continuous view of time, to be analyzed in mathematical terms, where intervals are its constitutive elements, whose duration lasts as much as a certain change takes to occur (in support of i). Such changes are the necessary components for the flowing of time because we think there cannot be time without change, (thus supporting ii) and that the forward-looking feature of properties is what determines the direction of time (as per iii). The paper is structured in 5 sections. In the first section, we set the problem: we outline and criticize some dispositional theories that defend an unsatisfying notion of dynamism. In the second, third and fourth sections we defend each desideratum for a disposition to be dynamic. Finally, we draw some conclusions and consider potential future research.

Dispositionalism is the theory of modality according to which all (metaphysical and natural) modal truths are made true by some actual irreducibly dispositional property. The relationship between Dispositionalism and time is yet to be satisfactorily explored. In this paper we contribute to this task by examining how Dispositionalism deals with ‘dated truths’: propositions involving a specific time, e.g. “It might rain at 12.30”. We examine two possible accounts: the first, 'Dated Manifestations Strategy', is the idea that powers are very fine-grained, and tend towards temporally very specific manifestations. We argue that such strategy should not be adopted, for it leads to unnecessary violations of ontological parsimony; it is unable to accommodate an ontology of platonic universals; and it is incapable of offering a principled explanation of the forward-looking nature of powers. We offer an alternative account, the "Duration Strategy", which relies on an independently determined arrow of time and the existence of some “duration facts” that specify how long a power takes to bring about its manifestation. We argue that the Duration Strategy is to be preferred. We then flesh out the account by exploring the connection between powers, duration facts, and processes.

There is a tension between Dispositionalism––the view that all metaphysical modality is grounded in actual irreducible dispositional properties––and the possibility of time travel. This is due to the fact that Dispositionalism makes it much harder to solve a potentiality-based version of the grandfather paradox. We first present a potentiality-based version of the grandfather paradox, stating that the following theses are inconsistent: 1) time travel is possible, 2) powers fully ground modality, 3) self-defeating actions are impossible, 4) time-travellers retain their intrinsic powers upon time-travelling, and 5) time-travellers are ordinary agents with basic intrinsic potentialities. We then consider a number of potential solutions, and find them wanting. We argue that the metaphysical impossibility of performing a self-defeating action acts as a necessary perfect mask––while time-travel lets us “slip” the potentiality under the mask, thus generating the contradiction. We conclude considering what are the options for the dispositionalist.

Contemporary philosophers have studied food and its consumption from several disciplinary perspectives, including normative ethics, bioethics, environmental ethics, political philosophy, epistemology, and aesthetics. Many questions remain, however, underexplored or unaddressed. It is in the spirit of contributing to fill in these scholarly gaps that we designed the current issue, which represents the first collection of papers dedicated to food from a perspective of analytic metaphysics. Before presenting the five papers published in this issue, we shall briefly frame the current research on food linked to analytic metaphysics and point out future directions of research in this area. We begin with the most basic interroga- tive, namely What is food?, and then offer three illustrations of more specific re- search questions. We hope these examples suffice to demonstrate that food is a fertile terrain of inquiry for analytic metaphysics and that it deserves to be devel- oped.

In this paper I argue that dispositionalism is the metaphysical theory that can best contribute to the construction of a metaphysical model for Molecular Gastronomy. Molecular Gastronomy is better explained if physical and chemical theories, which lie at the heart of Molecular Gastronomy, and cooking phenomena in general are described in terms of dispositions. This is the reason why trying to construct a metaphysical model for Molecular Gastronomy by using a dispositional metaphysics is a challenge worth taking on. I will thus explore what happens when we bring dispositions in the kitchen, and so the intersection between food, science and metaphysics. The main aim of the paper is then to pave the way toward the development of a metaphysical model for the physical and the chemical aspects behind Molecular Gastronomy. In the first section, I will briefly reconstruct the history of Molecular Gastronomy, give a definition of it and outline its program. In the second section, I will describe the version of dispositionalism that I adopt in this paper. In the third section, I will sketch a dispositional model for Molecular Gastronomy by relying on two case studies. In the fourth and final section I will draw my conclusions and raise some issues deserving further investigation.

This is a paper about trust, with a specific focus on the ways in which trust is investigated in the business literature and the commercial sector. The lens through which the topic is approached is distinctively philosophical. We use philosophical tools to demonstrate the paucity of some of the accounts of trust that are given in the business and management literature, as well as the empirically informed literature that has flowed from them. We close with a discussion of some work on trust drawn from the commercial sector that would, as we shall demonstrate, benefit from a clearer understanding of the nature of trust. We take this to be important. Trust is a key moral and ethical component of transactional relationships. Without a clear understanding of the notion, we will be missing a central concept in our attempts to understand the commercial world that we inhabit. The paper proceeds in four parts. In the first part of the paper we introduce some reasonably standard philosophical distinctions between different kinds of trust, as well as saying a little more about our methods. In the second, we demonstrate that a reasonably widely held account of trust in the business and management literature fails to capture the nuance reflected by the philosophical literature. On the basis of this, in the third section, we suggest that various pieces of empirical work require reassessment. In the final part of the paper we explore some non-academic discussions of trust drawn from the commercial sector arguing that, there too, we require a more precise understanding of trust. In short, though, our overarching argument is simply this: if we can give a more precise analysis of trust, it follows that both our empirical research and current commercial activity can be improved.