Ebrahim Azadegan

About 150 years ago, two famous Iranian mystic and jurisprudent Najaf seminary people debated the interpretation of one of the poems of Attar Nishabouri. In this chapter, we try to outline the key points of the dispute between these two Hercules of contemporary Islamic mysticism and then try to extract out of this debate a conception of the relation between the unity of God and the manifold and plurality in His creatures to introduce a type of symbiotic perspective of a man–God relationship. To explain the social and even political role of human beings in the journey toward the ethical community, we appeal to the metaphor of the mystical journey from thirty birds [si murgh] toward unified Simurgh. If every person in society does her role perfectly, they will reach the Qaaf of a good and unified society.

This book promotes entirely new insights into women’s contributions to the history of philosophy and boasts papers spanning the centuries from Antigone until twentieth century phenomenology, covering fields from logic to mysticism, stretching from Brazil to Early Modern Europe. The book is of interest for all scholars and students of the history of philosophy, but especially for those who are interested in women philosophers and in new narratives in the history of philosophy. The book is representative of the immense scope of academic discussion women were involved in over the centuries as well as their varying styles and methods. It features papers in logic and in mysticism, presents papers on female authors in Antiquity and in the twenty-first century and it includes papers on phenomenology and analytic philosophy. The chapters consider philosophical positions in literature and drama, in letters and in classical philosophical treatises, ensuring this book contributes significantly to research on the individual women authors, who are all to date still understudied figures.

This paper confirms a longstanding feminist critique that the belief in God’s sovereignty, understood as His having supreme authority over all creatures and controlling them according to His own will, has served to bolster the non-egalitarian and sexist political order of our world, since a sovereign ruler can easily claim that his model of government is in accordance with and conforms to the model of divine sovereignty. Feminist theology, by criticizing this conception of divine sovereignty, proposes a reconciliatory resolution between theology and a nonsexist non-paternalist socio-political order, whereas the lack of this sort of reconciliatory resolution leads to tragedy. Focusing on Sophocles’ Antigone, in this paper I read Antigone’s deed as a feminist critique of the sexist/racist political order of her day interpreted through her feminist theology. I conclude that if we see God’s power and sovereignty as bestowing freedom and love, as from Antigone’s feminist perspective it does, then the divine law of love and mercy and the human law of the nonsexist polis can be reconciled.

From a traditional theological perspective, the ontological randomness and apparent lack of purpose in the evolutionary process appear to conflict with God’s providence, sovereignty, and wisdom. Many physicists confirm that there are forms of ontological (metaphysical) randomness in the world that are intrinsic and real, and cannot be reduced to a mere lack of knowledge. We then examine the traditional notions of divine sovereignty and providence, proposing how an open theology perspective can reconcile ontological randomness with divine providence and wisdom.

This article argues in favor of Open conception of divinity and theology in Islam. In Section 1, I explain the main textual difference between traditional transcendent conception of divinity and the open conception. Then, I will demonstrate the essential elements of this theology according to the various interpretations of the texts. I will then introduce a different meaning of God’s power as freedom bestowment. Next, I will argue that open theology can be supported rationally through its capability to dissolve some philosophical concerns of theism. It will be concluded that since in the modern era, human beings have changed their position in the world consciously, this change in the position of the man-world state definitely affects our epistemic position toward God, which is our theology. Nowadays, after challenging the sociopolitical paternalistic hierarchy of the world, we become more ready to understand the immanence, nearness, and love of God instead of seeing Him as the almighty King who governs the world from an eternal and too transcendent position. In my view, Open theology could be a fruitful avenue for Islamic theology to pursue as it seeks to answer the emerging questions concerning Man–God relationship in our modern world.

We argue that there is an incompatibility between the two basic principles of Molinism, i.e., God’s middle knowledge of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, and divine immutability. To this end, firstly, we set out the difference between strong and weak immutability: according to the latter only God’s essential attributes remain unchanged, while the former affirms that God cannot change in any way. Our next step is to argue that Molinism ascribes strong immutability to God. However, according to Molinism, some counterfactuals of freedom need to be actualized by divine will. We argue that this claim does entail a change in God because it attributes a knowledge to God that involves moving from possibility to actuality through divine will. Therefore, claiming God knows counterfactuals of freedom leads us to reject the strong sense of divine immutability. Further, we argue that assuming God’s knowledge encompasses counterfactuals of freedom cannot be consistent even with weak immutability because, according to Molinism, a change in God’s knowledge requires a change in His essence. We conclude that Molinism is incoherent.

Affirming that divine knowledge of occurrent changes among particulars is incompatible with the doctrine of divine immutability, this article seeks to resolve this tension by denying the latter. Reviewing this long-running debate, I first formalize the exchange between al-Ghazālı̄and Avicenna on this topic, and then set out the ways in which contemporary Sadrāean philosophers have tried to resolve the incompatibility. I argue that none of the cited Sadrāean attempts to resolve the incompatibility between divine omniscience and immutability is successful. Then, by reference to certain principles drawn from Shia theology, I indicate how one might seek to reject the dogma of divine immutability. I conclude that by emancipating ourselves from that dogma, new horizons could be opened for Islamic philosophy, free from traditional Hellenistic constraints.

From the Qur'an, Surah Maryam: (21) So she conceived him, and went in seclusion with him to a remote place. (22) And the pains of childbirth drove her to the trunk of a palm tree: she cried (in her anguish): "Ah! would that I had died before this! Would that I had been a thing forgotten and out of sight!" (23) But (a voice) cried to her from beneath the (palm tree): "Grieve not! for thy Lord hath provided a rivulet beneath thee;" (24) "And shake towards thyself the trunk of the palm tree: it will let fall fresh ripe dates upon thee." (25) "So eat and drink and cool (thine) eye. And if thou dost see any man say 'I have vowed a fast to (Allah) Most Gracious, and this day will I enter into no talk with any human being.'" This Surah depicts a human being in unbearable pain. What makes the pain tolerable is the sympathy that God shows for Mary. Hearing her inner voice, understanding her suffering and her grief, God is moved to provide her with practical and substantive support to help her bear her agony. For me this story portrays a God who is active in the world, hears the supplications of humanity, and has empathy with the needy, the oppressed, and those who are suffering. Yet I am concerned that our theological traditions in the Islamic world (as also in Christendom) have developed through the centuries such that God is now seen, by overwhelming theological consensus, as an immutable being, a being outside time who has determined our providence from the standpoint of eternity, who has foreknowledge of every free action of his creations and has designed all according to His plan for past and future events; who knows in advance even the timings and contents of our petitionary prayers and has decided already whether to answer them.

If the world has been fine-tuned for human life, why does that life encompass such calamity and suffering? It seems that in so far as we are impressed by the fine-tuning intuition that the world has been designed for human life, the problem of natural evil gains in urgency. I propose that observing the world from the anthropic point of view is the source of theists’ challenge which arises from this tension. Dealing with this challenge I suggest perhaps the world is fine-tuned for God’s telos, which may be His manifestation of love through sentient beings’ pains and emotions.

This paper criticizes one of the premises of Schellenberg’s atheistic argument from divine hiddenness. This premise, which can be considered as the foundation of his proposed argument, is based on a specific interpretation of divine love as eros. In this paper I first categorize several concepts of divine love under two main categories, eros and agape; I then answer some main objections to the ascription of eros to God; and in the last part I show that neither on a reading of divine love as agape nor as eros can Schellenberg’s argument be construed as sound. My aim is to show that even if -- contra Nygren for example -- we accept that divine love can be interpreted as eros, Schellenberg’s argument still doesn’t work.

Kahane introduces two versions of antitheism: impersonal and personal. I deny that impersonal antitheism can be cogently defended, but I accept that the meaningful life argument in favour of personal antitheism is sound. I then argue that the personal form of antitheism reduces to a form of gratuitous evil. Subsequently, I show that instead of denying the existence of gratuitous evil by approving sceptical theism, one can accept the existence of gratuitous evil and show that this sort of evil provides for a special sort of goodness. In line with this, I demonstrate that the existence of personal antitheists makes the world a more valuable place than a Godless world free of antitheists would be. The conclusion is that even for antitheists the existence of God is valuable, because they can thereby find a new meaning for their lives.