Eduardo Lopez

According to contemporary just war theory waging a just war requires that a belligerent fulfill a number of stringent conditions such as just cause, proportionality, and necessity. Failing to fulfill any of them would render a war unjust. It is therefore surprising that there has been almost no philosophical work on wars that are unjust from both sides. The fact that mutually unjust wars exist empirically seems fairly obvious. However, we argue that there are two difficult theoretical puzzles at the core of this type of situation that have remained underexplored. This article sorts out these puzzles and advances the view that mutually unjust wars are not only conceptually coherent, but that they constitute a philosophically challenging and practically pressing starting point for thinking on the ethics of war.

The historical importance of Lambert’sLambert Lambert, J. H. (1728–1777) Mémoire turns out evident as soon as one realizes the issues tackled by the Swiss. There is little doubt that fame goes to the first part of the article, in which LambertLambert Lambert, J. H. (1728–1777), showing a high level of skill with such then-recent analytic tools like continued fractions, demonstrates with unusual rigour for the 18th century standards the irrationality of \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\pi $$\end{document}. The issue of the nature of this constant had taken a new impulse since the herculean efforts by Ludolph van CeulenCeulen, L. van (1540–1610) at the end of the 16th century with the use of new analytic tools and their application to some geometric problems. Authors like GregoryGregory, J. (1638–1675), HuygensHuygens, C. (1629–1695), MengoliMengoli, P. (1626–1686), LeibnizLeibniz, G. W. von (1646–1716) or WallisWallis, J. (1616–1703) faced these issues, and in particular, the circle-squaring problem, in which \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\pi $$\end{document} played a central role. LambertLambert Lambert, J. H. (1728–1777) takes up the baton of this analytic tradition —enriched by EulerEuler, L. (1707–1783) with his first systematic study of continued fractions— and settles the question of its irrationality.

Proving that the diameter of the circle is not to its circumference as an integer number to an integer number is something that will hardly surprise geometers. We know Ludolph’s numbers, the ratios found by ArchimedesArchimedes (287–212 BC), by MetiusMetius, A. (1571–1635) etc. as well as a large number of infinite series, all of which refer to the quadrature of the circle. And if the sum of these series is a rational quantity, we must naturally conclude that it will be either an integer number or a very simple fraction.

This publication, now in its second edition, includes an unabridged and annotated translation of two works by Johann Heinrich Lambert (1728–1777) written in the 1760s: Vorläufige Kenntnisse für die, so die Quadratur und Rectification des Circuls suchen and Mémoire sur quelques propriétés remarquables des quantités transcendentes circulaires et logarithmiques. The translations, as in the first edition, are accompanied by a contextualised study of each of these works and provide an overview of Lambert’s contributions, showing both the background and the influence of his work. In addition, by adopting a biographical approach, it allows readers to better get to know the scientist himself. Lambert was a highly relevant scientist and polymath in his time, admired by the likes of Kant, who despite having made a wide variety of contributions to different branches of knowledge, later faded into an undeserved secondary place with respect to other scientists of the eighteenth century. In mathematics, in particular, he is famous for his research on non-Euclidean geometries, although he is likely best known for having been the first who proved the irrationality of pi. In his Mémoire, he conducted one of the first studies on hyperbolic functions, offered a surprisingly rigorous proof of the irrationality of pi, established for the first time the modern distinction between algebraic and transcendental numbers, and based on such distinction, he conjectured the transcendence of pi and therefore the impossibility of squaring the circle.

The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we argue that killing a Conditional Threat usually involves an unnecessary act of self-defense, so killing this aggressor is usually morally impermissible. We defend this thesis by showing that this case is fundamentally similar to a case involving an Unconditional Threat in which the victim can flee to safety although this involves incurring a minor cost. Second, we analyze the thresholds of maximal harm that victims are required to bear before they are permitted to defend themselves by harming their aggressors related to the conditions of necessity and of proportionality. We argue that the maximal harm a victim is required to bear sanctioned by the condition of necessity is, all else being equal, lower than the maximal harm that a victim must bear sanctioned by the condition of proportionality. This result is relevant for determining in which cases victims may use lethal force against Conditional Threats, both in the individual case and also in the case of war.

In Logical Forms Part II, Chateaubriand begins the Chapter on “Propositional Logic” by considering the reading of the ‘conditional’ by ‘implies’; in fact he states that:There is a confusion, as a matter of fact, and it runs deep, but it is a confusion in propositional logic itself, and the mathematician’s reading is a rather sensible one.After a careful, erudite analysis of various philosophical viewpoints of logic, Chateaubriand comes to the conclusion that:Pure propositional logic, as just characterized, belongs to ontological logic, and it does not include a theory of deduction as a human activity. This is a part of epistemological logic, and is more closely connected to the applications of pure propositional logic.An implicit assumption in Chateaubriand’s reasoning appears to be that propositions have a timeless status. I will present arguments for the opposite viewpoint which leads to an analysis of Propositional Logic not covered under Chateaubriand’s monograph and perhaps resolves some conflicts therein; much as the conflict between the Intuitionist and Classical Mathematician on whether every function on the Reals is continuous is resolved by the realization that they are talking about different “entities”.Em Logical Forms II, Chateaubriand inicia o capítulo “Lógica Proposi-cional” considerando a leitura do ‘condicional’ como ‘implica’. De fato, ele diz o seguinte:Na verdade, existe uma confusão, e ela é profunda, mas é uma confusão na lógica proposicional ela mesma, e a leitura de um matemático é bastante sensível.Depois de uma análise cuidadosa e erudita dos vários pontos de vista filosóficos da lógica , Chateaubriand chega à conclusão que:A lógica proposicional pura, tal como aqui caracterizada, pertence à lógica ontológica, e não inclui uma teoria da dedução como atividade humana. Isto é parte da lógica epistemológica, e é mais intimamente conectada às aplicações da lógica proposicional.Uma premissa implícita no raciocínio de Chateaubriand parece ser a de que proposições têm um estatuto atemporal. Eu argumentarei em favor da visão oposta, que leva a uma análise da Lógica Proposicional não abordada no texto de Chateaubriand e que talvez resolva alguns conflitos. Muito do conflito entre Intuicionistas e Matemáticos Clássicos sobre se toda função sobre os números reais é contínua é resolvido pela compreensão de que eles estão falando de “entidades” diferentes

Los Estados confederados proyectan la existencia de un doble sistema normativo: federal y local. Esto provoca el surgimiento de colisiones y contradicciones entre ambos sistemas, lo que se pensaría debería ser resuelto por el derecho internacional, atendiendo el principio de subsidiariedad, no obstante, esto no siempre es así, ya sea porque el derecho internacional no regule ese caso concreto o bien, porque el Estado en cuestión no haya otorgado su consentimiento y la respuesta no le sea vinculante. Estas reflexiones invitan a contrastar la naturaleza de las normas del derecho local y del derecho internacional, pues mientras que las primeras son asociativas, dado que no necesariamente requieren ser consentidas para ser vinculantes, las segundas, aparentemente, sí requieren el consentimiento de los Estados para que tengan efectos vinculantes. En este artículo pretendemos postular una posible solución al problema del conflicto entre los distintos órdenes normativos, partiendo desde una postura cuasi-voluntarista. Las obligaciones cuasi-voluntarias son aquellas que no surgen del consentimiento, pero tampoco completamente de los roles que tienen los Estados en el sistema internacional. Estas obligaciones nacen en el núcleo de grupos dominantes, a los que llamaremos grupos autocontenidos en el ámbito internacional, que tienen como rol la creación y socialización de las normas y obligaciones de derecho internacional, logrando que los otros grupos simplemente las sigan como si tuvieran un deber de hacerlo. Para ello, servirá como referencia el análisis del caso de las disimiles normas migratorias entre California y Texas dentro de Estados Unidos.

Consensual homicide remains a crime in jurisdictions where active voluntary euthanasia has been legalized. At the same time, both jurisdictions, in which euthanasia is legal and those in which it is not, recognize that all patients (whether severely ill or not) have the right to refuse or withdraw medical treatment (including life-saving treatment). In this paper, I focus on the tensions between these three norms (the permission of active euthanasia, the permission to reject life-saving treatment, and the prohibition of consensual homicide), assuming a justification of euthanasia based on the right to (personal) autonomy. I argue that the best way to provide a coherent account of these norms is to claim that patients have two distinct rights: the right to autonomy and the right to bodily integrity. This solution has some relevant implications for the discussion of the legalization of active euthanasia.

The question I address in this paper is whether and under what conditions it is morally right to bring a person into existence. I defend the commonsensical thesis that, other things being equal, it is morally wrong to create a person who will be below some threshold of quality of life, even if the life of this potential person, once created, will nevertheless be worth living. However commonsensical this view might seem, it has shown to be problematic because of the so-called 'Non-Identity Problem'. Both utilitarian and rights-based approaches have been unable to provide a solution to this problem. I rest my thesis on two premises: that causing a disability or impairment in a future person is prima facie wrong, so long as we can avoid causing such a disability to that very person; and that reproduction, under normal conditions, is prima facie morally indifferent. From these two premises, I conclude that it is prima facie wrong to bring into existence a person with a non-trivial disability or impairment (which might be, nonetheless, compatible with a worthwhile life), even if the only available alternative is to remain childless.

The problem of nonideal theory has been widely discussed in political philosophy in recent times. The problem has received much less attention, however, at the level of individual morality. Since the real world is a nonideal one, the problem is extremely relevant, if moral theory is to guide our action as moral agents. My purpose in this paper is mainly conceptual. I first clarify the distinction between different kinds of nonideal situation (natural accidents or limitations and partial compliance with morality) and how different moral theories face those different kinds of imperfections. Secondly, I try to show that the distinction between the two main sources of imperfection is less straightforward and more complex than might be expected. Finally, I suggest that the role of partial compliance in nonideal moral theory is much more modest and difficult to defend than we might at first think.

Nozick's well-known Experience Machine argument can be considered a typically successful argument: as far as I know, it has not been discussed much and has been widely seen as conclusive, or at least convincing enough to refute the mental-state versions of utilitarianism. I believe that if his argument were conclusive, its destructive effect would be even stronger. It would not only refute mental-state utilitarianism, but all theories considering a certain subjective mental state as the only valuable state. I shall call these theories "mental state welfarist theories." I do not know whether utilitarianism or, in general, mental-state welfarism is plausible, but I doubt that Nozick's argument is strong enough to prove that it is not.

My aim in this paper is to provide an effective counterexample to consequentialism. I assume that traditional counterexamples, such as Transplant (A doctor should kill one person and transplant her organs to five terminal patients, thereby saving their lives) and Judge (A judge should sentence to death an innocent person if he knows that an outraged mob will otherwise kill many innocent persons), are not effective, for two reasons: first, they make unrealistic assumptions and, second, they do not pass the rule‐consequentialist institutional test. My example (The Moral Murderer), instead, assumes a realistic empirical framework and the relevant action does not undermine basic social institutions. On the contrary, it reinforces them. In The Moral Murderer, Tom (an adult male) is morally allowed to murder a person (preferably a woman) in order to be punished to death.

ABSTRACT In a recent paper published in this journal, Thomas S. Petersen makes a qualified defense of what he calls ‘the Claim from Adoption’, according to which, ‘instead of expending resources on bringing new children [in developed countries] into the world using reproductive technology and caring for these children, we ought to devote these resources to the adoption and care of existing destitute children’. My purpose in this paper is not to discuss Petersen’s argument in favor of that claim. Rather, I want to show that, even if the Claim from Adoption might be, other things being equal, true, it is not true all things considered. What is, all things considered, true is a much more complex set of statements, including a general prima facie obligation to adopt, as well as an obligation by the state of developed countries to discourage procreation and promote adoption of destitute children.