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19Doxastic Justification and Testimonial BeliefsEpisteme 1-14. forthcoming.I argue that a general feature of human psychology provides strong reason to modify or reject anti-reductionism about the epistemology of testimony. Because of the work of what I call “the background” (which is a collection of all of an individual's synthetizations, summarizations, memories of experiences, beliefs, etc.) we cannot help but form testimonial beliefs on the basis of a testifier's say so along with additional evidence, concepts, beliefs, and so on. Given that we arrive at testimonia…Read more
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9Reasons for Belief and Aretaic ObligationsEpisteme 1-12. forthcoming.I argue that, if doxastic involuntarism is true, then we should reconceive what are traditionally called reasons for belief. The truth of doxastic involuntarism would rule out a certain understanding of reasons for belief according to which they are reasons to form, alter, or relinquish beliefs. Thus, reconceiving reasons for belief would require reconceiving doxastic obligations. I argue that, in fact, a reconception of reasons for belief warrants abandoning the notion of doxastic obligations, …Read more
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24Critique and Refinement of the Wakefieldian Concept of Disorder: An Improvement of the Harmful Dysfunction AnalysisJournal of Medicine and Philosophy 47 (4): 530-539. 2022.One way in which bioethicists can benefit the medical community is by clarifying the concept of disorder. Since insurance companies refer to the DSM for whether a patient should receive assistance, one must consider the consequences of one’s concept of disorder for who should be provided with care. I offer a refinement of Jerome Wakefield’s hybrid concept of disorder, the harmful dysfunction analysis. I criticize both the factual component and the value component of Wakefield’s account and sugge…Read more
Tallahassee, Florida, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
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Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
Applied Ethics |
Action Theory |
Philosophy of Religion |
Religious Studies |