Esther Oluffa Pedersen

We argue that philosophy of trust can be employed to counter the paralysis of action ensuing out of the experience of polycrisis in the current state of international social life. Philosophy of trust can recognize the impact of the polycrisis on contemporary societies all the while that an analysis of trust inevitably takes the concrete life world experiences of humans as a central part of the analysis. Using the philosophy of trust as an analytic tool involves digging into relations of trust and distrust situated in concrete social environments which takes humans’ concrete experiences of trust, distrust, and breaches of trust into account all the while that its theoretical conceptualizations can pay heed to overall societal challenges. As such it provides a means to study our contemporary world of polycrisis without simplifying the social world or succumbing to paralysis. This is shown in short discussions and presentations of the five articles included in the special issue.

The ongoing Post Office scandal in the UK and the 2021 Child Daycare Benefit Scandal in the Netherlands make up exemplary cases of how digital automation has changed and in fact severely harmed trust relations ranging from trust in oneself over trust in social roles, trust in institutions, trust in technology and general trust. By looking closer at how digital automation in these cases generated ruptures in the lives of ordinary citizens and also affected the involved institutions and society at large I discuss how we may begin to discuss the impact of digitalization on trust in societies. I start with an introduction to the panoramic view of trust, followed by a short description of the two scandals. Based on the exploration of the two cases I take an ex post facto perspective on the dynamic social events as they unfolded in the scandals in order to analyze how the introduction of digital automation tools affected trust relations. I draw attention to some of the most noticeable changes in the four relations of trust, which is trust in institutions, interpersonal trust, trust in oneself and trust in technology.

To commemorate the centenary of Ernst Cassirer's Philosophy of Symbolic Forms this essay focuses on how Cassirer in the development of a distinctive philosophical method analyzed the newest development within philosophy and science. Discussing Einstein's theory of relativity and Russell's formal logic Cassirer found tools to expand the critique of reason into a critique of culture. The course of argumentation is as follows. At the outset Cassirer's outline of the idea of The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms in the 1920 book Einstein's Theory of Relativity is presented as a reaction to the increasing distance between theoretical physics and ordinary experience. The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms can be read as an answer to an inner methodological demand within critical idealism. I encircle this motif in Cassirer's comment that Plato's idealism, understood as the dianoia of thought, is reiterated in Kant's transcendental philosophy and Herman Cohen's reception of Kant. This leads to a discussion of how Cassirer breaks away from Cohen by the positive reception of Russell's symbolic logic. Finally, I present the theory of functional concepts developed by Cassirer (1910) in the book Substance and Function as a prerequisite for the conception of a plural but systematic philosophy of symbolic forms.

Our world is under going an enormous digital transformation. Nearly no area of our social, informational, political, economic, cultural, and biological spheres are left unchanged. What can philosophy contribute as we try to under- stand and think through these changes? How does digitization challenge past ideas of who we are and where we are headed? Where does it leave our ethical aspirations and cherished ideals of democracy, equality, privacy, trust, freedom, and social embeddedness? Who gets to decide, control, and harness the powers of digitization and for which purposes? Epistemologically, do most of us understand these new mediations – and thus fabrics – of our new world? Lastly – how is the new technological landscape shaping not only our living conditions but also our collective imaginary and our self-identities?

The chief aim of the paper is to argue for a two-level theory of trust consisting of basic and intentional trust. The paper sets out by comparing the concepts of trust and justice to highlight the double meaning of trust as a descriptive social phenomenon and an evaluative normative term. It is subsequently argued that the conceptions of trust known from political science and recent philosophical debates of trust do not capture this double meaning of trust as the former focuses on trust as a social phenomenon while the latter focuses on the normative aspect. As an alternative I develop a two-level theory of trust where basic trust, understood in accordance with sociologist Harold Garfinkel’s conception of trust, is combined with a conception of intentional trust as a willed response to breaches in the social expectancies. Finally, the social philosophical consequences of the two-level theory of trust are indicated in a brief recapitulation of the comparison of trust and justice.

The article follows Kant’s different views on aesthetics ranging from the pre-critical period to the Critique of the Power of Judgement. It argues that John Zammito’s psychological explanation of why Kant in the third Critique developed an argument for the transcendental justification of judgements of taste is unconvincing. As an alternative, the article shows how Kant in his published pre-critical discussions of aesthetics was relying upon empiricist sources while he in private comments turned to consider the culture critique of Rousseau. Kant’s preoccupation with questions of culture critique, it is argued, was an important reason to enlarge the doctrines of transcendental philosophy with a third Critique containing a transcendental aesthetics of beauty. Additionally, it is pointed out an interesting similarity throughout the development of Kant’s philosophy. In 1765 and in the third Critique Kant was concerned to keep philosophy and judgements of taste apart from science.