Eugene Y. S. Chua

It is often said that time vanishes in quantum gravity. One general approach to quantum gravity accepts this fundamental timelessness but seeks to derive time’s emergence at a non-fundamental level. To better assess such approaches, I develop the criterion of physical coherence and situate it in context by applying it to two programs for time’s emergence, drawing from recent works by Chua and Callender (2021) and Chua (2025): semiclassical time and thermal time. Unlike some recent arguments for the metaphysical incoherence of time’s emergence, which rule out all claims of time’s emergence ‘from on high’ once we’ve fixed a definition of metaphysical emergence, my criterion of physical coherence leaves open the possibility that some programs in quantum gravity may succeed on their own terms in providing a physically coherent derivation of time from no-time. This sets a challenge for proponents of time’s emergence to clarify the conceptual foundations of their program, while at the same time acting as a litmus test for a program’s success.

It is often said that time vanishes in quantum gravity. One general approach to quantum gravity accepts this fundamental timelessness but seeks to derive time’s emergence at a non-fundamental level. To better assess such approaches, I develop the criterion of physical coherence and situate it in context by applying it to two programs for time’s emergence, drawing from recent works by Chua and Callender (2021) and Chua (2025): semiclassical time and thermal time. Unlike some recent arguments for the metaphysical incoherence of time’s emergence, which rule out all claims of time’s emergence ‘from on high’ once we’ve fixed a definition of metaphysical emergence, my criterion of physical coherence leaves open the possibility that some programs in quantum gravity may succeed on their own terms in providing a physically coherent derivation of time from no-time. This sets a challenge for proponents of time’s emergence to clarify the conceptual foundations of their program, while at the same time acting as a litmus test for a program’s success.

There is a question of whether de-idealization is needed for justified use of -- for 'checking' -- idealizations. We argue that the standard philosophical account of de-idealization has become too idealized, but that this does not preclude the possibility of justificatory practices which show how models can be used to make inferences about the world. In turn, motivated by examples in physics, we provide a more expansive and practice-driven account of de-idealization by relaxing the standards for closeness to more realistic theoretical items, identifying at least three kinds of procedures for de-idealization: intra-model, inter-model, and measurement de-idealizations. These examples highlight how idealizations can be -- and indeed have been -- scrutinized within physics without appealing to the philosopher's idealized notion of de-idealization.

Much of the century-old debate surrounding the status of thermodynamics in relativity has centered on the search for a suitably relativistic temperature; recent works by Chua (2023) and Chua and Callender (forthcoming) have suggested that the classical temperature concept – consilient as it is in classical settings – ‘falls apart’ in relativity. However, these discussions typically assume an unproblematic Lorentz transformation for – specifically, the Lorentz invariance of – the pressure concept. Here I argue that, just like the classical temperature, the classical concept of pressure breaks down in relativistic settings. I discuss how this might suggest a new thermodynamic limit – a u → 0 limit – without which an unambiguous thermodynamic description of systems doesn’t emerge.

This paper diagnoses a much-discussed problem in quantum thermodynamics, that of generalizing classical work into the quantum domain. I begin with the no-go theorem of Perarnau-Llobet et al (2017): no universal measurement scheme for quantum work satisfies two intuitive, classically consilient desiderata. I assess this incompatibility as stemming from the measurement problem. Decoherence restores compatibility for all practical purposes, but raises questions about what 'universality' should mean and whether any measurement scheme can be 'universal'. I consider a different standard of universality -- in terms of ontology -- by defining a trajectory-based notion of quantum work using the quantum potential. While this preserves the classical role of work as the integral of forces over distances, and evades the tension of the no-go theorem, consilience fails elsewhere; no single quantum work concept seems capable of preserving all classical features, raising questions for what it takes for successful generalization of the work concept to quantum thermodynamics.

Lakatos’s analysis of progress and degeneration in the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes is well-known. Less known, however, are his thoughts on degeneration in Proofs and Refutations. I propose and motivate two new criteria for degeneration based on the discussion in Proofs and Refutations – superfluity and authoritarianism. I show how these criteria augment the account in Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, providing a generalized Lakatosian account of progress and degeneration. I then apply this generalized account to a key transition point in the history of entropy – the transition to an information-theoretic interpretation of entropy – by assessing Jaynes’s 1957 paper on information theory and statistical mechanics.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly proposed as scalable solutions to the global mental health crisis. But their deployment in psychiatric contexts raises a distinctive ethical concern: the problem of atypicality. Because LLMs generate outputs based on population-level statistical regularities, their responses—while typically appropriate for general users—may be dangerously inappropriate when interpreted by psychiatric patients, who often exhibit atypical cognitive or interpretive patterns. We argue that standard mitigation strategies, such as prompt engineering or fine-tuning, are insufficient to resolve this structural risk. Instead, we propose dynamic contextual certification (DCC): a staged, reversible and context-sensitive framework for deploying LLMs in psychiatry, inspired by clinical translation and dynamic safety models from artificial intelligence governance. DCC reframes chatbot deployment as an ongoing epistemic and ethical process that prioritises interpretive safety over static performance benchmarks. Atypicality, we argue, cannot be eliminated—but it can, and must, be proactively managed.

The Tolman effect is well-known in relativistic cosmology but rarely discussed outside it. That is surprising because the effect -- that systems extended over a varying gravitational potential exhibit temperature gradients while in thermal equilibrium -- conflicts with ordinary classical thermodynamics. In this paper we try to better understand this effect from a foundational perspective. We make five claims. First, as Tolman knew, it was Einstein who first discovered the effect, and furthermore, Einstein's derivation helps us appreciate how robust it is. Second, the standard interpretation of the effect in terms of 'local temperature' leads to the breakdown of much of classical thermodynamics. Third, one can rescue thermodynamics by using Einstein's preferred interpretation in terms of the 'wahre Temperatur' -- what we'll call global temperature -- but it too has some costs. Fourth, the effect is perhaps best understood in terms of clocks as opposed to energy loss. Fifth, inspired by a proposal of Einstein's elsewhere, we sketch an interpretation of the effect in terms of a third novel temperature, which we call the 'wahre-local temperature'. On this view, temperature -- and thermodynamics -- is defined only in relation to local clocks. In sum, we view the fragmentation of temperature in thermodynamics as a natural and expected result of the fragmentation of time in general relativity.

Taking the formal analogies between black holes and classical thermodynamics seriously seems to first require that classical thermodynamics applies in relativistic regimes. Yet, by scrutinizing how classical temperature is extended into special relativity, I argue that the concept falls apart. I examine four consilient procedures for establishing the classical temperature: the Carnot process, the thermometer, kinetic theory, and black-body radiation. I argue that their relativistic counterparts demonstrate no such consilience in defining the relativistic temperature. As such, classical temperature doesn’t appear to survive a relativistic extension. I suggest two interpretations for this situation: eliminativism akin to simultaneity, or pluralism akin to rotation.

A family of arguments for black hole evaporation relies on conservation laws, defined through symmetries represented by Killing vector fields which exist globally or asymptotically. However, these symmetries often rely on the idealizations of stationarity and asymptotic flatness, respectively. In non-stationary or non-asymptotically-flat spacetimes where realistic black holes evaporate, the requisite Killing fields typically do not exist. Can we ‘de-idealize’ these idealizations, and subsequently the associated arguments for black hole evaporation? Here, I critically examine the strategy of using ‘approximately Killing’ fields to de-idealize black hole spacetimes and approximately extend conservation laws to non-idealized cases. I argue that this approach encounters significant challenges, undermining the use of these idealizations to justify the evaporation of realistic – rather than idealized – black holes, and raising questions about the justified use of such idealizations.

Preparing general relativity for quantization in the Hamiltonian approach leads to the `problem of time,' rendering the world fundamentally timeless. One proposed solution is the `thermal time hypothesis,' which defines time in terms of states representing systems in thermal equilibrium. On this view, time is supposed to emerge thermodynamically even in a fundamentally timeless context. Here, I develop the worry that the thermal time hypothesis requires dynamics -- and hence time -- to get off the ground, thereby running into worries of circularity.

In Everettian quantum mechanics, justifications for the Born rule appeal to self-locating uncertainty or decision theory. Such justifications have focused exclusively on a pure-state Everettian multiverse, represented by a wave function. Recent works in quantum foundations suggest that it is viable to consider a mixed-state Everettian multiverse, represented by a (mixed-state) density matrix. Here, we develop the conceptual foundations for decoherence and branching in a mixed-state multiverse, and extend arguments for the Born rule to this setting. This extended framework provides a unification of 'classical' and 'quantum' probabilities, and additional theoretical benefits, for the Everettian picture.

[Accepted for publication in Lakatos's Undone Work: The Practical Turn and the Division of Philosophy of Mathematics and Philosophy of Science, special issue of Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy. Edited by S. Nagler, H. Pilin, and D. Sarikaya.] Lakatos’s analysis of progress and degeneration in the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes is well-known. Less known, however, are his thoughts on degeneration in Proofs and Refutations. I propose and motivate two new criteria for degeneration based on the discussion in Proofs and Refutations – superfluity and authoritarianism. I show how these criteria augment the account in Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, providing a generalized Lakatosian account of progress and degeneration. I then apply this generalized account to a key transition point in the history of entropy – the transition to an information-theoretic interpretation of entropy – by assessing Jaynes’s 1957 paper on information theory and statistical mechanics.

Conventional wisdom holds that the von Neumann entropy corresponds to thermodynamic entropy, but Hemmo and Shenker (2006) have recently argued against this view by attacking von Neumann's (1955) argument. I argue that Hemmo and Shenker's arguments fail due to several misunderstandings: about statistical-mechanical and thermodynamic domains of applicability, about the nature of mixed states, and about the role of approximations in physics. As a result, their arguments fail in all cases: in the single-particle case, the finite particles case, and the infinite particles case.

[To be presented at PSA 2018] The gauge/gravity duality and its relation to the possible emergence of gravity from quantum physics has been much discussed. Recently, however, Sebastian De Haro has argued that the very notion of a duality precludes emergence, given what he calls the internal view of dualities, on which the dual theories are physically equivalent. However, I argue that De Haro's argument for the internal view is not convincing, and we do not have good reasons to adopt it. In turn, I propose we adopt the external view, on which dual theories are not physically equivalent, instead.

The laws of classical logic are taken to be logical truths, which in turn are taken to hold objectively. However, we might question our faith in these truths: why are they true? One general approach, proposed by Putnam [8] and more recently Dickson [3] or Maddy [5], is to adopt empiricism about logic. On this view, logical truths are true because they are true of the world alone – this gives logical truths an air of objectivity. Putnam and Dickson both take logical truths to be true in virtue of the world’s structure, given by our best empirical theory, quantum mechanics. This assumes a determinate logical structure of the world given by quantum mechanics. Here, I argue that this assumption is false, and that the world’s logical structure, and hence the related ‘true’ logic, is underdetermined. This leads to what I call empirical conventionalism.