Eva Read

A fundamental role of farm animal welfare science is to generate evidence-based knowledge on animals’ needs and well-being to inform decision-makers, and ultimately society at large. However, we argue that the knowledge produced by welfare science is systematically affected by pragmatic considerations that shape what problems are studied and how, limiting the information available. This phenomenon, which we term ‘pragmatism bias’, manifests in tendencies to focus on intensive production systems, short-term gains, and symptoms rather than root causes. In the absence of sufficient information, decisions are made with whatever knowledge is at hand. As a result, systems regarded as economically efficient, yet which offer unsatisfactory animal welfare become entrenched, systemic welfare issues are addressed incrementally, and the discipline’s epistemic progress is constrained. We argue that funding availability and operational constraints are central in driving pragmatism bias, yet equally significant is the way researchers, under these pressures, frame and pursue their investigations. To counteract pragmatism bias, we propose a multifaceted approach that includes strengthening researchers’ responsibility to acknowledge how pragmatic constraints shape scientific work. We recommend normalising transparent, reflexive communication about these influences through training, manuscript requirements, and professional dialogue. Meanwhile, funding structures should be reformed so that neutral, bottom-up mechanisms support open-ended, animal-centred inquiry. Science-based knowledge should be broadened to include a wider range of conditions outside of currently economically viable alternatives, including those that enable animals to thrive. Lastly, we suggest that researchers engage more with emerging frameworks for formal animal representation to support more systemic and ethically grounded change.

This dissertation examines the discipline of animal welfare science, focusing on two foundational questions: what the purpose of animal welfare science should be, and what ‘animal welfare’ is. These are sources of longstanding disagreement, but the debates and any discussions of their implications rarely make it into the published literature. I aim in this work to evidence and explain the disagreements about these questions and to suggest ways forward. I begin with an exploratory survey of the animal welfare research community, focusing on questions to do with researcher beliefs and values about what animal welfare is, what the field should be doing, and how well it is currently doing it. The survey indicates, among other things, widespread disagreement within animal welfare science about what animal welfare is. I show that this disagreement has been exploited in practice to legitimise practices harmful to the welfare of farmed animals, which motivates a conceptual engineering project aimed at developing a definition of animal welfare fit for collective uptake by the field. I propose four desiderata for such a definition: permissiveness about plausible constituents of welfare, theoretical grounding, amenability to scientific enquiry, and entrenchment in the field’s existing language and commitments. I evaluate Nussbaum’s extension of the Capabilities Approach to all sentient animals (ECA), which is inspirational for its focus on flourishing independent of human interests in animal lives, but ultimately does not have sufficient theoretical grounding for the constituents of flourishing that it picks out. Taking lessons from the ECA, I argue against a simple form of hedonism – the valence aggregation model (VAM) – that is gaining prominence in animal welfare science and, develop in response a characterisation of welfare as holistic self-maintenance (HSM). Under this framework, an animal fares well to the extent that they flourish across bodily, agential, social, ecological, and narrative dimensions of their lives, each with both objective and subjective components. This project is intended to support animal welfare science’s progress towards understanding animal welfare and away from the influence of the animal industries.

Martha Nussbaum’s Justice for Animals calls upon humanity to secure for all sentient beings the central capabilities they need to flourish. This essay review critically examines the ethical and scientific foundations of Nussbaum’s position. On the ethical side, we explore the tension between a robust defence of animal rights and political liberalism, which requires tolerance of a range of reasonable views. On the scientific side, we reflect on how our uncertainty regarding the distribution of sentience in the natural world leaves us uncertain about how many claimants of justice there are and about the relative strength of their claims. We bring out some further problems with Nussbaum’s views on animal killing and pest control. We also reflect on how animal welfare science might be done differently if guided by Nussbaum’s framework.

Martha Nussbaum’s Justice for Animals calls upon humanity to secure for all sentient beings the central capabilities they need to flourish. This essay review critically examines the ethical and scientific foundations of Nussbaum’s position. On the ethical side, we explore the tension between a robust defence of animal rights and political liberalism, which requires tolerance of a range of reasonable views. On the scientific side, we reflect on how our uncertainty regarding the distribution of sentience in the natural world leaves us uncertain about how many claimants of justice there are and about the relative strength of their claims. We bring out some further problems with Nussbaum’s views on animal killing and pest control. We also reflect on how animal welfare science might be done differently if guided by Nussbaum’s framework.

Martha Nussbaum’s _Justice for Animals_ calls upon humanity to secure for all sentient beings the central capabilities they need to flourish. This essay review critically examines the ethical and scientific foundations of Nussbaum’s position. On the ethical side, we explore the tension between a robust defence of animal rights and political liberalism, which requires tolerance of a range of reasonable views. On the scientific side, we reflect on how our uncertainty regarding the distribution of sentience in the natural world leaves us uncertain about how many claimants of justice there are and about the relative strength of their claims. We bring out some further problems with Nussbaum’s views on animal killing and pest control. We also reflect on how animal welfare science might be done differently if guided by Nussbaum’s framework.