Fatema Amijee

The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) is a cornerstone of rationalist metaphysics, yet many of its consequences remain underexplored. I argue that among these underexplored consequences is a striking variety of neutral monism, construed as the thesis that all entities share the same fundamental modal base. My argument proceeds in three stages. First, I motivate a commitment to attributes, metaphysically necessary properties that ultimately explain an entity’s modal profile. Second, I argue that the PSR supports the claim that every entity must instantiate every attribute. Third, I draw out the metaphysical implications of this conclusion: I show that it rules out substance dualism, versions of reductive and nonreductive physicalism, and idealism in favour of a neutral monist ontology.

Emilie Du Châtelet’s Institutions de physique (1740) predates Kant’s pre-Critical texts, in which he develops his account of physical influx. This chapter draws on Kant’s pre-Critical account to shed light on how Du Châtelet might have responded to a central objection against physical influx raised by Leibniz. I first show that despite Du Châtelet’s explicit claim in the preface of the Institutions to be expounding Leibniz’s metaphysics, her metaphysical commitments diverge from Leibniz's in a striking way: unlike Leibniz, she seems to endorse physical influx for created substances, the view that created substances stand in transeunt causal relations to one another. I then reconstruct Leibniz’s objection that transeunt causation between substances is metaphysically incoherent because it involves the transfer of accidents. Finally, I argue that Du Châtelet, on the basis of her Institutions, has the resources to address this objection. The key insight, which Du Châtelet shares with the pre-Critical Kant, is that transeunt substantial causation requires the causal powers of both the substance that acts and the substance that is acted upon.

Can inquiry begin with a standpoint that is maximally non-committal or without presupposition? And if it can, what value might there be in such presupposition-free inquiry? I answer negatively on both fronts: such presupposition-free inquiry is neither possible for us, nor the only way available to us for knowing what our world is really like. I begin by defending these two claims. I then discuss how Fiocco’s (2024) recent book Time and the World: Every Thing and Then Some poses a direct challenge to my position, and how that challenge might be overcome.

According to the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR), every fact has an explanation for why it obtains. If the PSR is true, there must be a sufficient reason why God chose to create our world. But a sufficient reason for God’s choice plausibly necessitates that choice. It thus seems that God could not have done otherwise, and that our world exists necessarily. One therefore appears forced to pick between the PSR, and the contingency of creation and divine choice. This chapter argues that a third option remains open, and thus that it is possible to preserve the contingency of creation and divine choice even while endorsing the PSR. The solution depends on the coherence of a restricted modal realism. On this modal realism, there is more than one possible morally optimal created world, and for each such world there is an existing possibility in which God creates that world.

This volume brings together new work on Émilie Du Châtelet that highlights the depth, range, and systematic nature of her philosophical thought. Spanning metaphysics, physics, theology, mathematics, ethics, and biblical interpretation, these chapters collectively reveal Du Châtelet as a unified and original thinker whose work demands recognition alongside early modern rationalists such as Leibniz and Spinoza. A central thread running through the volume is Du Châtelet’s commitment to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, which anchors her rationalist metaphysics, underwrites her theory of knowledge, and guides her methodological and theological critiques. The contributions explore Du Châtelet’s epistemology of space, her theory of liberty, her metaphysics of fire and mathematical objects, and her relation to Newtonian science. Several chapters emphasize her independence from major influences such as Leibniz and Wolff. Others expand the scope of her legacy—whether by situating her as a paradigm-establishing figure in early mechanics or by connecting her theological and moral views to her broader philosophical commitments. The volume also reflects a methodological richness: it draws on historical, textual, and conceptual resources, and brings together scholars at various career stages. Together, these chapters move Du Châtelet scholarship into a new phase—one that takes seriously the unity and ambition of Du Châtelet’s thought, and that recognizes in her rationalism not merely an inheritance from others, but a distinct and consistently articulated vision of the nature of reason, knowledge, and the world.

I show that Leibniz’s account of divine concurrence is constrained in a surprising way by his commitment to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, where a sufficient reason for the existence of an entity or a state of affairs is understood to be the totality of requisites for its existence. I argue first that Leibniz endorses, in both his early and later metaphysics, the ‘totality of requisites’ conception of sufficient reason. I then show that this conception gives rise to a distinctive and underappreciated logical redundancy problem. Finally, I show that the logical redundancy problem can be side-stepped if we attribute to Leibniz the view that the states of any created substance are caused by God in a single act. On this view, God’s concurrence with creaturely activity is irreducibly plural: the natural effects or states of any created substance are brought about together, as a collective. I show that there are both philosophical and textual grounds for attributing such a view to Leibniz.

Can the human rights we recognize today be derived from the central Muslim text, the Qur’an? I will argue that they can, but that this requires reconceptualising the believer’s relationship to revelation. On the standard view, the believer is bound by all prescriptions in the Qur’an. By contrast, I will argue that the Qur’an prescribes two distinct kinds of norms—thin norms and thick norms—and only the latter have normative force here and now. With this novel framework for understanding Qur’anic norms on the table, I address two barriers to grounding human rights in the Qur’an: the problem of omission, according to which there are rights that we want to recognize that are seemingly missing in the Qur’an, and the problem of rejection, according to which the Qur’an seems committed to rejecting some rights that we do want to recognize. I will argue that both problems can be overcome.

Leibniz endorses the world apart doctrine, according to which a substance is that which is independent of all other things except God. However, I will argue that in what appears to be a radical departure from the causal version of the world apart doctrine, Du Châtelet—whose metaphysics appears to be Leibnizian from a distance—embraces the causal connectedness of created substances. I further show that Du Châtelet’s rejection of Leibniz’s claim that a substance is causally independent of all other created substances can be traced back to a more fundamental antiLeibnizian commitment on Du Châtelet’s part concerning the in-principle accessibility of natural (i.e., non-divine) sufficient reasons by finite minds and to her commitment to a causal theory of intentionality.

I show that unlike her rationalist predecessor Leibniz, Du Châtelet is committed to epistemic causal idealism about natural causes. According to this view, it is constitutive of natural causes that they are in principle knowable by us (i.e. finite intelligent beings). Du Châtelet’s causal idealism stems at least in part from the distinctive theoretical role played by the Principle of Sufficient Reason in her system (as presented in her Institutions de physique), as well as her argument for the Principle of Sufficient Reason. I show that far from merely explicating Leibniz’s metaphysics, Du Châtelet develops a radical and novel rationalism that is in keeping with her core commitment to science.

Epistemic injustice consists in a wrong done to someone in their capacity as a knower. I focus on epistemic injustice—more specifically, testimonial injustice—as it arises in the Qur’an. Verse 2:282 implies that the worth of a man’s testimony is twice that of a woman’s testimony. The divine norm suggested by the verse is in direct conflict with the norms that govern testimonial justice. These norms require that women should not be judged less reliable simply because they are women. But a divine norm that says that a woman’s testimony is worth less than a man’s also generates a puzzle for the norms that govern testimonial justice: when the divine norm that says that a woman’s testimony is worth half that of a man’s testimony is endorsed and internalised by Muslim women who then assert it, testimonial justice seems to require that we should take these women’s testimony to be less reliable than men’s testimony. I will argue that the solution to the puzzle lies in recognizing that the application of Quranic norms to a given situation requires getting some relevant facts right, and is not purely a matter of one’s values. As such, asserted Quranic norms are not subject to the deference characteristically demanded by testimonial justice.

Bertrand Russell was neither the first nor the last philosopher to engage in serious theorizing about propositions. But his work between 1903, when he published The Principles of Mathematics, and 1919, when his final lectures on logical atomism were published, remains among the most important on the subject. And its importance is not merely historical. Russell’s rapidly evolving treatment of propositions during this period was driven by his engagement with – and discovery of – puzzles that either continue to shape contemporary theorizing about propositions, or ought to do so. Russell’s creative responses to these puzzles also laid the foundation for many later accounts (most obviously, contemporary ‘Russellian’ accounts of propositions). In this entry we provide an opinionated overview of Russell’s influential treatment of propositions, with a focus on the evolution of his views from 1903 to 1919. A growing secondary literature is dedicated to Russell’s changing views during this period, and their often complex or opaque motivations. We do not intervene overmuch in this ongoing scholarly discussion. Instead, our aim is to trace some of the central motivations for Russell’s evolving views, and highlight the extent to which these motivations remain relevant to contemporary theorizing about propositions.

Can Muslim values be reconciled with a feminist outlook? The question is pressing on both an individual level—for Muslim feminists—and on a political level—for the project of making Islamic practice compatible with the ideals of a just and liberal society. A version of this question arises specifically for the central Muslim text, the Quran: can the message of the Quran be reconciled with a feminist outlook? There have, broadly speaking, been two approaches to this more specific question. I argue that both are inadequate. I then develop a novel approach to reconciliation that does not threaten the objective and universal normative force Muslims attribute to the Quran. My approach is revolutionary rather than apologetic, and carves out a central role for moral understanding in Islam-as-practiced.

ABSTRACT According to an important version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, every fact has a metaphysical explanation, where a metaphysical explanation of some fact tells us what makes it the case that the fact obtains. I argue that, so long as we have not yet discovered that any fact is brute, we ought to be committed to this version of the principle—henceforth ‘the PSR’—because it is indispensable to a species of inquiry in which we ought to engage. I argue, first, that a practical indispensability argument applied to this species of inquiry supports a commitment to the PSR. I then show that we ought to engage in this inquiry. If my argument succeeds, then our attitude at the outset of such inquiry should not be agnosticism about whether any particular fact has a metaphysical explanation. Instead, we ought to be committed to the PSR.

According to the Principle of Sufficient Reason (‘PSR’), every fact has an explanation for why it obtains. If the PSR is true, there must be a sufficient reason for why God chose to create our world. But a sufficient reason for God’s choice plausibly necessitates that choice. It thus seems that God could not have done otherwise, and that our world exists necessarily. We therefore appear forced to pick between the PSR, and the contingency of creation and divine choice. I show that a third option remains open, and thus that it is possible to preserve the contingency of creation and divine choice even while endorsing the PSR. My solution depends on the coherence of a restricted modal realism. On this modal realism, there is more than one possible morally optimal created world, and for each such world there is an existing possibility in which God creates that world.

It strikes many as obvious that negative facts—such as that Justin Trudeau is not the prime minister of Australia—are not fundamental: negative facts must ultimately be explained in terms of positive facts (for instance, that Justin Trudeau is the prime minister of Canada). I focus on a particular class of negative facts: contingent negative existentials (such as that there are no 10ft tall humans). If contingent negative existentials are not fundamental, then they must be explained. But the claim that contingent negative existentials are explained is in tension with the widely held view that any universal generalization can be explained by its instances together with a totality fact (i.e. a fact to the effect that the instances exhaust the relevant domain). This is because a totality fact is itself a negative existential, and equivalent to a universal generalization. If the explanation for any contingent negative existential must appeal to another contingent negative existential, then—unless there are no fundamental facts—not all contingent negative existentials can be non-fundamental. I argue that we should give up the age-old mantra that only positive facts can be fundamental. I show that at least some contingent negative existentials are fundamental. I first make the case for including a totality fact in the explanans for a contingent negative existential and show that alternative accounts for explaining such facts are inadequate. I then undermine the standard arguments for subscribing to the view that there are no negative facts—including negative existentials—at the fundamental level.

According to the Principle of Sufficient Reason (henceforth ‘PSR’), everything has an explanation or sufficient reason. This paper addresses three questions. First, how continuous is the contemporary notion of grounding with the notion of sufficient reason endorsed by Spinoza, Leibniz, and other rationalists? In particular, does a PSR formulated in terms of ground retain the intuitive pull and power of the PSR endorsed by the rationalists? Second, to what extent can the PSR avoid the formidable traditional objections levelled against it if it is formulated in terms of ground? And finally, how might historical discussion of the PSR shed light on the contemporary notion of grounding?

In his Problems of Philosophy, Bertrand Russell distinguished knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge of truths. This paper argues for a new interpretation of the relationship between these two species of knowledge. I argue that knowledge by acquaintance of an object neither suffices for knowledge that one is acquainted with the object, nor puts a subject in a position to know that she is acquainted with the object. These conclusions emerge from a thorough examination of the central role played by attention in Russell's theory of knowledge. Attention bridges the gap between knowledge by acquaintance and our capacity to form judgements about the objects of acquaintance.